TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.......................................................................................................................................................................................1
FOREWARD.............................................................................................................................................................................................................2
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................................................2
CHAPTER II: ORIGINS AND EARLY STRUGGLES ..............................................................................................................................................6
CHAPTER III: QUEST FOR STABILITY AND INFLUENCE ..............................................................................................................................16
CHAPTER IV: THE ATTAINMENT OF GOALS .................................................................................................................................................26
CHAPTER V: COPING AND MATURING IN THE REAGAN YEARS...............................................................................................................37
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................................................................47
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................................................................................................52

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have helped me with the preparation of this work, and I am pleased to acknowledge their assistance. The National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators provided a research grant which enabled me to spend time in Washington; they also made available their files and gave me free rein to explore as I wished. I am grateful to them for providing the funding which permitted me to conduct the research and for allowing me to pursue their history without restricting my inquiries. This freedom was understood from the beginning of the project, when a committee composed of Neil Bolyard, the Association’s Historian, Dallas Martin, its Executive Director, and William Bennett, its 1984-85 President, kindly selected me to receive the research grant. I hope they will find that the history thus produced justifies both their investment of financial resources and their faith in academic freedom.

The staff of the NASFAA central office, particularly Dallas Martin, Joan Holland, and Marty Guthrie, were unfailingly responsive to my persistent requests for additional data and insight. I am appreciative of their efforts. Numerous members of the Association gladly offered their comments in personal interviews; I am especially grateful for the opportunity to discuss my interpretations with Edson Sample, who probably knows more of the history of NASFAA than anyone else alive. I also deeply appreciate Ed Sample’s careful reading of a draft of this work and I am indebted to him for his insightful and helpful comments.

J. Allen Norris, Jr., President of Louisburg College, offered me generous release time from my duties at that institution so that I might conduct my research unfettered by daily work obligations. For his constant support and encouragement I am indeed thankful. In addition, I wish to acknowledge the willingness of staff members at the College to assume greater work burdens in my absence. I particularly wish to thank Phama Mullen, Director of Admissions, Missy Rose, Director of Financial Aid, and Carolyn White, Registrar, for their cheerful handling of these larger duties.

An earlier version of this study was prepared as a dissertation at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I am particularly indebted to Julio R. George, who directed my efforts and provided essential advice on numerous occasions. His friendship and support meant much during my years at the University. Other members of my committee, Samuel M. Holton, Donald G. Mathews, George W. Noblit, and Eugene R. Watson, also gave liberally of their time and effort in helping me focus the study, aiding me both in understanding the larger context of the Association’s history and in refining the conceptual framework employed in its study.

Finally, my wife, Jennie, and my children, Spence and Hunter, have been willing to surrender our evenings and weekends, normally spent in family pursuits, to the constant whirring of the word processor and to my resulting inattention to their needs. Their support throughout the research and writing has been crucial to my efforts, and I hope they will find the finished product to be worthy of the sacrifices they have made.

Steven Brooks
Louisburg, North Carolina
FOREWORD

Steven Brooks’ history chronicles many of the events and individuals that have been involved in developing the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators. This publication, the first of its kind, provides a written and well-documented record of the Association’s origins in 1966 through its first twenty years of existence. It traces the tentative beginnings of NASFAA through the establishment of its national office in Washington, D.C., in 1972, on into its current position of being the largest postsecondary institutionally-based organization in the nation’s capital and the premier association speaking on a national level for the interests of student financial assistance.

Those of us whose names appear below had the privilege of serving as president of the Association, and as such are mentioned throughout the pages of the text. While we all take great pride in the accomplishments of the past, the real strength of the Association has been and continues to be in its people. While no history can acknowledge fully the contributions made by the hundreds of members who have served and assisted NASFAA through the past two decades, we can be assured that the challenges of the future will continue to be met by the same kind of dedicated and professional people that have served in the past.

1966-1969 Allan W. Purdy, University of Missouri
1969-1970 Kenneth L. Wooten, University of Mississippi
1970-1971 H. Carroll Parish, University of California at Los Angeles
1971-1972 Grant E. Curtis, Tufts University
1972-1974 Eunice L. Edwards, Fisk University
1974-1975 Edson W. Sample, Indiana University
1975-1976 Robert B. Clark, Oklahoma State University
1976-1977 Mildred S. McAuley, Grossmont College
1977-1978 Joe L. McCormick, Mississippi State University
1978-1979 Neil E. Bolyard, West Virginia University
1979-1980 Robert P. Huff, Stanford University
1980-1981 Gene S. Miller, Pasadena City College
1981-1982 Donald E. Holec, Purdue University
1983-1984 Mary Haldane, Drake University
1984-1985 William R. Bennett, Cleveland State University
1985-1986 Gerald T. Bird, University of Alabama at Birmingham

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (NASFAA) began nearly twenty years ago as an effort on the part of a small group of aid administrators to coordinate more effectively the efforts of regional associations of financial aid. The early organization was fragile, incomplete, and utterly lacking in financial resources. What little political influence it mustered was based on the personal contacts of a few of its members, not upon the reputation of the organization itself. By the end of the 1960s the organization still lacked financial stability although it had begun significant internal development. Through its first decade of existence NASFAA struggled valiantly to exert an influence on the federal policies regarding student aid programs, yet, in the active legislative years of 1972 and 1976 the real influence lay with other organizations. After 1976, however, NASFAA had made sufficient progress in both its internal and environmental scanning mechanisms that it rapidly rose to a position of prominence.

(“Scanning” refers to the process of identifying future trends which will have an impact on the organization, either positive or negative. Scanning may be performed internally or upon the environment within which the organization exists. In this latter instance it may be termed “environmental” or “boundary” scanning). By 1978 the organization played a significant role in the creation of new financial aid legislation, and in 1980 its Executive Director actually drafted large portions both of the legislation which reauthorized the federal student assistance programs and of the regulations which would govern the campus administration of those programs.

Today NASFAA has become the largest institutionally based membership organization among the Washington, D.C., higher education associations. It has evolved into the major association speaking on a national level for the interests of student financial assistance. It has nearly 3,200 institutional members, a central office in Washington, a full-time staff of thirteen, an annual operating budget in excess of $1.8 million, and a strong influence on national policy regarding higher education based upon its recognized technical expertise and insight concerning student financial aid. The Association publishes a number of important and useful monographs and special reports, a newsletter, a scholarly journal, a series monitoring the regulatory proposals of the federal government concerning the administration of student aid programs (normally distributed well in advance of the appearance of these proposals in the official Federal Register). NASFAA also publishes other items of a specialized nature, including the recent Encyclopedia of Student Financial Aid, which provides an authoritative, comprehensive, and unique guide to the myriad of federal regulations governing aid programs. Both the scope and quality of NASFAA publications evince the Association’s expertise in the field of student financial aid.

The Politics of Federal Student Aid

The rise of NASFAA to such prominence has been inextricably bound to the larger history of federal involvement in student aid; a recounting of the details of the organization’s history should therefore provide insight into the larger context of federal philosophy related to student assistance. A number of scholars have
focused on federal aid policies in recent years, and much of their discussion has been devoted to federal policy goals.

Indeed, many writers have concluded that there have been no underlying goals for the federal role — that it has instead evolved in a piecemeal fashion, in response to transitory popular desires. Among these scholars is a view of the political process as strictly pragmatic; and while they give some recognition to the emphasis on aid to the needy shared by the major federal student assistance programs, they devote more attention to the peculiar nature and constituency of each program. Beck (1971) saw these programs as responses to particular situations, and thus he viewed each as narrow and independent of the others, seeing little overall goal or policy behind the federal efforts in student assistance. McCormick (1972) agreed with an interpretation of the aid programs as responses to historical circumstances, while Edward Sanders (1975) chose instead to accentuate the wide variety of interests to which policymakers reacted in developing the aid initiatives. Among those interests cited by Sanders were support to institutions of higher education and support to needy students. Van Dusen (1979, p. 4), argued that the federal government had made no “comprehensive attempt to achieve a coherent set of public purposes” during its nearly twenty-five years of offering aid to students in higher education. Jensen (1983, pp. 287-289) emphasized instead a series of federal objectives which changed according to the current political milieu, moving progressively from manpower enhancement in the 1950s to anti-poverty efforts in the 1960s, student-centered aid in the early 1970s, recognition of a politically potent middle class in the late 1970s, and retrogression under Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Fenske (1983, p. 11), while acknowledging the underlying support for higher education evinced by the federal aid programs, still referred to the efforts as a “patchwork quilt.” Herndon (1984, p. 3) agreed that there had been a “proliferation of programs” resulting from “the apparent absence of explicit purpose” in the federal efforts.

Other writers, however, have chosen to stress the underlying commitment to aiding the needy which has been demonstrated in the federal programs. Rudolph (1962), writing at the time a new anti-poverty consensus was forming in America, emphasized this goal of opening the doors of postsecondary education to all. After the 1965 Higher Education Act institutionalized this objective Henry (1969, p. 227) saw a “national commitment to equal access to higher education, regardless of financial ability.” Trotter (1975) extended the broad goal articulated by Henry, describing the commitment as promoting some measure of choice of educational experience as well as access to some form of higher education. Moon (1975) referred to this national purpose as an underlying concern with equality of educational opportunity, while Charles Saunders (1982) emphasized the loss of this common understanding during the Reagan presidency. Moore (1983), although emphasizing the differences in intent and administrative requirements of the various federal aid initiatives, chose also to stress the common bond of a basis in meeting the needs of those unable to pay their own way in colleges or universities. Higgins (1983) agreed that the programs shared this bond, while Gillespie and Carlson (1983) argued that of the existing federal programs, those which were “generally available” — authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act — evidenced a deep federal commitment to equalizing educational opportunity.

Among all the authors who have examined the purposes of the federal efforts in student financial assistance, Gladieux and Wolanin (1976) have perhaps offered the most satisfactory analysis of the federal policymaking field. They argue that by 1972 there had evolved in the United States a “basic consensus on the proper federal role in relation to higher education.” New policies, according to Gladieux and Wolanin, are historically not created through a vast uprooting of existing practices; rather, programs in place are the customary beginning points for subsequent federal activity. Current procedures and practices, that is, customarily and frequently define the practical limits of political debate. The same authors posited a model of the federal “policy arena,” in which are made national decisions relating to higher education. This arena, bounded by political realities as perceived by the actors within it, contains a subgovernment of close, longstanding connections among members and staffs of the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education, the Senate Subcommittee on Education, the U. S. Office (or Department) of Education and selected “Washington representatives of higher education associations” (p. 252). It is within this subgovernment that political actions are debated and decided. In the 1972 arena, Gladieux and Wolanin argue, NASFAA was not among those higher education associations comprising the true subgovernment. King (1975) has outlined the roles of the higher education associations and has confirmed the lack of influence of the aid administrators in the early 1970s.

Gladieux and Wolanin have further developed their model of the policy arena to account for three environmental factors which together form its boundaries. The first is termed “political culture,” the fundamental societal consensus which defines the limits of public debate. The culture reflects broad agreement on federal policy goals and the means to be employed in attaining those goals. This culture is not static; rather, it reflects “a moving consensus” (p. 255). By 1972 that culture was evolving toward the assumption by the federal government of a greater role in the field of higher education, aimed primarily at the quest for equal educational opportunity.

The second set of forces bounding the policy arena are public attitudes toward higher education. Insofar as higher education has come to be regarded as an enterprise essential both to the well-being of society and to the development of the potential of the individual within society, public support for higher education has increased. Nevertheless, Gladieux and Wolanin argue that there is an essential difference in the public attitudes supporting higher education and those surrounding, say, crime control. While both issues may be regarded by the general population as proper and even necessary areas for federal policy, the needs of higher education lack the urgency attached to crime control in the public perception. This view of aid to higher education as desirable but not pressing has colored the policy arena and the decisions made within it. This in turn is related to a third constraint on the policy arena, the availability of resources. While student aid had experienced a “bull market” (p. 256) through 1976 — as it would continue to do throughout the 1970s, the Gladieux and Wolanin model recognized the effect public attitudes regarding the urgency of higher education programs would have in an era of diminished resources.

The model of the policy arena bounded by a moving consensus reconciles the apparent conflict between those scholars who have emphasized the fragmented nature of diverse federal student aid...
programs which lack overall purpose and those who have instead stressed that an underlying theme of equal opportunity for higher education unites the modern federal efforts. Those who argue for “no goals” question the rationale behind a federal system offering to the general population three different grant and two different loan programs, depending upon three different methods of eligibility determination. Their response to this question has been the argument that aid programs have been targeted at momentarily popular social goals, often in reaction to a crisis real or perceived, with a lack of overall purpose or conceptual clarity, and in an irregular and haphazard fashion. This emphasis, insofar as it goes, seems quite accurate, and a compelling case can be made in its support. Yet it misses the underlying ideology which has evolved in support of federal involvement in student financial aid. This ideology is the political culture defined by Gladieux and Wolanin; its evolving consensus had not yet been fully articulated in 1958 when the National Defense Education Act was passed by Congress. By 1972 the consensus had been formed around the rationale of equal opportunity, probably as much because of Lyndon Johnson’s assault on poverty as for any other reason. Since 1972 the consensus has experienced numerous shifts; it continues and must by its nature continue to undergo modification.

Perhaps it is this changeable nature of the underlying ideology which has caused Van Dusen (1979) to muse that the federal efforts have the appearance of Rube Goldberg architecture; nevertheless, he concluded, the system which Goldberg could well have designed has one uniting feature: it works well for large numbers of students. Perhaps this good effect is achieved because, no matter how diverse in appearance the programs are, they are all reasonably consistent with the underlying ideology of democracy in the United States. Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter, each in different ways and at different times, emphasized the desirability of a national commitment to access to higher education regardless of family ability to pay its ever-increasing costs. Even the Reagan Administration, with its antipathy to domestic spending for the social welfare, has been unable to argue publicly against this national consensus. Their arguments instead have focused on overexpenditures in an era of finite resources, claiming that federal largesse has undermined the traditional family responsibility to finance postsecondary education when able to do so. Their case against student aid, then, has been made not on the basis of public disagreement with the rationale underlying it, but rather on grounds that it has become excessive. The public attitudes bounding the policy arena, then, appear to continue to support the role of the federal government in providing access to educational opportunity. The consensus has shifted, but its shifts have come within a narrow band of pervasive public agreement; it would require a revolution in basic values seemingly beyond even the popularity of the Reagan reaction to effect a denial of the goal of equal opportunity.

Even student aid critic Chester Finn (1985), current Assistant Secretary for Educational Research and Improvement in the United States Department of Education, in arguing for the “desanctification” of student aid, has emphasized the underlying rationale which supports the existing programs. Finn tends to see aid efforts as value-free; that is, he stresses the market forces which are affected by the aid programs. He argues that the federal role has been rather fragmented because it is based upon a divided understanding of who benefits from higher education — sometimes the individual, sometimes the society at large, and sometimes the institutions of higher education themselves have been viewed by policymakers as the intended beneficiaries of federal financial aid. Yet even in this somewhat jaundiced view of the philosophy behind federal student assistance Finn acknowledges common purposes which engender that assistance. “The primary rationale underlying most of the large federal student aid programs,” he admits, concerns three related ideas — increasing “social mobility,” fostering “equality of opportunity,” and lessening “the importance of private wealth” (p. 3). It is revealing of the depth of the prevailing political culture that even five years into the “Reagan revolution” Finn argues of means rather than ends.

Sources for a History of NASFAA

NASFAA, then, has existed during a period of remarkable consistency within a strong and stable political culture. Indeed, the Association, in its own philosophy of emphasis on the welfare of students rather than of institutions, has in many ways served for its members as the practical embodiment of that culture. Little has been written on the history of NASFAA; aside from two brief, unpublished papers prepared a decade ago, there is no secondary literature on the Association’s history.

There does exist a collection of primary documents, including copies of Minutes, correspondence, publications, reports and records of committees, and the NASFAA Oral History Project tapes. This last resource contains approximately seventy hours of the recorded recollections of key individuals from the student aid community, representing a time period of roughly 1954-1983. In addition, there is Edson Sample’s NASFAA Fact Book, which contains a collection of numerous Association documents and statistics in a format which is revised quarterly to reflect additional information. This reference is an invaluable guide to the history of NASFAA; it presents a variety of data without editorial comment. Further, since the Association is still relatively young, most of its members are still living and available for personal interviews when needed. Taken together, these primary sources provide a rich set of materials for the historian.

Benefits of a History of NASFAA

A study of NASFAA’s history would be worthwhile in itself for the members of the Association. More importantly, however, such a study can also reveal additional knowledge of the political arena and the underlying culture within which NASFAA has existed. From a history of the Association we may expect to gain a better understanding of federal policymaking for higher education — who have been the principal players within the policy arena and how have the subgovernment and its underlying political culture evolved over the past two decades of NASFAA’s existence? While such a study would not be designed as an intensive analysis of federal policymaking, it should provide a perspective on the higher education policy arena.

Another potential use of a study of the history of NASFAA may be to reveal elements of the behavior of a certain type of organization. Blau and Scott (1962) classified organizations according to the concept of cui bono — who benefits. Using this concept they identified four distinct possibilities: business organizations, which operate for the purposes of their owners; mutual benefit organizations, which exist to serve their members; service
organizations, which are centered on their clients’ interests; and commonweal organizations, which are designed to benefit the public at large.

Each of these organizational types has a different set of central problems and characteristics. The business organization confronts the problem of maximizing efficiency in a competitive situation. The mutual benefit organization has the central problem of maintaining internal democracy, avoiding both member apathy and oligarchical control. The possibilities of apathy and oligarchy are related; as more members become apathetic and leave the running of the organization to others, there is a greater chance that a ruling elite will emerge. Further, the existence of such an oligarchy, barring actions on its part which inflame the passions of the rank and file, tends to promote the apathetic attitude among members that the organization runs well enough without additional member input. Service organizations must deal with the conflict inherent between the interests of their clients and the administrative procedures which may frustrate the professional orientation of their members. The components of professionalism, especially those dealing with autonomy in decision-making and collegial support, can create conflict with the rule-oriented, hierarchical model of some service organizations. In these settings the classic dysfunctions of bureaucracy seem magnified. The final organizational type, the commonweal organization, has as its central problem the development of democratic mechanisms which the public (its beneficiary) can control. While at first glance NASFAA would seem to be a mutual benefit organization, further exploration of its history may reveal the Association to bear characteristics of more than one of the Blau and Scott types. This seems particularly likely given the stated values of the Association, which are centered primarily on the well-being of the student-client, and the underlying rationale for student aid as benefiting not only the individual student but also the public at large.

The work of Peters and Waterman (1982) can also supply an effective method of focus in approaching NASFAA’s history as a study of organizational behavior over time. Their study of the excellence of corporations was derived from their McKinsey 7-S Framework, which rejects the normative, rationalist approach to studies of organizational behavior and moves beyond the traditional dichotomy of emphasis on either structure or people. Rather than viewing an organization in terms of the conflict between its structural arrangements and its effective use of its human resources, the McKinsey 7-S model proposes a set of seven interdependent variables as the focus for inquiry. Each of these variables is related to the others, and they are all clustered around a centerpiece, called organizational culture or shared values.

The model lends itself to a study of an organization over time as well as to a present day inspection of operations; by looking at each component variable of the organization during different periods of its past one may learn much about its evolutionary processes. For the sake of simplicity, Peters and Waterman described each variable with a word beginning with an “s” — strategies, systems, structure, skills, style, staff, and shared values. Of these the first three are related to the task orientation of the organization, while the next three are more descriptive of its relationship orientation. They are united by the seventh variable, shared values.

Strategies represent the goals of the organization as well as its specific plans for the attainment of those goals. Systems are the precise institutional arrangements made in order to effect these strategies; the systems are designed to accomplish specified tasks related to organizational input, throughput, output, boundary scanning, and the like. Structure refers specifically to the organizational chart. Is the organization hierarchical or more democratic? Is it the same in reality as on paper? Structure also includes those systems which relate to the goal of organizational viability; in that sense structure represents the “macro-system” of an organization. Skills refer to the present and potential abilities of the organization’s members and leaders; in an Association such as NASFAA they would describe the expectations of the membership. The style of the organization illustrates its methods of managing its concerns; does its style, for example, foster the development and effective use of organizational resources, or does it instead lead to inefficiency and duplication of effort? The staff must be included among the variables since, regardless of what structural elements are in place or what expectations the membership may have about the functioning of an association, the organization can only be as good as are the people who run its day to day operations.

A final benefit to be derived from a study of the history of NASFAA may be insight into the emergence of a new administrative level in higher education. While the standard works on the history of American education inform their readers concerning the larger context of postsecondary education (cf. Cremin, Rudolph, Brubacher, Jencks and Riesman, Brubacher and Rudy, and Sanford), there is little mention within them of student aid. The subject is a relatively recent phenomenon in the history of American higher education, at least insofar as its importance to the success of the enterprise is concerned. Perhaps a history of the major Association representing the interests of those who administer the aid programs will reveal the central values which have shaped this new area. Those values, of course, have not developed in a vacuum, and more general works on social history of the United States during the formative years of the Association will also be helpful. Three of the best of these are Matusow (1982), Viorst (1981), and O’Neill (1972).

Methodology

The method employed in this study of NASFAA, then, will encompass an appreciation of the larger social history of the United States and the role of higher education within that history. It will also emphasize the organizational theories of Blau and Scott and Peters and Waterman while attempting to reveal something of the working of the federal political process over the past thirty years. The procedure chosen for this analysis is a chronological review of the operations of the Association, with purposive emphasis on the McKinsey 7-S Framework variables and the problems identified by Blau and Scott as central to various types of organizations.
CHAPTER II: ORIGINS AND EARLY STRUGGLES

Background
With the passage of the National Defense Education Act of 1958, the United States entered a new era in its longstanding support for higher education. While student aid, based on need for funding, had existed since 1643 (when Lady Anne Mowlson made a gift of one hundred pounds to Harvard University for the benefit of a “poor scholler”), governmental support had not customarily been centered on student assistance. The appropriation of public lands for universities in admitting new states in the early nineteenth century and the creation of the land grant colleges in 1862 characterized the limited role of the federal government in higher education prior to the twentieth century. With the depression of the 1930s came a variety of government programs designed to assist individuals; among these the National Youth, Administration included funds for the employment of college students. This program, however, was designed with the same basic idea as other New Deal efforts: to “provide young people with something to do” as opposed to providing assistance to promote access to higher education (Purdy, Parish, and Wooten, 1975, p. 1).

In 1944 the “G.I. Bill” enabled thousands of veterans of the armed forces to pay the costs of postsecondary education; this Act, which represented the desire of the nation to reward its veterans for their military service, had the secondary impact of popularizing the idea that large numbers of people could benefit from a college education (McCormick, 1972).

Still, in the decade after World War II there was no popular demand for federal involvement in student assistance. In 1957, however, an external event galvanized public opinion. The Soviet launching of Sputnik in the fall of that year evoked an outcry from the American people, who were culturally unprepared to be second-best in anything, especially second to the Russians in outer space. Would the Soviets press their new scientific superiority into advanced weaponry? How had Americans allowed such a dangerous event to take place? Who was to blame for the apparent American inferiority? Certainly not the Congress, that body promptly asserted. The real problem, the Congress said, lay in “the ‘weakness’ of the American educational system” and required a “new, dynamic, and total commitment to the problems facing higher education” (McCormick, 1972).

The National Defense Education Act was one result of this new “commitment.” If America lacked scientists and mathematicians, it must find them. To do so it must be certain that no talented individual would be denied an opportunity for the training required to develop his or her needed skills. Among the provisions of the new Act was the National Defense Student Loan (NDSL) program, designed to assist needy students planning studies in science or mathematics or preparing to become educators in those subjects. Unlike the G.I. Bill, this aid was to be based on a demonstrated need for funds; it was to function not as a reward for prior service but as a means of assuring the nation an adequate supply of people trained in essential fields. While this aid was therefore targeted at a special group, its emphasis on demonstrated need as a qualification for assistance set a precedent for future federal efforts. Also important for the future was the provision that NDSL would be administered not through a central lending bank, but on campuses participating in the program.

From the beginning of this new federal involvement in addressing the goal of access to higher education, then, there was a reliance on the ability of the campus to administer the available aid. At the time of passage of the National Defense Education Act of 1958, there was no federal definition of “need.” There was simply a vague requirement in the law that loan funds be awarded exclusively to those “in need” of assistance; yet no guidance was offered on how those students were to be identified. This lack of regulation, according to Peter Muirhead, Executive Deputy Commissioner of the U.S. Office of Education, was intentional. The “concept of turning to the university community,” he recalled, was already established; consequently the “federal government relied upon the college community to determine need” (Muirhead, 1980).

Many institutions, when left with this flexibility, elected to use the methodology which had been recently developed by the College Scholarship Service (CSS) of the College Entrance Examination Board (Moore, 1983, p. 44).

This group, which was directed by Rexford Moon from a New York headquarters, based much of its early efforts into need analysis on the work of John Munro, Director of Financial Aid at Harvard. The Harvard system of measuring need had been refined by a group of western colleges and universities, which developed common procedures and forms for the analysis. A group of eastern institutions then brought about a similar process of refinement, and by 1956 a tentative national system, developed by the higher education community for use in awarding institutional aid, was in place. Edward Sanders, who later served as Director of the College Board’s Washington office, has argued that the earliest motive for the development of the College Scholarship Service system involved not only a dedication to equal opportunity but also a desire to avoid expensive competition for student enrollment. By having a standard system designed to measure the ability to pay, institutions could have a rationale for offering assistance to prospective students; by agreeing on a common system they could avoid “bidding” on a student (Sanders, 1982). Regardless of motive, however, the establishment of a system based upon measuring the ability of a student and his or her family to pay for the costs of education provided the beginnings of a philosophy that aid should be awarded on the basis of need. The system also provided a reason for financial aid administrators to meet together, first in developing and refining the methodology and later in training themselves and their colleagues in computation of need (Purdy et al., 1975, pp. 2-3).

Those who attended these early meetings were rather a diverse group of collegiate employees; only a few colleges and universities had by 1958 designated any individual by title similar to “Director of Financial Aid.” Existing scholarships and other forms of aid had been administered in a variety of ways at different institutions. With the ascendency of the College Scholarship Service idea of need-based assistance, however, colleges began increasingly to recognize the desirability of having at least one administrator trained in need analysis. This recognition was hastened by the passage of the NDSL program, and newly designated aid administrators were drawn from the ranks of faculty members, admissions officers, and student services personnel (Huff, 1985, pp. 98-99).

While the College Scholarship Service was the dominant group in the early training and associational activities of the members of a newly emerging branch of higher educational administration, two other groups were also active in exploring financial aid issues.
One, which was devoted to the concerns of Deans of Students, was the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators. The second group, the American College Personnel Association (ACPA), was more concerned with the interests of counselors. Both groups established “commissions” to work on financial aid administration; but neither group made a real commitment to soliciting the membership of financial aid administrators on a national basis. While some aid administrators did join each association, it remained the College Scholarship Service which was seen as the national organization for these new professionals (Purdy et al., 1975, p.2).

By the early 1960s the College Scholarship Service (and its parent organization, the College Entrance Examination Board), had developed influence over national policy, as had the umbrella presidential higher education association, the American Council on Education (ACE). Insofar as postsecondary educators helped determine governmental policy on education, federal efforts in the early 1960s were primarily shaped by these two bodies. “We were the experts ... there was no question in ... our minds,” said Rexford Moon. When Lyndon Johnson wanted advice regarding higher education, he called on Moon or John Munro (Moon, 1979). Others have agreed that the College Board and ACE dominated the higher education scene in the early 1960s. Ed Sanders, of the College Board, recalled working closely with John (Jack) Morse of ACE during this period (Sanders, 1982).

Yet more influential than the higher education community itself was the prevailing spirit of the early 1960s. During the Kennedy Administration longstanding concerns in Congress regarding both the expansion of the federal role in higher education and the thorny issues concerning separation of church and state continued to block increased federal student aid programs. These concerns, which had been temporarily suspended in the defense “emergency” of 1958, were put aside again after Kennedy’s assassination and the landslide election of Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Johnson swept into office with him a liberal congressional majority the likes of which had not been seen since the New Deal experienced electoral setbacks in 1938; with this new majority it became possible once again to enact sweeping new social policies designed to benefit those excluded from the mainstream in America (Moynihan, 1986).

In this new political climate the old reservations regarding proper federal government roles gave way to a growing national commitment to the ideology of equal opportunity. This ideology was reflected in the War on Poverty and Great Society domestic initiatives of the Johnson Administration. The concern with poverty in the midst of plenty produced programs such as Medicare; concerns over equality were expressed in passage of civil rights, voting rights, and housing legislation. In education, as in other areas, this growing commitment overcame the earlier reservations with enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Less visible, but of genuine significance, was the increased federal student aid programs. These concerns, which had been temporarily suspended in the defense “emergency” of 1958, were put aside again after Kennedy’s assassination and the landslide election of Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Johnson swept into office with him a liberal congressional majority the likes of which had not been seen since the New Deal experienced electoral setbacks in 1938; with this new majority it became possible once again to enact sweeping new social policies designed to benefit those excluded from the mainstream in America (Moynihan, 1986).

In this new political climate the old reservations regarding proper federal government roles gave way to a growing national commitment to the ideology of equal opportunity. This ideology was reflected in the War on Poverty and Great Society domestic initiatives of the Johnson Administration. The concern with poverty in the midst of plenty produced programs such as Medicare; concerns over equality were expressed in passage of civil rights, voting rights, and housing legislation. In education, as in other areas, this growing commitment overcame the earlier reservations with enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Less visible, but of genuine significance, was the Higher Education Act of 1965, which focused on student aid and which attained bipartisan support in the Congress (Gladeix and Wolamin, 1976, pp. 3-18). This Act broadened the existing NDSL program and moved the College Work-Study (CWS) program, which had begun the previous year in the Office of Economic Opportunity, to the Office of Education. In addition, the new Act established a federal grant program titled Educational Opportunity Grants (EOG). These three programs — NDSL, CWS, and EOG — were based on campus for administration in accordance with legislated eligibility requirements. An added program, the Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL), was also devised as a financing mechanism for those students unable to secure NDSL funds, either due to ineligibility or to insufficient allocations to the campus of the student’s choice (G. Miller, 1975).

Emergence of Associations for Aid Administrators

With the establishment of these new and substantial programs of student assistance by the federal government, the role of the campus financial aid administrator was magnified. This accelerated the trend among institutions to designate an individual responsible for administering student aid. The resulting growth of this administrative specialty had significant consequences on the existing student aid community. While numerous administrators of financial aid worked at institutions holding membership in CSS, increasingly they expressed reservations about the capability of that group to serve the individual needs of aid professionals. Such sentiments had arisen prior to the 1965 legislation. Ronald Brown, an aid administrator instrumental in early activities of the community, has recalled that many aid administrators indicated discomfort with the image of the College Board “as a snob, Eastern seaboard organization.” More practical concerns, too, were present; professional organizations governed by aid administrators themselves might lead to increased campus recognition of the importance of this newly emerging administrative area (Brown, 1979).

Neither was ACPA membership viewed by many as entirely satisfactory. While Commission V of ACPA functioned “as a financial aid organization within a broader base” of student personnel and led to political involvement in providing Congressional testimony (Huff, 1979) a number of aid administrators began calling for a different pattern of organization — a pattern which recognized financial aid as the primary business of an association.

This concern was partially addressed by regional groups of aid administrators in the early 1960s. Building on a base established in Big Ten and Big Eight football conferences, aid administrators in the Midwest began meeting on an informal basis in the 1950s. Administrators from other states sometimes joined in these meetings, and among topics discussed were the need for regional and national organizations of aid administrators. Gradually a consensus developed that a formal regional association could have benefit; yet there were serious reservations about the need for a national group. Essentially these concerns related to the ready availability of ACE, CSS, and other organizations which could represent institutions of higher education. Action was thus deferred on establishing a national body, or even on suggesting a confederation of regional associations.

In October, 1962, however, a group of nearly 100 aid administrators met at Purdue University, for a discussion of associational needs. At the close of this session the Midwest Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (MASFAA) was formally organized. This pioneer group was followed by the formation of the Southwestern Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (SWASFAA) in November, 1962, the Southern Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (SASFAA) in February, 1963, and the Eastern Association of Student Financial
Aid Administrators (EASFAA) in October, 1966. Aid administrators in the Rocky Mountain and Western regions had not by the end of 1966 organized formally. Some of them were meeting together, however — generally under the auspices of CSS (Sample, 1986).

With regional groupings in place a number of aid administrators again began to call for a national organization. Others still found reasons to object. Rex Moon, as Director of the College Scholarship Service, could see little rationale for aid administrators leaving the well-financed operation of CSS in order to start their own poor, struggling one; he had little sympathy for the concerns of aid administrators such as Allan Purdy, George Risty, and Carroll Parish that an institutional organization such as CSS could not represent those aid administrators employed by non-member institutions (Moon, 1979). Others, such as Robert Huff, felt that CSS was sufficient for the needs of aid administrators and opposed a proliferation of organizations (Huff, 1979). It was this sentiment which prohibited Westerners from forming even a regional association separate from CSS.

The Founding of a National Association

Yet by late 1966 those with reservations expressed a minority viewpoint within the aid community. No individual vocalized the necessity for national structure more forcefully than did Allan Purdy, who in October, 1966, called together representatives of the existing regions along with aid administrators from the east and the west. This group, which met during a CSS conference at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York, voted to form the “National Student Financial Aid Council” (NSFAC). Much of the motivation behind the organizational session of this group of aid administrators — which had been meeting earlier on a “semi-regular basis” — was to develop a formal body which could represent the political interests of student aid at the national level in a timely and forceful manner. The regional groups could identify concerns, but without national coordination there was no effective voice for their views. CSS might have represented the aid administrators in this regard, but many found that organization, as a part of the College Board, too cautious in its approach to political issues (Purdy, 1979). The NSFAC created in 1966, then, was a device to coordinate and give voice to regional points of view. It was not, however, a creation of the regional associations themselves. Indeed, two of the regions had not yet formed their own organizations; those which were functional sent no official representatives to the organizational meeting. Rather, the aid administrators who gathered at the Waldorf were self-appointed volunteers. It remained for them to establish a structure which would appeal to all aid administrators in the nation.

The very name chosen for the new national organization reflected the magnitude of this task. There existed considerable diversity of opinion among members of the aid community regarding the necessity of having a national organization at all. The name “Council” rather than “Association” was selected in deference to the view that a proliferation of professional associations was to be avoided. Bob Huff, along with other Westerners, continued to believe that CSS could serve effectively as the professional development vehicle for the aid administrator; it was only after the advent of competitive financial aid services by the American College Testing Program (ACT) that Huff and his colleagues acquiesced in the formation of the Western Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (WASFAA) in January, 1969, following the establishment of the Rocky Mountain Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (RMASFAA) in October, 1968. (Purdy et al., 1975, pp. 4-5; Sample, 1986). In its first three years of existence, then NSFAC represented “sort of a rag-tail six regional associational membership” (Wooten, 1979), operating in the main as a national coordinator of and spokesperson for regional members.

At the initial meeting in October, 1966, the group formed the Council and elected its first set of officers — Purdy of Missouri as Chairman, L. W. Davis of Tuskegee Institute as Vice-Chairman, and John Jones of Arkansas A&M as Secretary-Treasurer. They also discussed professional placement activities, which had been a function under ACPA Commission V, and asked that Purdy advise “various committee heads in Washington” of the founding of the Council. Having accomplished this, the group adjourned (National Council Minutes, October 24, 1966).

In February, 1967, the Council met again, and this time the agenda included items which would mark the structure of the organization’s future. James Moore, from the United States Office of Education (USOE), attended the meeting to provide information regarding Washington developments relating to financial aid. This set two important precedents: first, the council would devote significant portions of its deliberations to development of a knowledge base regarding federal initiatives; second, “liaison representatives” from USOE, ACE, CSS, ACT, and other members of the higher education establishment would be invited to attend all Council sessions (National Council Minutes, February 12-13, 1967).

The Structure of the Council

At this same meeting, Council instructed the officers to form a committee to develop a constitution and by-laws; this effort was approached cautiously and took nearly three years to complete. During that time the Council continued to use the structure established at its initial meeting. Allan Purdy, whose personal efforts had led in large measure to the formation of NSFAC, was elected Chairman again in 1967 and 1968 (terms ran from October to October); the work of Council during these years bore the mark of his legislative acumen and devotion to student aid issues. In October, 1969, however, Purdy announced that he would not accept another term as “President,” as the office was to be called in the new constitution then pending regional ratification. (Although he never bore the title of President during his terms of service, Purdy was accorded recognition, upon ratification of the constitution, as the organization’s first President.) Kenneth Wooten of Mississippi was elected to serve as the second President of the organization, and Carroll Parish of California was chosen President-Elect, to succeed Wooten in 1970-71. Another new office, that of Vice-President, was filled by Grant Curtis of Massachusetts (National Council Minutes, October 25, 1969).

Upon leaving office Purdy reiterated his often expressed concern that the Council continually seek ways to broaden its base — calling for increased representation among women, minorities, and aid administrators from two-year colleges (National Council Minutes, October 25, 1969). Even at its initial meeting Purdy had stressed awareness that in order to become an effective force in the higher education community and before Congress, NSFAC
would have to be broadly representative of all aid administrators. He had made certain that the initial meeting had been attended by aid administrators from all six regions of the nation, including those which had no formal organization themselves, and that a balance was achieved regarding race as well as institutional sector and size. Purdy would later remember with pride that he never called a meeting without representation by all regions, nor without representation by blacks and women. This balance was a matter of fairness, of course, but Purdy was also aware of its practical importance: in going to Congress with a united viewpoint, based on wide representation, Purdy could speak with a stronger voice for NSFAC. “If we truly represented,” he remembered, “then the different factions had to be heard” (Purdy, 1979).

The work of the Council under Purdy was conducted through a number of committees, usually appointed for brief durations in regard to a specific situation. Under Ken Wooten this use of committees was increased. One on-going committee, however, stood out from the rest: Allan Purdy would coordinate a legislative advisory group of regional representatives as Chairman of the State-Federal Relations committee. This activity would clearly continue to be the primary external focus of the organization. Two additional standing committees related to federal relations were also appointed: one dealing with current concerns and the other to focus on future possibilities. A new committee was formed to coordinate professional development activities, pointing to an increased future role in training, placement, and consulting. Among the committees appointed four were devoted exclusively to internal affairs: communications (publications), constitution and by-laws revision, membership representation, and “means of funding NSFAC activities.” Clearly the Council still had need to focus on its own development (National Council Minutes, October 26, 1969). One aspect of that development, at least, had jelled by late 1969; the pending constitution and by-laws achieved ratification by all six regions. Under this constitution the organization received a new name, the “National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators” (NASFAA), retaining a “National Council” as its governing body (Purdy et al., 1975, p. 6).

Financial Limitations

With NASFAA officially in existence, the National Council began during 1969-70 to explore mechanisms for strengthening its role as representative of the student aid community. In May, 1969, Council had already determined to conduct its own regular meetings in the future rather than “piggybacking” on scheduled conferences of CSS or other organizations. Further, the new constitution made formal the official representation of regional associations on Council: each region was entitled to select three of its members to serve at the national level. The President-Elect was to be chosen by the resulting Council, from among its own members. With these structural decisions made, the Council could turn to ways of attracting the notice of practicing financial aid administrators. Among the possibilities proposed were the publication of a national newsletter and a journal, the establishment of a central office for the Association, and the holding of a national conference (National Council Minutes, 1970).

Constantly limiting all such ventures was the dismal financial situation of NSFAC/NASFAA. While Rex Moon may have underestimated the determination of aid administrators to become directly involved in political discussion, he had accurately gauged the financial hardship their new organization would undergo. At the initial 1966 meeting the Council had requested contributions of $50 per region. While all regions complied with the request, the total income thus derived was meager. By October, 1967, the Treasurer reported a bank account balance of only $87.45 and stated the obvious: there “will be a need for additional funds” (National Council Minutes, October 22, 1967). The National Student Financial Aid Council survived during this time through “pinching off” institutional travel budgets and through the personal financial sacrifices of its members (Franklin, 1983).

Indeed, funds were in such short supply that it was October, 1969, before the National Council recorded its first serious discussion of a working budget. By that time dues of $5.00 per regional member were being assessed by NASFAA, meaning a possible operating budget for the year of nearly $10,000 (Sample, 1981, p. 2). While this income seemed large compared with that generated by the prior system, it was still scarcely sufficient to cover the costs of travel, supplies, and operating expenses; much less did it seem to allow for publication of the desired newsletter in a reasonable quality or frequency. By March, 1970, the Treasurer, citing a financial crisis, called on the officers and legislative liaison Purdy to refrain from making additional travel commitments. Even so, council was reluctant to ask for more dues from NASFAA members; Edson Sample of Indiana, deferring to the desires of several other Council members to consult their respective regions prior to endorsing any increase, was forced to withdraw a motion to raise the dues assessment to $10 per regional member (National Council Minutes, March 16, 1970).

Such consultations slowed the process of obtaining additional funding; it was August of the same year before council voted to adopt the increase Sample had earlier recommended. Since July 1 had been used by NASFAA as the date governing regional payment of dues per member, the opportunity to effect the increase during 1970 was lost, and the Association had to be content with expecting the additional revenues beginning July 1, 1971. Even then there was concern regarding potential regional opposition, and President-Elect Grant Curtis volunteered to prepare a chart showing possible national activities at the present and proposed dues levels. The resulting table clearly depicted the organization’s priority on legislative matters as well as a commitment to some strengthening of its ability to communicate with members; its expanded services under the enlarged budget were designed to provide the appropriate organizational systems for the attainment of its goals. It maintained legislative activities at $7,500 per year under revenues of either $10,000 or $20,000; it provided for a central office and newsletters, at drastically different levels of support, under each budget. Added under the proposed increase, in addition to expanded roles for the central office and newsletter, were funding levels for publication of a journal, placement service activities, a recognition award, a brochure depicting NASFAA, and a contingencies fund (Sample, 1981, pp. 3-4).

Even this increase, it was clear to many, would be insufficient to conduct the affairs of NASFAA as National Council wished. Consequently the Council began to investigate alternative sources of revenue. Plans were made to request a Sloan Foundation grant of $40,000 over a three-year period; unfortunately these plans had
to be canceled since NASFAA lacked tax-exempt status. President Parish therefore moved the Association into an investigation of incorporation, reporting to Council in September, 1971 that it might be financially beneficial to establish two separate and distinct corporations (Sample, 1981, pp. 4-5). Others elaborated on this idea; Ken Wooten circulated a paper in the fall of 1971 which brought to the attention of National Council the need to investigate structural changes. Wooten called for the establishment of a social welfare (mutual-benefit), dues-based corporation to be known as the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators. He further suggested the creation of a second corporation, made up of those institutions of higher education whose aid administrators were on its Board, organized for “educational purposes” and soliciting income from “foundations, government, business, or individuals for the purpose of educational research, publication of professional journals, preparation of educational training materials, workshops, seminars, and similar non-political endeavors” (Wooten 1971, pp. 3-6). As 1971 ended, then, NASFAA was earnestly considering means of providing itself with a structure which would lead to goal attainment.

Organizational Goals

These goals, from the 1966 organizational meeting on, had been largely understood by the membership of Council. By creating their own “Council” they had attained the desired outlet for individual activity within an organization totally devoted to their area of expertise; by forming a new group, separate from CSS, they had expanded their opportunities for involvement in the political process. These two motives which led to the founding of NSFAC became the initial goals of the organization.

The outlet for involvement in the political process particularly intrigued a number of influential members. Ken Wooten, for example, has recalled that it was the desire to have a mechanism of translating regional concerns into national activity which led him to attend the first Council meeting. Everything else was secondary to the opportunity to be heard by policymakers (Wooten, 1979). Even the slogan chosen for the stationery printed during the first year of NSFAC’s existence revealed the underlying organizational goal: “Representing Student Financial Aid Administrators in Higher Education” (National Council Minutes, February 12-13, 1967).

Other goals came later, but these remained secondary to legislative advocacy during the first years of NSFAC/NASFAA’s existence. Allan Purdy was instrumental in those years in bringing the name of the new organization to the attention of Congressional and USOE staff, just as his interest in legislative matters had given impetus to the founding of NSFAC, so did his personal involvement in this area translate into organizational strategies. Under his leadership the vast bulk of Council work and resources, other than that devoted to internal structure, was related to legislative concerns. This emphasis continued under President Wooten; the membership brochure printed for the 1969-70 year explained that NASFAA had expended “most of its energies to date ... representing the profession in Washington.” Wooten also advocated the practice of organizational liaison, calling upon NASFAA to work on building effective relationships with other higher education associations and government agencies, to the purpose of attaining greater recognition of the importance both of student aid and of those who administer it (Sample, 1986, p. 1.1.1). Carroll Parish, in 1970-71, gave increased attention to the goal of training and professional development, supporting projects such as the “training the trainers” of aid administrators, the holding of a national “Leadership Conference,” and the publication of a journal. Even with this added emphasis on the goal of professional development, Parish later stated, during his term of office NASFAA continued to devote so much time and effort to legislative matters that services to members suffered (Parish, 1979).

Under the leadership of Grant Curtis the goals of the past years were restated, together, as a set of objectives to which the Association aspired. Three broad areas of associational endeavors existed, declared Curtis: first, the establishment of effective liaison with other educational organizations and aid agencies; second, the devotion of resources to the advancement of the profession through training and development; and third, the active involvement of the Association in legislative advocacy (Sample, 1986, p. 1.3.1-1.3.3). While each of these goals had origins in the beginnings of NASFAA, Curtis had articulated them clearly and systematically for the first time.

Using his expression of the goals in 1971, it is possible to see how NSFAC/NASFAA strategies had unfolded during the preceding five years. Liaison, for instance, was discussed at the first Council meeting when Purdy was asked to inform various agency heads in Washington of the founding of NSFAC. It continued as representatives of diverse groups of government and higher education organizations were invited to participate in subsequent National Council meetings. Among the early visitors to Council meetings were James Moore of USOE and Jack Morse of ACE, as well as representatives of CSS and ACT. President Parish in 1970, continuing the work of President Wooten, established an active committee devoted to organizational liaison. Underlying all this effort was a keen awareness of the need to be regarded by the entire higher education community — and especially by its student aid component — as a legitimate organization entitled to speak for the interests of student aid programs and administrators. Such recognition, the early leaders of NSFAC and NASFAA instinctively understood, would lead to greater influence on aid issues; it would lead to NASFAA “membership” in the higher education “subgovernment” itself.

Professional development, too, was an area of interest to NSFAC from its earliest stages; yet before the emergence of ACT as a rival service to CSS there was little reason to offer formal training opportunities. Once the competition between the two service agencies intensified, however, NSFAC had to begin to give serious consideration to an impartial training effort. Further, since USOE lacked the staff to conduct extensive training activities, the federal authorities sought to use “a cadre of contributors” from the field; training thus became a natural area of NSFAC discussion (Muirhead, 1980). Still, by 1969 the national organization had little record of direct involvement in professional development. Training workshops and consulting services for inexperienced aid administrators essentially remained a state and regional responsibility, while placement service operations were still in the hands of ACPA’s Commission V. NASFAA did continue to express its interest in professional development through the use of committees designed to maintain communication with regions and with Commission V regarding their activities (National Council Minutes, October 26,
Yet it was not until Carroll Parish announced, on September 1, 1971, the receipt of a $15,000 grant from USOE for the conducting of three national training workshops, that NASFAA made direct involvement in training an official activity. In these sessions NASFAA would train small groups of experienced aid administrators so that they might serve, in turn, as trainers of less experienced colleagues at state workshops throughout the nation (National Council Minutes, September 1, 1971). While few recognized the significance of this new role at the time, these training workshops launched a significant aspect of the reputation of NASFAA, a reputation for expertise in training which was to grow during the next several years (Muirehead, 1980).

Another area of professional development which began during the same year was publication in May of the first issue of the Journal of Student Financial Aid. The Journal, which had been desired for several years and postponed because of a lack of funds, had evolved from a proposal made to Carroll Parish and Bob Huff by Edson Sample at a luncheon in 1969 (Sample, 1981). Once sufficient funding was in hand the Journal began sporadic publication under Huff’s editorship. Only two issues could be afforded during 1971; still, this new publication served to inform NASFAA members concerning broad issues affecting student financial aid, and it also served the profession as an outlet for research in the field.

During its first five years, then, NSFAC/NASFAA little recognized the role professional development activities — especially training — might play in enhancing its reputation. In part this lack of awareness was related to the traditional role of states and regions in training activities and to the corresponding reluctance of the national organization to usurp a local function. In larger measure, however, it appeared to result from the heavy involvement of NASFAA with legislative advocacy, an involvement so intense that it greatly limited the resources available for other activities. Since liaison with other organizations was recognized as integral to legislative success, NASFAA found time to interact with several other groups, both to acquire knowledge and to establish contacts. Professional development, prior to 1971, had less obvious possibilities for enhancing legislative outcomes.

Influencing these outcomes was the primary stated goal of NASFAA from the beginning: the founding aid administrators desired nothing less for themselves than full membership in the “subgovernment” involved in the higher education policy arena. This subgovernment — a network of close, longstanding connections among members and staffs of various congressional subcommittees, executive agencies, interest groups, and program clientele — included those who made policy decisions regarding student aid (Gladieux and Wolanin, 1976).

Into the Policy Arena

In 1965 financial aid administrators had little influence in the policy arena. William F. Gaul, then Counsel to the U. S. House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education, chaired by Edith Green of Oregon, recalled vividly the enactment of the 1965 Higher Education Act. It was an exciting time for Gaul, a chance to enact the principles of the Great Society into higher education policy. Among the participants in this historic process were ACE’s Jack Morse, CSS’s Rex Moon, representatives of bankers’ organizations, and the staffs of the Subcommittee and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Only about five aid administrators actually offered testimony, Gaul stated, and these were all local, Washington-area college employees. “We were not that familiar with the people in the field who were the decision-makers and leaders in ... student aid” (Gaul, 1980).

This lack of Congressional familiarity with aid administrators was a condition Allan Purdy and his colleagues sought to remedy. Several of these leaders of the aid community had appeared in Washington before; Purdy, for example, had served as a chairman of ACPA Commission V and in that capacity had offered testimony before Congress (Parish, 1979). Yet it was mainly after passage of the 1965 Act that Purdy and the others became well-known to Congressional staffers. Their practice of “working the Hill,” as Purdy described it, developed in large part from the close relationship of the NSFAC leaders with Jim Moore at USOE. During the Johnson Administration the relationships between the staffs at USOE and Congress were cordial; Moore’s friendship with Purdy and other NSFAC members provided aid administrators with excellent introductions to policymakers. After 1966 Edith Green began increasingly to call upon aid administrators, especially Allan Purdy, for advice on student aid issues (Purdy, 1979, and Parish, 1979).

The attraction for Green and others was the technical expertise of several individuals within NSFAC rather than the prestige of the organization itself. This desire on the part of Congressional leaders for accurate technical information accelerated after the January, 1969, inauguration of Richard Nixon as President of the United States. With the advent of the Nixon Administration the Congress found itself heavily involved in technical issues they had previously entrusted to USOE. In the early days after passage of the 1965 Act, Bill Gaul remembered, congressional staffers seeking to refine the aid programs simply called Jim Moore at USOE, asking “is this good or bad?” There had been little perception on Capitol Hill of a need to seek advice outside of Washington. However, the generalized distrust of the Executive Branch stemming from the foreign policy of the latter years of the Johnson had had its effect on Congressional relations with USOE staff; under Nixon, with many of the old Johnson contacts gone “no one trusted them [USOE staff] to do anything.” Every Office of Education regulation became the subject of review (Gaul, 1980).

NASFAA saw an opportunity in the growing atmosphere of distrust between the legislative and executive branches of government; as technical experts on the operation of the existing aid programs the administrators were asked to present testimony before various Congressional committees. The distrust between branches of government did not extend to diminished relationships between NSFAC and Jim Moore, however. In March, 1968, the day before he was to present testimony before Green’s subcommittee, Purdy held a meeting of National Council in a USOE conference room in an effort to plan last minute details of his statement. Jim Moore was present during this strategy session, as was Jack Morse of ACE. The partnership among Congress, USOE, and the higher education may have slipped a bit during the final of Lyndon Johnson’s term of office, but it had not yet fallen apart (National Council Minutes, March 6, 1967).

In addition to soliciting the advice of Council and other interested parties, Purdy understood the uses of additional,
practical, political measures. One of his favorite strategies was to identify and mobilize working financial aid administrators from the home districts of Congressional representative This skillful use of people “from the field” helped lend credibility to NSFAC opinions as well as letting Representatives understand that the people back home were informed about aid issues (Gaul, 1980).

The strategic initiative which most benefited NSFAC/NASFAA legislative activities during its early years was not the idea of the aid administrators themselves. Rather, it came from Bill Gaul of the House Subcommittee staff. The emphasis of all NASFAA positions, Gaul suggested, must always be on the needs of students rather than those of institutions. In that way NASFAA could win the trust of policymakers weary of expressions of self-interest from countless lobby groups in Washington. This advice was not only followed but also quickly internalized by NASFAA members as a central value; it has remained the focus of NASFAA policy ever since. This emphasis on students as the focal point of NASFAA policy has been a key factor in the ability of the representatives of a diverse group of institutions to remain united in the organization (Parish, 1979).

The goals of NASFAA, then, were heavily weighted toward legislative ends. Part of their strategy, particularly after President Nixon took office, was to counteract Administration proposals (Wooten, 1979). Yet NASFAA in its early years was more than a watchdog and nay-sayer; it saw itself as “a major spokesperson for financial aid interests to Congress and the Administration” (Membership Brochure, 1969-70) and thus regarded its role as more progressive than reactive. By May, 1971, Allan Purdy could point with pleasure to the inclusion of 16 out of 20 NASFAA recommendations in a higher education Bill being introduced by Green. The goal of legislative involvement seemed to have been met (National Council Minutes, May 15, 1971).

A Personal Network
In part this was a result of the strategies employed, especially the idea of becoming recognized as the technical experts on aid issues. The systems used to effect this strategic initiative were quite simple: Purdy and a few other NSFAC leaders, in “working the Hill,” cultivated personal friendships with key decision makers such as Jim Moore, Bill Gaul, Jack Morse, and Ed Sanders, the Director of the new College Board Washington Office. The active group in this process, in the early years, was rather small — Purdy, Wooten, Parish, Curtis, and Sample were the main figures involved in this system of personal contact; Purdy was by far the most active of the group. Of particular importance to the development of NASFAA was the trusting relationship which developed over the years between Allan Purdy and Edith Green (Gaul, 1980).

The NSFAC legislative advocates remained ever careful of their role as providing information rather than lobbying, as being a “cadre of experts” rather than a set of influence peddlers (Curtis, 1979; Rowe, 1980). While they welcomed the political advice of men like Gaul, Moore, Morse, and Sanders, they also relied on the technical expertise of aid administrators throughout the country through the use of a telephone network. This system enabled the small group to enlarge their base of knowledge, giving credence to their claim of representing the interests of aid administrators from all regions and sectors. It also enabled them to mobilize their colleagues across the nation during critical periods. Still, it was the small group which ultimately made the decisions on how to proceed. Throughout the period the bulk of NSFAC/NASFAA resources were devoted to the expenses of the group of advocates who spent so much of their time in Washington.

Their personal “making the rounds” in Washington did not always seem sufficient to the task, however. Carroll Parish, who as President-Elect in 1969 anticipated good relations with the Nixon Administration based upon his California connections with the Secretary of HEW, Robert Finch, soon found that cordial personal relationships were not adequate to influence the new administration (Sample, 1986, p. 1.2.3). More systematic effort was now required than even frequent personal visits to the nation’s capital could provide. By early 1971 NASFAA had begun to explore opportunities to establish a permanent representative in the Washington area. Before taking action on its own the Executive Committee chose to consult both Jack Morse at ACE and Ed Sanders of the College Board for advice (Executive Committee Minutes, February 14, 1971). Morse was not encouraging: he saw no real need for another higher education association to have a Washington office; he even rejected an informal request by Purdy and Sample to establish a “financial aid desk” at ACE. Sanders was planning to retire from his service to the College Board. NASFAA representatives unofficially discussed with him the possibility of his staying on in Washington on a part-time basis on behalf of the aid administrators. However, since he was planning to return to California he declined (Sample [unpublished interview]).

The approaching departure of Sanders, a close ally of NASFAA, created additional interest among the aid administrators in establishing a permanent representative of their own in the capital. Carroll Parish formally appointed a committee to investigate the possibilities of such a move in late 1971 (National Council Minutes, September 1, 1971).

In its legislative advocacy activities, then, NASFAA had come to realize that it needed to expand its system of personal contacts into a more formal mechanism. The successes of the personal contacts of a small group of leaders had been important to the Association. However, the system had actually been based more upon the reputations of the individuals involved than on any recognition of organizational expertise. As late as 1971 the legislative advocacy operations of NASFAA depended more heavily on the actions of a small group of influential people than on the influence of the organization these people represented.

Systems for liaison with other higher education organizations were similarly based around personal connections. The College Board and ACE had been the principal players in the policy arena among the higher education establishment; it was not coincidental that Ed Sanders and Jack Morse were frequently invited to participate in Council meetings. Before NSFAC/NASFAA achieved any organizational influence of its own it nevertheless had opportunities to express its views directly to these men who did have access to the corridors of power. This not only gave NASFAA a “back door” mechanism for presenting views to policymakers (Curtis, 1979), it also offered the NASFAA leaders the chance of gaining a future voice in their own right by giving them the opportunity to become involved directly in the “subgovernment” of decision makers. Liaison activity was vital to NASFAA, and it was made a formal part of associational activity as early as 1969, when NASFAA joined the Council of Student Personnel Administrators.
Communications With Members

Professional development, as an organizational focus, was not given the emphasis of the other organizational goals; nevertheless, NSFAC/NASFAA during its early years did develop systems designed to foster communications with its membership. While placement activities and training were largely left to others during the early stages of organizational life, the realization of the desirability of widespread representation among aid administrators across the nation and of mobilizing this larger group from campuses in the field led the Association to search for a mechanism for mass communication with its members. Grant Curtis suggested as early as 1967 that a national newsletter be mailed to all members of regional financial aid associations, but limited funds prohibited any immediate action on his idea (National Council Minutes, October 22, 1967). In March, 1969, Edson Sample led the Council to call for some system of sending periodic reports to the membership (National Council Minutes, March 31, 1969).

By October of that same year Council discussed the urgent need for improved communication within the financial aid community. Council expressed the hope that a newsletter — perhaps “not too sophisticated at first,” but issued at “frequent intervals” — could be made a priority for NASFAA. On October 25, 1969, President Wooten appointed Sample chairman of a committee to investigate the possibilities (National Council Minutes, October 25, 1969). Sample wasted no time; he had come to Council prepared to work hard for this idea. The next day, as Chairman of the new committee, he called upon Council to plan for an eight-to-twelve page newsletter to be published every two months and mailed “to Congress, to regional and national 0.E. staff members, to dues paying financial aid officers in regional associations, and to all schools on the HEW institutional mailing list” (National Council Minutes, October 26, 1969).

Perhaps Sample’s proposal was a bit ambitious for such a financially struggling organization, but Council accepted his report and called for the establishment of a permanent newsletter committee, funded at $2,000 of an $8,000 total organizational budget. By March of the following year Sample could report to the Council that “I have brought my report in the person of Mrs. Nancy Eichsteadt of the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, who has agreed to serve as editor of the newsletter.” Eichsteadt received clarification on several items regarding this new project: based on the available funds she planned three issues of eight pages each; these were to be mailed to “members and nonmembers” in the aid community but not directly to Congress, USOE, or other policymakers (National Council Minutes, March 16, 1970).

The first issue of the NASFAA Newsletter was published in June. Its stated purpose was the development of the profession through communication between Council and membership; its contents included lengthy articles on new aid amendments endorsed by NASFAA and on the Nixon Administration’s proposals regarding student aid. The intent, clearly, was to enlighten the membership on the technical aspects of Council positions. The newsletter was only six pages long rather than the hoped-for eight; and number 1 was the only issue of 1970. Still, the process of systematic communication with the membership had begun; three additional issues would follow in 1971; seven in 1972 (Sample, 1986, p. 12.2.1).

Nor was the Newsletter the only system created for professional development activities in 1970. The Journal was well into the final developmental stages in that year, as were plans for a national meeting, a placement service run exclusively by NASFAA, and appropriate professional recognition awards for leaders in the student aid field (National Council Minutes, August 19-21, 1970). Further, desiring greater coordination of the burgeoning activities of the national association, its leaders arranged in October, 1970, for a part-time, volunteer-run, “central office” to be established on the campus of Purdue University. The person in charge of that office, Richard Tombaugh of Purdue, planned to serve primarily as a facilitator of mailings and other communication with members and of associational activities in professional development (Tombaugh to Council, February 14, 1971).

By the beginning of the 1970-71 associational year, then, systems for professional development, like those for legislative advocacy and liaison with other educational organizations, were becoming more formally organized. Yet at best the status of all such systems was transitional from the personal connections of the early days toward greater organization. In many ways this transition was demonstrated by the way NASFAA had to handle the “training the trainers” grant from USOE. Since NASFAA was not a tax exempt organization the grant technically had to be accepted by some other group; Stanford’s Huff brought his institution to the rescue. NASFAA had the expertise and the willingness to do the job it was being asked to do; it simply lacked the formal mechanism which would enable it to carry it out (National Council Minutes, October 24, 1970).

A Personal Style of Management

The management style of NSFAC/NASFAA during its early years reflected its system of organization around personal contacts. While their choosing the name “Council” may have implied a desire by some to avoid the creation of yet another professional association among aid administrators, the group which met at the Waldorf in October, 1966, agreed that it wanted to have a voice in development and implementation of federal policies. In attempting to find this voice they would use a variety of approaches, all united behind an informal, personal style of management.

That style predominated the organizational meeting itself, which after all was a gathering of a self-appointed “club” of aid administrators who happened to be attending a conference sponsored by another group. From the beginning, however, the organizers were aware of the need to move away from the clublike atmosphere this self-selection promoted, and the new Council expressed its interest in being open to a variety of points of view during its first meeting (Huff, 1979; Purdy, 1979). Movement from a club to a wider representation would characterize the efforts of NSFAC/NASFAA for the next five years.

It was not that anyone, from any sector within higher education, was specifically excluded or discouraged from participation in
early NSFAC activities; rather, the group which emerged as active generally came from those institutions which could offer them the necessary support, in time and resources, for associational activities. In practice this tended to result in an emphasis on legislative matters by a small group of aid administrators. These worked on a voluntary, part-time basis, and there were so few who could afford the time and money required that Jim Moore recalled “it got pretty incestuous around here” as Purdy, Sample, and a few others worked with USOE on ideas for policies (Moore, 1980).

The ideas thus developed were carried to Congress by these same individuals. NASFAA members believed at the time that they were having a genuine impact on legislation, despite the fact that they were “rather young.... We were running around the halls of Congress talking to a few people ... [then] they started contacting us.... We depended on the College Board for a lot of technical assistance ... typewriters, etc.” (Wooten, 1979). Edson Sample later conceded, however, that “our reputation in those days far exceeded our capacity to support the organization ... we made our name in Washington.... Little did they know we were living hand-to-mouth and could hardly pay our bills” (Sample, 1981). The small group participating on behalf of NSFAC/NASFAA, however, attempted to overcome financial limitations with a great deal of “careful, low-key, but persistent work.” Sometimes, though, other limitations, such as the lack of experience of these aid administrators, also showed. “We really pussyfooted around Washington and tried to conform to local mores,” recalled one of the group.

Some of their inexperience was substantive, and a number of Washington insiders helped the aid administrators learn the mores Curtis described. At other times less significant issues demonstrated how much NSFAC had to learn. For instance, Grant Curtis had his elephant tie pin rather unceremoniously removed by Purdy just prior to entering the offices of Democratic partisan Edith Green (Curtis, 1979). Obviously some pragmatic political lessons were required. Among these lessons were some of a more serious nature, including one missed by the entire higher education community. In order to achieve real results in Washington more than an issue-orientation was necessary. Simply asserting that higher education has value, or that student financial aid was needed, would not produce desired funding. The issues had to be stated, of course, but more important was an attention to the mobilization of political resources — trustees and other key influential persons at the local level who could influence the actions of policymakers. The benefits of this “working into a relationship” with Congress were seen only dimly by the higher education community in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Cable, 1980). NSFAC/NASFAA perhaps recognized the benefits more than most; Purdy had worked to mobilize “the field” of aid administrators in key congressional districts. Later experience would teach NSFAC and the entire higher education community that such mobilization efforts had to be expanded to include not only their own membership but also influential persons who could support their point of view.

**Greater Coordination of Effort**

Experience had already begun to teach that greater coordination of effort was required. The organization which had centered its initial activities around the abilities of its founding President began, by the end of the 1960s, to realize the requirement for a consistent, long-term center of operations. Thus NASFAA arranged in 1970 to have Dick Tombaugh of Purdue University direct the operations of a “central office” (Sample, 1981). Tombaugh at the time was best known to Sample and others inside the state of Indiana, but he had also established a good rapport with a number of NASFAA leaders during 1969-70. He had spent that year on a leave of absence from Purdue, conducting research at USOE. During that period in Washington he had served NASFAA as an advisor regarding USOE activities, briefing Purdy, Sample, and the others on “inside” information whenever they came to Washington (Tombaugh, 1982).

Upon his return to Purdue, then, Tombaugh must have seemed a natural choice to coordinate additional activities of the Association. He undertook his duties, without salary, with a number of mechanical concerns before him, including postal regulations, accumulation of a complete mailing address file, and financing procedures. Additionally, as he indicated to Council, “I need a title” (Tombaugh to National Council, November 22, 1970). This request was rapidly granted; Tombaugh was officially designated “Director of the Central Office” and assigned specific duties, involving coordination of all associational mailings, responding to “inquiries regarding national financial aid professional activities,” and serving as a “Director of Placement” (Newsletter, January, 1971). Other problems were not so rapidly solved, however, and in the fifth month of operation of the central office Tombaugh admitted that “progress has not been as rapid as I hoped” (Tombaugh to National Council, February 14, 1971).

Another factor was perhaps even more limiting than the money problem. While Tombaugh was able to perform his newly assigned duties from his desk at Purdue, the Association missed his presence inside Washington. Ken Wooten, in the same paper in which he proposed the restructuring of NASFAA into two corporations, also questioned the “indirect approach” the Association employed. “We wait patiently ... for the periodic flares that are planted along the Potomac,” he argued, and “more often than not we arrive on the scene after the fire has run its course....” Aid administrators simply needed greater visibility in Washington, Wooten believed, if they were to become valued participants inside the higher education policy arena. He did not intend his paper to represent criticism of the valiant efforts of professionals in the aid field who have devoted so much time and effort to provide the image and information so vital to positive congressional action. It is, rather, an admission that part-time representation by individuals whose expertise and astuteness is not necessarily in the political academy, may well be unequal to the gargantuan task which is our challenge (Wooten, 1971).

Others in NASFAA agreed with Wooten, and the Association began to explore ways of bringing its central office operations to Washington. They also began to look at the problems inherent in using a volunteer, part-time staff of one in serving a national membership. Tombaugh reported that the position was “much more time-consuming than anticipated.... There is so much that could be done if I had the time.” He therefore called upon Council to “pursue the establishment of a Central office staffed with a full-time” employee (Tombaugh to National Council, February 19, 1972). As 1972 began, then, NASFAA was recognizing the necessity of altering its staffing arrangements. While its staff had already evolved away from some of the old emphasis on volunteers-for-every-task toward a pattern of greater centralization of effort, in staffing, as in other...
 areas of its organizational life, NASFAA had begun to understand that changes were coming.

**Skilled Technicians in the Policy Arena**

Awareness of the need for changes demonstrated the increasing skills of NASFAA leadership. Effective leadership skills had been present from the beginning. The organizers of the Association in 1966 formed a knowledgeable group of practicing aid administrators, and the federal student aid effort was then so new and malleable that their practical expertise made their views valuable to policymakers. Congressional representatives, staff, and even USOE officials sometimes lacked sufficient background upon which to base decisions and thus looked for NSFAC/NASFAA advice on the practical effects of potential policy directions.

This data void among policymakers, then, gave NSFAC/ NASFAA its initial opportunity for legislative influence, and as relations between Congress and first Johnson, then Nixon, worsened, the opportunity for the aid administrators widened. If there was a felt need for good, technical data, Purdy and company were only too willing to meet that need. Initially, however, the new group had to find a way to establish its credibility as the technical experts without alienating the rest of the higher education community. Purdy, with outstanding personal communications skills, achieved this goal almost immediately. As Edson Sample has recalled, Purdy “put us in good stead with the Washington groups.” Understanding that “the last thing Jack Morse [of ACE] wanted ... was another association messing around” in Washington, Purdy made it his practice to telephone Morse and others upon his every arrival in the capital. In these conversations he requested both information on recent political developments and advice on how NSFAC/NASFAA could help the other organizations achieve their common goals. Purdy’s own abilities in communication were vital:

> that dialogue and openness ... did a lot to make the people there feel good and [to understand] that we were not going to go out and espouse causes and say things that would embarrass them or be contrary to the interests of the other associations (Sample, 1981).

In addition to his work with other groups, Purdy also established a reputation as a “crackerjack” witness before congressional committees (Moore, 1980). In the House of Representatives, in the early days of the Nixon Administration, Edith Green felt somewhat isolated. Many of her old contacts inside USOE were gone, and she instructed Bill Gaul to develop additional human resources outside of Washington. The resulting meetings with Allan Purdy led to an increasing exchange of technical information between the two. Some career employees at USOE remained involved as well. Among them was Richard Rowe, Director of the Division of Student Financial Assistance, who shared Gaul’s feeling that the Nixon Administration consisted of too many “scoundrels” and “high-handed” appointees who were attempting to “redirect student aid” administratively in ways which defied legislative intent (Rowe, 1980).

In an atmosphere thus charged, NASFAA was able to fill a void; Purdy established a telephone network in an effort to get reliable information from the field in a timely manner. NASFAA occupied an increasingly important position in the middle of negotiations between Congress and USOE, as Moore might call Purdy for advice on a proposal, Purdy would get reaction from his telephone network, and then both Moore and congressional staff could be informed of the opinions of leading aid administrators (Moore, 1980). While an increasing reliance on the use of the telephone among a number of NASFAA members characterized the process of information gathering, it remained the personal skills of Purdy and a small group of others upon which the Association really relied. While the knowledge from the field, combined with Purdy’s exceptional presentation abilities, helped the organization to counteract some legislation it believed harmful (Wooten, 1979), NASFAA leaders also began to realize their limitations in the policy arena — limitations based upon a lack of political experience and acumen.

Accordingly, they sought the advice of a number of skillful Washington operatives during NASFAA’s formative years. Morse, Sanders, and Moore frequently were asked to attend planning sessions and Council meetings, offering advice on the current political climate and on how NASFAA might best deploy its resources within it. Bill Gaul, too, served as a “coach” on the federal arena. His relationship with Purdy, along with the increasing reliance of Edith Green on the technical advice of aid administrators, greatly enhanced the recognition within Washington of NASFAA as a legitimate group (Gaul, 1980).

**Enlarging the Network**

In May, 1971, as a part of an enlarged effort to improve skills necessary for effective operation within the policy arena, NASFAA held a “Leadership Conference” at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington. This conference, chaired by Edson Sample, was attended by eighty financial aid administrators representing all regions and nearly all state associations. Those attending had an opportunity, for the first time in NASFAA history, to come together in a group larger than Council. The result was both unifying and enlightening for those present, and the existing network of NASFAA participants in the policy arena was thereby broadened. Among the presentations which educated them in the necessary political skills were ones by Harry Hogan (Legal Counsel for Edith Green), Peter Muirhead, Jack Morse, Ed Sanders, and Bill Gaul. Included in their presentations was practical, political advice, ranging from Morse’s descriptions of the significant congressional committees to Gaul’s counsel on letter writing as a tool for communication with Congress (Newsletter, June, 1971; Newsletter, March 31, 1972).

That NASFAA needed assistance with congressional communication was illustrated by a reception it held for lawmakers and their staffs during the Conference. Strapped for funds, the Council provided the best reception it could afford, but its best was not equal to desired standards. The affair was held in a “very small room” in a House office building, and the “very few ... [congressional representatives and staffers] who came” were treated to “the sorriest looking sandwiches” (Curtis, 1979). Still, for those who did attend, the reception provided an opportunity for new acquaintances and, perhaps, new opinions. Despite the funding limitations which caused problems with the reception, the Leadership Conference itself was proclaimed an unqualified success (Newsletter, March 31, 1972).

Part of the reason for that success was the recognition of NASFAA’s potential role in training and professional development. James Nelson of USOE spoke to the assemblage, raising publicly the possibility of a grant for “training the trainers” (Newsletter,
June, 1971). Peter Muirhead and others in the Office of Education had realized that in NASFAA they had available a genuine resource, “a cadre of people out in the nation” who could train the aid community for USOE (Muirhead, 1980). Dick Rowe, Director of the Division of Student Financial Assistance within the Office of Education, had agreed with Muirhead; he later reflected that NASFAA’s emergence as a respected member of the higher education community was linked not only to its celebrated technical expertise but to its role in training the profession as well (Rowe, 1980).

By 1971, then, NASFAA was acquiring and refining the requisite skills for more effective involvement in the policy arena, but their abilities remained limited by two constraints: they continued to lack the financial resources to pay for the political and professional development functions they desired, and they seemed unable to provide a central office properly located and staffed to direct these functions. Edson Sample, always a progressive thinker regarding the potential of the Association, had effectively summarized the situation the previous summer. NASFAA, he said, has made significant progress toward becoming established and recognized as THE association of student financial aid administrators. However, there is much more that can be done and I believe that we are now at a point where we must move out into new areas of activity and greatly expand others (Sample to Wooten, August 14, 1970).

Such attempts at expanding the Association would occupy center stage for NASFAA during the next several years.

CHAPTER III: QUEST FOR STABILITY AND INFLUENCE

The National Institute
By October, 1972, as he prepared to leave the presidency of NASFAA, Grant Curtis felt optimistic about the future of the Association. “We had the groundwork done.... we were at step two.... the structures were in place — we just had to build upon them” (Curtis, 1979). Curtis was referring to two important structural modifications which had occurred during his term of office. First, NASFAA had attained tax-exempt corporate status, as a “social welfare league.” This change would enable the organization to claim exemption from income and sales taxes and to obtain lower postal rates for its many mailings. Second, a new corporation, the National Institute for Financial Aid Administration (NIFAA), had been established, since under the existing Internal Revenue Service code the mere incorporation of NASFAA did not give it the necessary tax status to enable it to accept grants from either foundations or government agencies. Further, in order to attain this preferred tax status, NASFAA would have been required to change from an individual membership association to an institutional membership one and would also have been forced to curtail its legislative advocacy activities. Legal counsel therefore advised Council to approve incorporation of a second organization, which would be established with the tax authority to accept grants, and which would be responsible for the non-political activities of the aid administrators — including “publication of monographs and the Journal of Student Financial Aid, training of aid officers, research activities,” funding various committees of NASFAA (other than its legislative advocacy committees), “and could administer and fund national meetings, workshops, and leadership conferences” (Newsletter, December 22, 1972).

Not all details were decided by the end of Curtis’s term, but the outline seemed clear. In the National Institute NASFAA had an apparent solution to the financing concerns which had so long plagued the association; the questions being raised were not whether NIFAA would be able to attract the needed support but whether “start-up grants” or institutional membership solicitation would be the proper method of beginning. No one expected immediate results, however, and it was summer of the following year when NIFAA was formally organized with a full Board of Directors, under the chairmanship of Grant Curtis (Newsletter, August 16, 1973). Further progress was slower than anticipated, though, and by September, 1974, the Institute was still being described as “off and running” but lacking “sufficient resources” (Newsletter, September 17, 1974). 1974-75 NASFAA President Edson Sample was still optimistic about the possibilities of success through NIFAA, but he admitted to National Council that “we do not have any solid basis on which to project income to NASFAA from the Institute” (Sample to National Council, July 2, 1974). Sample was thus willing to continue to hold hope for the success of NIFAA, but by the following year further optimism seemed futile. One aid administrator summarized the thoughts on the minds of most of his colleagues:
the Institute has fallen well below our expectations. Why the Institute failed to generate the support for NASFAA we so desperately hoped for is not the main issue now. The main issue is what to do with an Institute that is not working — only 313 institutions out of a possible 4,700 are members of NIFAA (McCormick, 1975).

NIFAA, which far from subsidizing its parent organization was by now financially indebted to NASFAA, agreed with this description, and Chairman Curtis informed Council in early 1975 that a merger of the two organizations should be considered (National Council Minutes, February 12, 1976).

**Toward a Restructuring of the Association**

The solution which had seemed so promising in 1972, then, was seen as a failure within three years. During that time a number of members of Council began to rethink the entire structure of their professional association. Sample was perhaps the main instigator of the structural introspection; as early as 1970 he had raised several provocative ideas as to the future of NASFAA. Sometimes he was too far apart from his colleagues; at the advice of some close friends in 1970 he used scissors to delete his proposal for the possible phasing out of regions before distributing his other thoughts on the association to his fellow Council members (Sample, 1981). At other times, however, Sample’s views were in the vanguard and he was frequently able to propose new ideas which were subsequently adopted by NASFAA. As he entered its presidency in 1974, Sample asserted that the current organizational structure came about by happenstance....

*We now have a national organization, six regional associations and almost fifty state associations.... Are we getting the most for our money the way we are currently organized? I am suggesting that the National Council establish a blue ribbon ad hoc committee to study this matter of organization.... we can study where we want to be in five or ten years — and then organize in the most effective manner to get us there (Sample to National Council, July 2, 1974).*

The result of Sample’s request was the establishment of the committee he desired. Chaired by Richard L. Waters of Rutgers University, the committee issued its “Analysis and Recommendations for the Organizational Restructuring of the National Association” in draft form to Council in May, 1975. The “A&R Paper,” as it came to be known, would go through three drafts before any decisions were reached. In part, at least, this redrafting resulted from the complex arrangements then in existence. As the committee stated, the aid community had evolved a “three-tiered structure” including state and regional bodies as well as the national association. While states were not technically subdivisions of their regions, nor regions of the national association, because of varying dues structures throughout the nation there were instances when in practice the technical distinctions were blurred. In some states, for example, dues were collected for state, regional, and national memberships at the same time; in some regions a national membership was included in the price of regional dues. Further, the membership was confused by the overlapping roles of NASFAA and NIFAA. The Waters committee looked at the confused state of affairs and concluded that certain changes were inevitable; among these were four distinct alternatives. In order to produce a balanced NASFAA budget “reduced services, increased membership, higher individual dues, or institutional membership fees” would have to be considered (Waters, Ehrensberger, and Jones, 1975).

An examination of the options of expanded membership and dues increases must have convinced the Waters Committee that neither held great promise as an organizational alternative; for although both membership and dues had steadily risen for several years, the Association was still strapped for funds. Membership, for example, had increased from 613 in 1970-71 to a record 2,783 in 1974-75; during the same period dues had been elevated from five dollars to twenty-five dollars annually. Even this increase was not sufficient, and dues would go up again for 1975-76, this time to forty dollars per member. Under this larger dues assessment only 2,461 aid administrators joined NASFAA in 1975-76. While revenues were certainly greater than they had been a few years earlier ($100,667 in 1974-75 compared to $15,678 in 1970-71), the amount of revenue per member (calculated by dividing revenue by membership in a given year) had not grown significantly, and the greater costs of goods and services in 1974-75 probably negated the slight increase which had occurred (Sample, 1986).

Having reached their conclusion that some change was necessary, the Waters Committee proceeded with an analysis of restructuring options, including several different arrangements of state and regional redefinition of roles and boundaries. Their report was highly controversial, and their specific recommendations concerning organizational alternatives were so complex as to defy prompt adoption by anyone. Nevertheless the Committee had reached one conclusion which NASFAA could not ignore:

*steps must be taken at once .... to restructure the professional associations in such a way as to make available the necessary financial and personnel resources required to provide services to the membership which are the first rate in both quantity and quality. Over the years the various associations, particularly the National Association, have been forced to operate on a “beans and rice” budget. While the accomplishments of NASFAA have been substantial... the unfinished work still far outweighs the accomplishments achieved. Without a sufficient, financial base to support the level of activity expected and deserved by the financial aid community, the objectives of the Association ... cannot be adequately served .... we hold the view that a significant restructuring of the National Association is required and appropriate (Waters et al., 1975).*

Among the recommendations of the Waters Committee were the merger of NASFAA and NIFAA and the conversion of NASFAA membership from an individual base to an institutional one. These two issues were destined to become the focal point of discussion, but the A&R Paper had so many other recommendations that the focus at first was obscured. In May the Council had decided to distribute the paper to the membership at a conference scheduled that summer in Aspen, Colorado, but later it was decided that Tombaugh would refine the paper for further Council discussion at Aspen and that Council could later circulate it among the regions. Tombaugh did use the A&R Paper material in a poorly-received speech to the conference at Aspen. Based partly on the reception given to Tombaugh’s remarks, the Executive Committee in the summer of 1975 appointed an “Ad Hoc Committee” of past presidents to review the A&R Paper and to report suggestions concerning it. The issues were complex, and feelings were strong. Some later charged that a committee made up of past presidents...
had been “stacked” in favor of structural changes (National Council Minutes, February 12, 1976). Nevertheless, the Committee was formed, and the result was the issuance of yet another document describing structural alternatives.

The Ad Hoc Committee met in August, and its report was submitted to Council in October, 1975. In their report they advocated a course similar to that proposed by Waters, including delineation of state, regional, and national functions, merging NASFAA and NIFAA, institutional membership with dues on a sliding scale based on full-time enrollment, and representation on Council to be related to the number of institutional members within each region (Newsletter, November 9, 1975). The past presidents were not totally unified in their report; Carroll Parish, who was unable to attend the “only lengthy meeting” of the committee, filed a “Minority Report” with Council. In it he called for a continuation of individual dues, an expanded effort to achieve financial security through NIFAA and a membership drive, and a real focus on just what the budgetary requirements of NASFAA were (Parish to National Council, October 18, 1975).

At this point there were so many proposals before Council that confusion predominated. In the resulting debate the Council decided to listen to counsel such as that of Joe McCormick of Mississippi, who, in advising his regional association colleagues of the restructuring debate, had suggested that the A&R Paper “recommends too many changes to occur too soon.” Rather than try to make multiple decisions regarding the roles and boundaries of regional and state associations, NASFAA first needed to face the financial issues which had initially prompted the question of restructuring, argued McCormick (McCormick, 1975).

**Individual or Institutional Membership?**

Council apparently agreed, for although 1975-76 President Robert Clark described in his Annual Report the morass of major documents before the membership for action, he also indicated that the main question to be considered was the one of individual or institutional membership (Sample, 1986, p. 1.5.11). The issue had by then dragged on for two years, and it was difficult to see an end in the near future. From the time Dick Tombaugh spoke to the Aspen Conference and made public the A&R Paper recommendation for institutional dues, there were “real struggles in the National Council,” which met “late into the night debating those issues” on several occasions (McCormick, 1983). In its October, 1975, meeting, the Council had taken no action on either the Ad Hoc Presidents’ Committee Report or Parish’s “Minority Report;” rather, they had engaged in lengthy discussion and then voted to distribute both reports to the membership (Newsletter, December 11, 1975). In essence this meant postponing a decision indefinitely, since the distribution to the membership implied a deferring of the decision to the regional associations.

Several of the regions were opposed to the idea of institutional dues; their reasons for opposition related chiefly to their pride in previous accomplishments and their concerns over possible loss of autonomy by individual aid administrators in an institutionally based association. Nowhere was the opposition stronger than in the Southern region. McCormick, one member of the Council who had become convinced that institutional dues were the only method of solving the chronic financial penury of NASFAA, was President of SASFAA during the national association’s struggle over changing organizational structure. As such he frequently had to confront the opposition to the idea. In February, 1976, SASFAA formally went on record as being opposed to the changes McCormick favored. Other regions, too, had significant reservations about the proposals; MASFAA particularly expressed its doubts, but its leaders declined to take formal action in opposition (Committee on Long Range Planning, 1977).

The regional opposition was taken seriously by the Executive Committee of NASFAA. They asked the SASFAA committee which had studied the issue on behalf of that region to continue its investigation, this time receiving the views of a national constituency. The SASFAA committee, chaired by Eleanor Morris of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, agreed to report to the National Council at its October, 1976, meeting (Executive Committee Minutes, April 8, 1976). Thus the process dragged on throughout the 1976 year. An underlying issue in the debate was that of a stronger centralized versus continued regionalized control of the organization, but this had less direct effect on deliberations than did the more frequently cited concerns with potential aid administrator loss of control over their own association if institutions could make the decisions for them (Cleveland, 1983). Despite such reservations, the institutional dues question was one that would not simply disappear; in addition to expectations on the part of those favoring the switch that dues income would greatly increase in an institutional arrangement, there was the necessity of securing the proper tax status in order to receive grant income. This was not a possibility under an individual membership structure (Martin to National Council, November 4, 1976).

One means of addressing the concerns over loss of autonomy by individual aid administrators if membership in the Association became institutional was a provision to restrict the choices of “institutional representative” (i.e., voting member). Providing that this representative had to be a practicing financial aid officer was the solution to the debate which satisfied most people on the autonomy issue (McCormick, 1983). With that settled, the National Council finally reached resolution on restructuring in December 1976, some two and one-half years after Edson Sample had asked Dick Waters to investigate structural alternatives. Even then the issue was not decided without much debate and parliamentary maneuvering; still, the Council was aware that too much time had passed in indecision and that prompt action was now required. Council approved the submission of the question to a vote of the membership, recommending to the membership that the change be adopted (Committee on Long Range Planning, 1977).

A special council meeting was then planned for January, 1977, for the purpose of preparing a mailing on the change to the membership. Mildred McAuley, then President of NASFAA, had not originally favored the change; it now became her responsibility to convince the membership to support the recommendation of the Council. She had decided, during the months of debate and in discussions with other associations, that the change was essential to the future well-being of NASFAA, and although she continued to have concerns over the alterations in interpersonal relationships which might accompany the restructuring, McAuley pressed hard to achieve the goal of institutional membership. She led Council in preparation of the mailing in support of change, writing a letter and composing a set of questions and answers for members. The
vote was to be held at a special national meeting in St. Louis in March, 1977, and proxy voting was made simple and convenient, since it was obvious that not every member of NASFAA could attend. Of the total membership of 2,889, only 120 members were in attendance at the meeting, although proxy ballots were cast by an additional 706 individuals. While this turnout represented under 30 percent of potential votes, among those participating there was overwhelming sentiment for the change to institutional dues: 709 (85.8 percent) favored the change. Effective July 1, 1977, NASFAA would plan to merge with NIFAA and become an institutional membership organization (Committee on Long Range Planning, 1977). All that remained was to persuade institutions to join.

Staffing and the Central Office
While it sometimes seemed that the entire energy of the Association was spent on its internal restructuring struggle, such was not the case. In staffing, for example, NASFAA made significant strides in the early and middle 1970s. In May, 1972 the Central Office was relocated to Washington. Dick Tombaugh moved with the office, accepting a position as Associate Director of Financial Aid at George Washington University and also becoming the Executive Secretary of NASFAA. The NASFAA position was a paid one; the Association, in order to be able to have Tombaugh’s services in Washington, agreed to pay him the difference between his Purdue salary and the lesser stipend at George Washington. NASFAA had an understanding with that university’s Maurice Heartfield, long-time friend and supporter of NASFAA, that Tombaugh, although technically employed full time at George Washington, would have sufficient release time to accomplish his associational duties (Tombaugh, 1982).

The move to Washington was expected to produce several desirable results for NASFAA. Chief among them were opportunities for improved liaison efforts with other professional associations and government agencies; these efforts were expected to enhance the Association’s role within the higher education policy arena. This gain in terms of liaison was to be accomplished by the maintenance of then current efforts regarding placement, mailings, and other tasks Tombaugh had performed while at Purdue (Newsletter, May 5, 1972). The transition to the new location was not lengthy; three days after his arrival in Washington Tombaugh reported that “most of the boxes are off the floor and we are back in business” (Tombaugh to Regional Presidents, May 12, 1972).

Some details remained to be resolved, however. Chief among them was a method of allotting time between his new institution and the Association. The level of potential activity as head of an association’s central office was much greater in Washington than in Indiana, and Tombaugh found by summer that demands on his time had “mushroomed” since his move to the capital. Interassociational activities accounted for much of his NASFAA time; the other associations, he reported, were beginning to seek opinions from NASFAA on a regular basis. Additionally, although most of the governmental contacts were still left to Allan Purdy when he visited Washington, Tombaugh did begin a process of visits to USOE at least once every two weeks (Tombaugh to National Council, August 6, 1972).

These increasing activities were exactly what the Association had hoped would occur: the aid administrators desired greater recognition within the higher education community and within the policy arena, and they had decided to gamble on the move to Washington as a necessary step in obtaining that recognition (Curtis, 1979). The greater gamble, however, was that of Dick Tombaugh, who left the security of his position at Purdue for a lower salary at George Washington. While the salary differential was to be supplied by NASFAA, the past record of the Association’s finances did not inspire total confidence that the money would always be forthcoming on a timely basis. Sometimes, indeed, NASFAA had to juggle funds, paying some accounts first, others later, in order to meet its salary obligation to Tombaugh. Understanding all the risks involved, Tombaugh still decided to wager on the future of the young Association, readily agreeing to the joint employment with George Washington, with NASFAA being responsible for one-fourth of his salary (Sample, 1981).

By the close of the first year in Washington, Tombaugh could see that his gamble had been worth the risk; if the money were not any more secure than in 1972, his position within the Association was certainly increasing in importance. President Eunice Edwards recognized the need in 1973 for additional space and staff for the central office, and began to work toward that end; Tombaugh fully understood that, once finances permitted, the office would become a full-time operation (Edwards, 1982; Tombaugh, 1982). The primary thrust of office procedures had already shifted to an increased role for the Executive Secretary in the development of NASFAA positions on issues. Besides the continuation of mailing activities, visiting USOE to serve as the “eyes and ears” of the Association, and representing NASFAA at those Washington meetings which did not warrant the flying of one of the officers to the capital, Tombaugh took an enlarged role in Congressional testimony. The previous practice had been for volunteers to collaborate on testimony, but

as we gained more experience the Executive Secretary’s role took on more and more of the functions that volunteers had provided in times prior to that; for example, before long we stopped bringing them in and writing the testimony the night before, but rather I was drafting it in advance, circulating it to the leadership, getting their concurrence ..., modifying it as necessary, and having it all printed and ready to go by the morning of the testimony (Tombaugh, 1982).

While the President still gave the prepared testimony, the Executive Secretary’s role had certainly evolved beyond the duties assigned to him at his desk at Purdue. The increased responsibilities brought about greater organizational awareness of the need to make the central office a full-time operation, and in January, 1974, Council decided that the membership base had grown sufficiently to make the move feasible. Tombaugh thus began looking for a suitable space for associational offices. Fortunately for the still-poor group, he found a classified advertisement for a sublease of office space held by the Little Cigar Council, which was going out of business. Not only did that company agree to sublet at a reasonable price, they also sold NASFAA their furniture at a “ridiculous rate” of 20 to 25 percent of its market value. The offices were not located close to the One Dupont Circle addresses of the other higher education organizations, which at first seemed unfortunate for NASFAA. Several members of Council, however, thought the different location might actually be beneficial to NASFAA, by allowing it to establish its own credibility apart from the other associations, which had had differences of opinion with Congress during the
1972 struggles over reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (Tombaugh, 1982).

Having its own offices apart from a university meant that someone had to be available to answer the telephone and receive visitors, and the workload was such that NASFAA filled this clerical position with an “Administrative Assistant,” Barbara Anderson. Having served as a student worker in the financial aid office at George Washington, Anderson was already familiar with much of the NASFAA structure. With her hiring in January, 1974, NASFAA went from a part-time staff of one person with no separate office, to a full time staff of two people and an independent headquarters. It was a change both long-desired and long overdue (Anderson, 1982). It was also a change which required that the Association develop policies regarding its employees; Council member Dallas Martin therefore prepared a handbook detailing staff responsibilities and associational procedures. In addition, President Edwards worked to define more formally the roles of the elected officers, and, together with Martin’s work on staff arrangements, her findings became the “operating guidelines and procedures for the conduct of the Association’s business” (Sample to National Council, July 2, 1974). During the next year Sample worked to arrange for employees of NASFAA to “have all of the normal benefits associated with employment,” and he announced success in this area in his annual report at the conclusion of his term of office (Newsletter, June 30, 1975).

Staffing, then, was at its highest point in the brief history of the Association as Sample’s term ended in summer, 1975. Incoming President Robert Clark, however, faced a “disastrous” situation almost immediately upon taking office; Dick Tombaugh, who Clark viewed as “99 percent of the organization,” resigned as Executive Secretary shortly after the conclusion of the Aspen Conference (Clark, 1981). Clark officially accepted Tombaugh’s resignation with “deepest regret” and praised the Executive Secretary for his “long and very valuable service to NASFAA” which had “advanced the Association to a position of greater visibility and credibility on the Washington scene” (Newsletter, August 22, 1975).

Tombaugh no doubt appreciated the praise, but he had been terribly frustrated by the indecision of NASFAA on the structural change questions which had occupied so much attention since mid-1974. From his position in the central office, Tombaugh knew first-hand just how fragile was the NASFAA budget under the individual dues structure. The lean budgets meant that Tombaugh had to attempt to replicate the services of other associations while lacking their support staff or their fiscal solvency; he needed to be in the field enough to promote the membership growth needed in order to pay the bills, yet in Washington enough to do his job there. Despite his loyalty to the organization, Tombaugh felt “burned out” by all the years of trying to hold NASFAA together “with binder twine and bailing wire,” and the group’s indecision on an issue which, in his mind, promised to resolve so many associational difficulties, culminated in his resignation (Tombaugh, 1982).

The Association was stunned by Tombaugh’s departure, and its leaders realized that his replacement had to be chosen carefully yet promptly. Even before he announced his decision to leave his post, Tombaugh had met with Dallas Martin, former Council Member and then-employee of the American College Testing Program. Martin, who was making a presentation for ACT at a RMASFAA conference in the summer of 1975, found Tombaugh a persuasive person, and he agreed to consider making application for the position. Not too many of the NASFAA leadership held any interest in becoming Executive Secretary, given the circumstances which had created Tombaugh’s frustration in the position (Tombaugh, 1982). Martin at first was reluctant to apply; but he did agree to discuss it with his boss at ACT, Joe Henry. With encouragement from Henry and from his friend Joe McCormick, Martin decided to seek the job (Martin, 1981).

Bob Clark, too, had a major role in the decision to hire Dallas Martin as Executive Secretary. He would later recall with pride the influence he had exerted on Martin, remembering the hiring as “my one great contribution to the national association.” Martin, he said, moved into the job with a “great deal of self-assurance, poise, and moxie,” three characteristics sorely needed at the time (Clark, 1981). Martin himself remembered his entering the position with a bit less enthusiasm. He was unable to report to Washington until December, so NASFAA was without an Executive Secretary for several months; during that time Barbara Anderson, along with Walter Schmucker, a member serving in an “experienceship” at the central office, did a good job of holding the Association together. Martin entered his new position feeling a real sense of nervousness. While he knew a few technical specialists at USOE, he felt himself to be basically unknown in Washington; he did not know the Hill people well and was an outsider among the higher education association personnel. His office staff consisted of Anderson and a newly hired additional secretary; while this was at least closer to sufficient assistance than what Tombaugh had known, the office still needed additional employees. Anderson gave him a warm welcome, but the financial report she presented him upon his arrival was chilling: there was not enough money available to pay either December salaries or rent (Martin, 1981). Clearly the new staff at the central office had its work before it.

Martin, however, was not one to sit idly and worry about circumstances, and he immediately began to do the work he was hired to do. He recognized the dilemma created by needing the Executive Secretary both on the road promoting membership and at the same time in Washington keeping “aware of the legislative and regulatory activity;” he proposed to resolve this by letting others do the visiting of state meetings (Executive Committee Minutes, July 18, 1976). The reason the central office had been moved to Washington, he argued persuasively, was to allow its staff to deal with government issues; by the fall of 1976 he wrote the state association presidents, informing them that he could no longer attend their meetings. Time demands were simply too great, and he asked the state presidents to explain this to their members, stating that

*the reason all of you pay your dues is to have a representative in Washington to monitor the ongoing activities that are occurring here and to present your feelings to legislators and to other association and regulatory people involved in student aid (Martin to State Presidents, September 9, 1976).*

He also made it clear to council just what he saw as priorities for the central office operations. Martin argued that there were three primary responsibilities: communication with members concerning legislation and regulations; carrying member comment back to the regulatory and legislative arenas, and promoting professional development. Other areas of concern would simply have to wait until additional staff could be hired. Martin’s concise and
forceful statement of his staffing concerns and resulting priority commitments met the approval of the Council, which endorsed his concepts and promised to so advise their own constituencies (National Council Minutes, July 20, 1976.)

**Shifting Associational Strategies**

The priorities Martin described in 1976 were related to the evolving strategies of the Association. Grant Curtis had defined the three areas of organizational effort: liaison, professional development, and legislative advocacy. During the period 1972-1977 all three would undergo shifts in emphasis and in goals.

Liaison, for instance, was enhanced by the moving of the central office to Washington, and Tombaugh could report his pleasure that the other associations were beginning to seek NASFAA opinion (rather than the other way around) soon after his arrival (Tombaugh to National Council, August 6, 1972). In part these contracts were almost certainly the obligatory courtesy calls which characterize Washington politics, but Tombaugh was correct in noticing a difference based on physical location. With NASFAA established — no matter how tenuously — in the capital, the other educational associations had to make some attempt to link their efforts with those of the aid administrators. The move also gave NASFAA an opportunity to participate more fully in capital events; on September 13, 1972, it hosted a conference on student loans which was attended by representatives of the American Bankers’ Association, several postsecondary institutions, and representatives of Congress, USOE, the Department of the Treasury, and others (Tombaugh to National Council September 27, 1972). Clearly the chance to host such a gathering indicated acceptance of NASFAA as a partner in the higher education community.

Still, the process of building effective liaison was ongoing, and the Association continued as policy the enhancement of its relationships with other organizations. Incoming President Sample exhorted Council members to

> work with and develop our relationships with other ... associations concerned with higher education.... The spirit of cooperation and understanding which has existed must continue .... as they gain from our shared experience, we, too, will gain from the relationship (Sample to National Council, July 2, 1974).

By the end of the year Sample was able to report interassociational activities which evidenced strong ties between NASFAA and a number of other organizations. Events included assisting the National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) in conducting training workshops on loan administration, sponsoring with USOE and the National Association of State Scholarship Programs two meetings on the SSIG program, and developing a consortium arrangement with NACUBO and the American Personnel and Guidance Association to conduct BEOG training. Additionally, and perhaps most significant in terms of the status accorded NASFAA by the middle 1970s, the Association had been invited to join twenty-four other organizations on the National Task Force on Student Aid Problems. This group, chaired by former Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel, became popularly known as the “Keppel Task Force” (Newsletter, June 30, 1975).

The Keppel Task Force was a voluntary assemblage of representatives of government, postsecondary institutions, and higher education associations. The group, initiated by the College Board to look at the future of financial aid as well as its current problems, chose to avoid making policy recommendations, concentrating instead on issues surrounding need analysis and delivery of student assistance. This subject, which had grown more complex with the advent of ACT and its methodology which differed from that of rival CSS, had been complicated further by the enactment in 1972 of the Basic Grant program, which utilized yet another method of determining eligibility for funds. There thus existed by 1974-75 a multiplicity of aid application forms, with differing methodologies and calendars for completion, and students were increasingly confused by the resulting labyrinth. The Keppel Task Force made three recommendations on simplifying the process: a common application form for campus based and BEOG programs, a common application calendar, and a uniform methodology for most aid programs (Halstead, 1979, p. 489). Among the NASFAA members serving on the Task Force were Allan Purdy and Eunice Edwards, Grant Curtis and Dick Waters (technically representing NIFAA) and Thomas Butts, who served as chairman of the subcommittee on the common Application (Newsletter, July 17, 1974). These NASFAA representatives made significant contributions to the progress of the Keppel group; Alexander Sidar, who worked with CSS for many years, recalled that NASFAA frequently served as a bridge between CSS and ACT; as well as between both agencies and the federal government. Indeed, Sidar stated, NASFAA was the one medium in which compromise was frequently possible; he cited the development of the common form as a dramatic example (Sidar, 1982).

By the middle 1970s, then, NASFAA had won the respect of a number of other higher education associations, as clearly demonstrated in the campaign to convince colleges and universities that they should join the newly restructured, institutional-membership NASFAA. Heads of seven prestigious organizations wrote a joint letter to their constituencies urging that they join NASFAA. Signing the letter were representatives of the American Council on Education, the Association of American Universities, the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges, the Association of Jesuit Colleges and Schools, and the National Association of College and University Business Officers. Describing NASFAA as their “working partner,” these men acknowledged the assistance the aid administrators rendered to them in an era of increasing attention to student aid. The long years of helping the other associations by providing them with technical information now seemed to be paying off for NASFAA (Bailey, Kidd, Huitt, Phillips, Tirrell, Kane, and Finn, to “Dear Colleague,” June 1, 1977).

In professional development, as in liaison, NASFAA strategies were proven successful during the early 1970s. The success of the “training the trainers” project in 1972 propelled professional development activities to a more prominent place among NASFAA goals; in 1973 the Association launched a massive “Survey of the Profession,” attempting to develop a sound data basis for determining “where are we and where ought we to be going” as aid administrators. (Newsletter, May 6, 1975). However, in-service training, not research, became the hallmark of NASFAA’s professional development efforts. In 1973 the goals of the in-service training committee were to “continue the development of training materials for use by regional and state trainers” (Newsletter, August...
16, 1973); in that same year Neil Bolyard and Donald Ryan became involved in an ongoing process of examining the training needs of aid administrators and reassessing the proper role of NASFAA in the effort (Bolyard, 1982).

In 1974 the Association received a training contract (jointly with NACUBO and the American Personnel and Guidance Association (APGA)) from USOE for the BEOG program. This project had much larger scope than the earlier training done in 1972; targeted for this effort were 60,000 counselors and 5,500 financial aid administrators. Making the task a bit easier was the decision to rely on the knowledge base already built by NASFAA in teaching state trainers during the previous project. This prepared cadre of people across the nation was so well-regarded by USOE that NASFAA's reputation became preeminent in training activities (Muirhead, 1980). The enhanced recognition gained through outstanding training activities was beneficial to NASFAA in other areas as well (Martin, 1981).

Yet another thrust in professional development during the middle 1970s was a push toward accreditation of institutional financial aid operations and certification of individual aid administrator competencies. NASFAA, under the leadership of Richard Pahre and Gene Miller, formed a certification committee as early as 1974, and Miller presented a paper on the subject at the 1975 Aspen Conference. The Association took note of the importance of this area; in the 1975-76 Annual Report outgoing President Clark called for expansion of certification and accreditation efforts. Part of the rationale behind the interest in this aspect of professional development was the similar interest of USOE. Aid administrators, preferring self-regulation to that imposed from the federal bureaucrats, sought to create a system for accreditation and certification which could surpass standards imposed for federal programs only (Sample, 1986). Yet obtaining agreement on such broad issues was not always simple or expeditious; just getting a "Statement of Good Practices" upon which everyone — in an association made up of representatives of such diverse institutions — could agree had taken four years to develop before it was adopted by National Council in October, 1975 (Newsletter, January 12, 1976).

Professional development and liaison, then, had both been emphasized in organizational strategies during the period 1972-1977. Legislative advocacy, too, continued as a primary activity for the Association. While it occupied a relatively less visible thrust during the early 1970s than it had previously, it was still the overall objective of NASFAA to exert influence on federal aid policies. The A&R Paper, for example, maintained that NIFAA could be merged with NASFAA since lobbying activities were by 1975 "far exceeded" by other associational concerns (Waters et al., 1975). If this were not totally accurate prior to the year it was printed it probably was true during the next two years; the Association was preoccupied with its own internal structural decisions. Further, after the 1972 modification and reauthorization of the 1965 Higher Education Act, much of the legislative business concerning student aid was settled for several years. The move to Washington coincided with the 1972 struggle, and in its aftermath NASFAA had a simple goal regarding legislative advocacy: to maintain its contacts and involvement, and to increase them whenever possible.

The Commission and Committee System Emerges

NASFAA had been evolving from such systems built around the personal contacts of a few individuals toward more formal and broad-based efforts since Grant Curtis ended his term in October, 1972. His successor, Eunice Edwards, had continued and accelerated this process. Through its first six years the Association had utilized a number of committees and "commissions," but the differences and relationships between of these groups had not always been clear. Edwards sought to clarify responsibilities by the establishment of commissions which would oversee the work of committees. Under her plan those committees which had tasks of related natures would be joined organizationally under commissions which could unify their efforts (Edwards, 1982).

Edwards certainly had sufficient time to get the new committee system functioning; she served as NASFAA President from October, 1972, until June 30, 1974. [Her term was extended in order to facilitate a change in the association's calendar; after 1973-74 the NASFAA year would run July 1 through June 30.] During her protracted period as president Edwards was able to get the commissions/commissions idea accepted by the Council. Edson Sample supported and continued the arrangement throughout his 1974-75 term of office. During his tenure NASFAA did look into the possibility of reorganizing committees along sectional lines as a cost-saving measure, but that idea, attractive though it was in light of the customary financial straits of the Association, was defeated in October, 1974. Most members of the Executive Committee felt that a national perspective, with the emphasis on a broad consensus, was too important an aspect of NASFAA committee work to allow poor finances to defeat. The commission and committee structure started by Edwards thus continued.

It did not continue unexamined, however, and at the 1973 and 1974 Leadership Conferences reports were presented on the committee system used by NASFAA. That system's record had been uneven, and much of the difficulty was attributed to the lack of sufficient funding to support group meetings. As a result of the reports on the system, the Council in 1974 voted to seek a "Director of the Commissions and Committees" who would monitor the activities and help gain support services for all groups. Additionally, the Director would serve as a liaison among the various committees, adding an extra measure of coordination to the system developed by Edwards. Finally, the Council recognized, the work of the Commissions and Committees of NASFAA had become "a most important facet of our Association's very being." Given its increasing role, they concluded, the Commission and Committee system's Director should be a salaried employee of NASFAA. NIFAA was requested to secure funding for this purpose, but, until successful completion of this request, a volunteer would be solicited (Newsletter, November 15, 1974).

This greater emphasis on the roles of committees during the first half of the 1970s indicated the increasing democratization of NASFAA. Although its Leadership Conferences were invitational in nature, they still involved many more individuals than did Council alone, and they also provided an excellent forum for committees to meet and act. The appointment of Joe McCormick as the first Director of the Commissions and Committees, and the work he did in helping facilitate committee sessions, also involved members
of NASFAA directly in its decision-making processes. During Bob Clark’s term as President, 1975-1976, the move toward greater membership participation accelerated rapidly. One factor was the holding of the Association’s first National Conference, in Aspen, Colorado. 570 members of NASFAA were registered for this event, which was by far the largest number ever to have had the opportunity to discuss organizational goals and policies. Plans were immediately made to hold another Conference the following year, both because of the popular support for such membership involvement and because of the supplementary revenue of $12,000 generated by the Aspen meeting (Sample, 1986, p. 1.5.10).

President Clark also wanted to strengthen the committee and commission system, believing that it provided a means of getting the “grass-roots know-how” to the top. He found the commission and committee structure, as it had evolved since 1973, to be a mixture of success and failure (Clark, 1981). In order to help its new Director, Joe McCormick, make the system more responsive to associational needs, Clark solicited volunteers for committee assignments through the NASFAA Newsletter, thus intentionally broadening the base from which appointments could be made (Newsletter, April 5, 1975). His efforts to secure the more effective functioning of the committee system were apparently rewarded; Clark was later recognized as having led the commission and committee system into becoming “a viable mechanism for conducting the activities of the Association” (Newsletter, August 11, 1976).

Both of Clark’s two immediate successors, Millie McAuley and Joe McCormick, continued the emphasis on the committee system as a means of involving the membership in NASFAA activities. Each appointed Neil Bolyard of West Virginia as Director of Commissions and Committees, and Bolyard provided effective organizational skills for the task. He structured the system to provide for permanent commissions, with non-permanent committees organized under each one in accordance with their purposes and functions (Minutes of Executive Committee, July 18, 1976). By the end of Bolyard’s service as Director the Committee and Commission system of Associational activity and decision-making was firmly entrenched, and the system was certainly more responsive to the larger membership than had earlier been the case.

A Democratizing NASFAA

The Association had been involved in a process of democratization in other ways, too. Council began in early 1970s to hear concerns of groups which felt left out of associational deliberations. Some of these concerns had been expressed by a group of minority aid administrators to Grant Curtis. While attending a NASFAA meeting in 1972 Curtis met with several of these minority aid administrators to discuss their under-representation on the National Council. Out of their meeting came the idea of choosing “at large” Council members in addition to the regional representatives and officers. This new idea also provided the solution to another problem that had bothered some Council members; experienced hands on Council had to continue to win regional positions in order to continue to serve NASFAA, and this meant that it was impossible to keep on council some individuals whose previous service made their presence beneficial. The coincidental appeal by the minority aid administrators for representation added to the movement to enlarge Council by electing members-at-large; and this practice was begun with the 1973-74 year. Voting for the at-large positions was done by Council itself, and the first members so chosen were weighted toward the old hands rather than the minorities. Selected were Edson Sample, Allan Purdy, Dick Rowe, Joe Henry, and Alexander Sidar, along with one minority member, Millie McAuley; by the following year, however, the at-large positions were “slotted” by race and sector to assure balance on the Council (Curtis, 1979; Newsletter, June 30, 1975).

The concerns had not been so much related to the practices of NASFAA — the organization had from its inception included representatives of minorities in its efforts to be broadly representative of the aid community — as they were based on the lack of a system which guaranteed the practices would continue. Eunice Edwards, as the first Association president who happened to be black, understood the need for these guarantees to be built into the system; it was she who gave leadership to the Council as it prepared to “slot” the at-large positions for 1974-75 (Newsletter, June 30, 1975). Edwards was not alone in appreciating systematic guarantees of membership involvement; Grant Curtis, in response to his meeting with the minority aid administrators at NASFAA, appointed a Commission on Minority Interests in March, 1972, to be chaired by Robert Franklin of Roosevelt University. In an effort to assure that this Commission could become directly involved in attempting to influence federal policy, Curtis and Edwards introduced Franklin to the key contacts of NASFAA in Washington (Newsletter, March 9, 1972).

While this may have enhanced minority involvement in NASFAA, there still frequently existed too much direction from Council and not enough input from members themselves (Anderson, 1982). The Council remained, in 1974, something of a small — if not always united — club. Infighting among regional representatives marred Council sessions; Bob Clark later recalled the difficulty he had experienced in persuading Council members to take a national perspective on issues facing them (Clark, 1981). When the Ad Hoc Committee of Past Presidents was asked in 1975 to examine the A&R Paper, they did so with broader interests than just the type dues structure the Association should have; from the national outlook they held as a result of having served a national constituency, these individuals well-understood Bob Clark’s frustration. A Council composed of regional representatives was one area of organizational concern which would demand the attention of those NASFAA leaders who wanted the Association to transcend sectional perspectives, and attention to the system of choosing representatives to that governing body would follow the more immediate structural question regarding institutional dues.

A Changing Policy Arena

The style NASFAA employed in attempting to effect its strategies remained a personal one throughout this period, but the perils of that emphasis were illustrated by the 1972 reauthorization process. The Higher Education Act of 1965 was due to be renewed a year earlier, but the Congress postponed action until 1972. NASFAA, as had other higher education associations, had developed close ties to the House side of the Congress; these bonds were particularly strong with Edith Green, Chairman of the House Subcommittee which would deal with reauthorization. Thus, as the process began
in earnest in 1972, the aid administrators tended to place their emphasis on Green’s ideas, virtually ignoring the Senate version of the legislation (Gaul, 1980).

There were substantive differences between the two Houses of Congress; differences based not just on technical aspects of student aid but more importantly on its underlying philosophy. Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Education, favored a drastic alteration of the existing arrangement, providing for a basic aid effort which would award grant funds directly to students meeting eligibility requirements rather than allocating funds to institutions for use as student aid. The Pell proposal also continued the existing aid programs. Green, on the other hand, supported minor adjustments to existing programs and staunchly opposed any needy student’s “entitlement” to funds regardless of which institution he or she attended. The argument between the two subcommittee chairs was one between the Senate philosophy that federal aid should not prop open the doors of postsecondary institutions which in the absence of federal support could not attract sufficient enrollment and the Green contention that entitlement assistance would result in the creation of “a morass of bureaucratic incompetence.” Green’s views were also formed around the desire to let each student be assisted according to individual circumstances of need and merit rather than according to the results of some arbitrary formula; the campus aid administrator, she argued, could ideally “sit down with each student and ‘package’ the available aid to fit the individual student’s situation” (Gladieux and Wolanin, 1976, p. 132).

The基本 decision to be made concerned individual student versus institutional aid; the higher education community in Washington instinctively backed Green’s version, not only because of their longstanding connections with her but also because it appeared to be in the best interests of their institutional members. In the preliminary discussion before 1972 the higher education associations did not so much argue against Pell’s student entitlement idea as they ignored its possibilities; Pell was visibly annoyed by the silence with which the postsecondary education lobby greeted his proposal (Gladieux and Wolanin, 1976, p. 95).

The breach widened as the legislative activity accelerated in 1972; now the educational associations were forced to address both of the formal proposals for reauthorization and to take sides on them in public. Almost from habit NASFAA joined with the majority of the community in offering strong support to Green’s proposals. The Association, of course, had just opened its Washington office, and it was still actively seeking equal partnership with the other organizations. Further, the aid administrators were concerned about funding for the aid program Pell proposed; as the basic aid effort of the federal government the new grants might jeopardize the existing aid programs by diverting scarce resources away from them (Edwards, 1982).

There was some justification for this concern; the Nixon Administration had proposed for two years the creation of a student assistance entitlement program, to be accompanied by the substantial reduction of the campus-based federal student aid. NASFAA, and most of the higher education groups involved, feared that Senator Pell’s new agenda, while not intended to do so, would inevitably lead in the direction favored by the Administration (Gladieux and Wolanin, 1976, p. 182). Actually there was little to fear from the Nixon White House in the election year of 1972.

Nixon had been surprisingly supportive of a student aid effort by the federal government, and while his appointees in USOE and elsewhere in the federal bureaucracy had certainly earned the distrust of Congressional staffs and many career Office of Education professionals, there had been no public effort by the Nixonians to dismantle the Great Society legacy in student financial assistance. Nixon himself found the issue in 1972 interesting mainly from the prospect of its effect on his electoral success that fall. During the famous “smoking gun” conversation which later confirmed Nixon’s downfall in the Watergate scandal, the President had revealed his attitude toward the 1972 reauthorization. In wondering whether or not he should sign the Bill, he repeatedly questioned his aides concerning the “sex appeal” of the measure. “How it would play in Peoria” was apparently the basis of decision-making on this, as on so many other issues, in the Nixon Administration (Froelicher, 1982).

Out of the apprehension — however poorly founded it might have been — regarding the potential for reduction of other aid programs if the “Basic Grants” (BEOG) emerged as the premier effort by the federal government came a new rationale on which Green could oppose the Pell concept. When the two versions of the Bill reached the conference committee Green fought Pell not so much on her concerns regarding the inflexibility of bureaucratic rationality as on the danger to existing aid efforts which were, after all, successful. From her argument emerged a compromise: “trigger” mechanisms were placed in the legislation; Basic Grants would only be funded after certain levels of spending had been appropriated for the campus based programs (Gladieux and Wolanin, 1976, pp. 182-183).

Even with this compromise present the aid administrators continued to regard the Pell proposal with skepticism. Their doubt was partially based on the knowledge that a less sympathetic Congress could always later reverse what this one had enacted regarding the triggers, but it also resulted from a concern over loss of campus control under a centralized program. NASFAA stoutly maintained at the time that funding, not control, was the core of the issue, but after the passage of several years at least one aid administrator was willing to acknowledge to a Senate aide that the control factor had played a part (Jerue, 1982). The motives of the Association, then, were mixed; included were prior contacts and loyalties on the House side, desires to be affiliated with the majority of the higher education community, fears over the possibility of the loss of funding for workable programs when an unknown effort was begun, and self-interest in terms of personal ability to direct funds to students according to professional judgment rather than serving as clerks who dispensed the federal largesse according to rote formula.

Whatever their motives, however, NASFAA had chosen the losing side in the struggle; Pell’s grant program was adopted as a major new thrust in the federal aid effort. The entire higher education community experienced a real loss of influence with the Congress, and the bitterness on the Senate side lingered for some years (Jerue, 1982). Part of this was focused on NASFAA; Steve Wexler, Counsel for the Senate Subcommittee on Education at the time, was so angered by the support of the aid administrators for Green’s efforts that he would rarely speak to NASFAA representatives for months thereafter; until his death in a motorcycle accident in 1975 Wexler viewed NASFAA with suspicion, always placing the aid administrators on the defensive in their conversations with him (Edwards, 1982; Froelicher, 1982). Clearly the use of personal contacts had its limitations.
That personal contacts were the basic skills available to NASFAA, however, was not in doubt in 1972. Still, the Association was beginning to become a bit more sophisticated in its approaches; when that summer there was a potential crisis in the Guaranteed Student Loan program NASFAA notified its members of the problem, which in turn resulted in hundreds of telegrams and letters being sent to the White House and Capitol Hill in support of its position. The communications this time were not restricted to aid administrators rather, students and parents were enlisted to assist in the effort to advise policymakers. Perhaps NASFAA was beginning to see the practical impact of more direct communication from constituents as opposed to flying a group of specialists into Washington at every aid crisis (Newsletter, September 8, 1972).

The days of so doing were numbered in any event; a new Congress convened in January, 1973. Apparently out of frustration over her 1972 defeat at the hands of the Basic Grant proposal, Edith Green had surrendered her Subcommittee chairmanship for a spot on the Appropriations Committee (Gladiox and Wolanin, 1976, pp. 237-238); James O’Hara of Michigan, a virtual unknown to the NASFAA membership, was the new power to face in the House. O’Hara was not a man to be persuaded by the arguments so frequently used by NASFAA; the issue orientation which had characterized the Association’s involvement previously would have to give way to more pragmatic politics under O’Hara’s leadership. Yet NASFAA had not yet completely learned this lesson, and Tombaugh continued to stress the concept of financial aid as promoting the common good more than he attempted to address the political realities of building a power relationship with the Congress (Tombaugh, 1982). Still, NASFAA did make some strides in gaining the respect of the new Chairman; they invited him to speak to a variety of functions, educated him on the need for the existing multiplicity of aid programs which had at first seemed ludicrous to him, and labored diligently to form a personal relationship with him reminiscent of that which they had had with Edith Green (O’Hara, 1981). Relations with the House side beginning in 1973, then, were cordial but not as effective as they had been prior to 1972.

Strain continued to characterize the relationship of the entire higher education establishment with the Senate side; Pell remained visibly irritated by the alliance between the community and Green, and, believing the alliance had been characterized by secret dealings, his attitude hardened into a “bunker mentality” (Froelicher, 1982). Years later Pell would still remember the One Dupont Circle associations as “the great fudge factory,” and he continued to regard with deep suspicion the motives of higher education associations (Jerue, 1982). NASFAA, as did the other associations, had bridges to build in the Senate. Ironically the new Basic Grant program offered exactly the opportunity needed in that regard; the program immediately involved aid administrators across the nation in ways theretofore unimagined; NASFAA reflected this new involvement over the next several years by accelerating its process of moving from the efforts of a small group of old professionals to a more open system including many more people (Cable, 1980). The use of new people in the process helped soften the animosities lingering between the organization and the Senate Subcommittee, since that latter group could now view NASFAA as larger than just the few who had alienated them in 1972.

During this stressful period NASFAA attempted to continue its normal operations, submitting testimony when invited to do so and maintaining insofar as possible its personal contacts throughout the Washington policy arena. These efforts were supplemented by renewed attempts to educate the membership through the Newsletter, in which Purdy described the political process in more explicit detail than he had done previously (Newsletter, February 21, 1973; April 28, 1973). Fortunately for the Association, the legislative issues confronting the aid community had been decided in broad outline by the reauthorization process, and the informal contacts of Tombaugh, Purdy, and the organization’s presidents were sufficient to prevent much regulatory harm to the aid programs during this period.

Since NASFAA began at this same time the struggle over its internal structural concerns, it paid less attention than usual to its legislative advocacy efforts during 1974 and 1975. While newsletters of those years continued to chronicle frequent NASFAA testimony and political involvement and to solicit member support and grass roots efforts on specific issues, the Association was diverted from its legislative advocacy by its internal concerns. Sample’s Annual Report, for instance, concentrated much more heavily on associational activities than on federal relations (Newsletter, June 30, 1975). Further, Allan Purdy suffered a heart attack in 1974, and while Eunice Edwards provided an able substitute during his recovery, no one could quite fill Purdy’s position in his unique manner (Newsletter, August 17, 1974). When Purdy decided to relinquish responsibility for federal relations permanently, it was the end of an era for the Association he had done so much to develop and nurture. Although informal personal contacts would continue to be important to NASFAA in its efforts to influence federal policy, Purdy’s warm style would be missed even as the Association moved into more broadly collaborative and formal arrangements, such as the development of a policies and procedures guideline, for legislative advocacy.

His legislative skills would be missed as well; while sometimes NASFAA seemed to be knowledgeable in its lobbying pursuits, at other times it exhibited a bewildering lack of political sophistication. In 1976, for example, NASFAA supported the inclusion of a “subminimum” wage for students employed in the College Work-Study program. Their support of this Republican proposal angered Chairman O’Hara, whose aide Jim Harrison telephoned NASFAA President McAuley to castigate the aid administrators. McAuley was surprised to learn from Harrison that the wage issue was one proposed by O’Hara’s rivals and opposed by his supporters in organized labor; she had not even realized that the issue was partisan. Harrison was amazed that “anyone lobbying could be such total babes in the woods,” recalled McAuley (O’Hara, 1981).

Despite such naivete in the political arena, however, NASFAA was emerging once again in the view of Congressional staffers as a beneficial source of data concerning the aid programs. Harrison continued to view them with some suspicion, thinking NASFAA appeared to be “spokesmen for the vested interest of their universities.” He did, however, become increasingly impressed with the group’s professional skills and technical understanding of the existing aid structure. By the time the 1976 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act came around, the House was once again “dependent in large part on the expertise of the student aid profession” (Harrison, 1981). Still, NASFAA did not always understand the high regard in which its skills were held in 1976. It had, as the year began, a brand new Executive Secretary in
Washington, and Dallas Martin admitted his uncertainty concerning the political arena during his first months in charge. Despite his own reservations, Martin possessed significant political skills; yet establishing the Washington contacts necessary to use these skills would occupy his attention in his early days at the central office. Consequently, as Martin recalled, NASFAA was not as influential in 1976 as were other groups (Martin, personal interview, 1985). It remained for later years for NASFAA to show its true strength in contributing to public policy development.

CHAPTER IV: THE ATTAINMENT OF GOALS

Selling the New Structure

At the close of the St. Louis meeting in which NASFAA adopted an institutional dues structure, incoming President Joe McCormick and Executive Secretary Martin shared a ride to the airport. Each man had labored diligently to assure adoption of the new structure, motivated by a common desire to see the financial stability of the Association assured. Now, on their way to the airport, each became aware of a new reality. The change they had long desired had been effected; but now they had to wonder whether or not the change would be successful. Would enough institutions actually join the new NASFAA? If not, the two leaders realized, Dallas Martin would soon have no job, and Joe McCormick would preside over the demise of the very organization he had sought to stabilize (McCormick, 1983). Fortunately, they need not have worried. During that first year of structural change NASFAA attracted 1,461 institutional members and received dues income of $261,100 (McCormick, 1978, p. 10). Total income from all sources was $367,376.39, which compared to the previous year’s dues income of $115,525 and total income of $168,223.37 (Sample, 1986, pp. 7.3.15-7.3.17). Further, this institutional base actually served 211 more individuals than had belonged to the Association in the previous year (3,100 compared to 2,889), based on staff members at member institutions (McCormick, 1978, p. 10).

Indeed, the increase was so rapid and so far beyond expectations for the first year of institutional membership that NASFAA actually had excess revenue: total expenditures for the 1977-78 year were $268,916.43 (over $100,000 more than previous year), but there remained a surplus greater than $98,000. This excess was used to establish a reserve fund for the Association (McCormick, 1978, p. 18). The surplus arose from inability in the first year of a new system to predict and therefore to budget institutional dues income. Accordingly, the Council did not budget its expenditures on a large scale for the 1977-78 year, preferring to wait for the new system to be tested prior to committing vastly increased funds to needed activities.

The rapid income growth did not occur without substantial effort. Joe McCormick attended 66 aid association meetings in an eighteen-month period, including all regional meetings and numerous state meetings. He saw this attendance as “barnstorming” for NASFAA membership, feeling that institutions would join if they received a clear, personal message as to the importance of the organization. The way McCormick thought best to provide this personal message was through extensive travel, so he simply kept his suitcase packed and ready (McCormick, 1983). Dallas Martin was also active in promoting membership; while he did not travel as extensively as did the Association’s elected leader, Martin communicated regularly with aid administrators throughout the nation. In September, 1977, by which time 950 institutions had paid their dues, Martin wrote a “Dear Fellow Financial Aid Administrator” letter encouraging schools to join NASFAA. 950 members was a promising beginning, he wrote, but “your professional association can only truly represent the financial aid community with the support of all the institutions in the nation.”
Because of the growth in dollars and programs, he argued, aid is having a larger impact upon institutions than previously. Therefore, “it behooves the financial aid community to present a unified voice before the Congress and Administrative agencies. Your input is absolutely necessary” (September 23, 1977). Further, Martin asked each state president, on behalf of John Moore, chairman of the membership committee, to select a state representative who would actively solicit membership in NASFAA from non-members in their state. Martin also called special attention to Moore’s request in a special “Status Report” to State Association Presidents (September 30, 1977). Thus, based upon his own personal efforts together with the coordination of membership through representatives in the states and exhortations by Martin promoting the Association, Joe McCormick could proudly proclaim to his colleagues at the close of his presidency that “our goal of financial stability has been achieved.” Now, for the first time, he continued, NASFAA can “truly provide the type of membership services and leadership so long needed by our profession” (Newsletter, August 1, 1978).

Presidential visits continued during 1978-79 in an effort to expand membership even more. President Neil Bolyard visited all regional meetings as well as those in most states. No systematic arrangements had then been determined for such visits; it was even unclear as to who should bear their costs. During Bolyard’s term payments were divided — sometimes state associations were able to pay, sometimes the National Association paid, and on two occasions his institution, West Virginia University, reimbursed him for his travel expenses (Bolyard, 1982). These efforts, the increasing visibility of student aid based on legislative activity in 1978, and the growing reputation of NASFAA within the aid community all contributed to a membership increase of 11 percent, to 1,627 institutions in 1978-79. Dues income expanded to $290,530, also an increase of 11 percent. Total income soared to $591,384.48, including revenues from investments, publications, the training contract with USOE, and the national conference (Sample, 1986, p. 7.3.19).

During 1979-80 associational membership again advanced, rising to 1,979 institutions — a gain of 21.5 percent (Sample, 1986, p. 9.1.2). Much of this gain could be attributed to the diligent and systematic work of membership chairman Thomas M. Rutter of the University of California at San Diego, whose committee was named Committee of the Year for its efforts in promoting the growth of the Association. The committee not only achieved a yield which surpassed expectations but also proposed a number of tactical changes in membership solicitation which were eventually adopted, including rolling membership, billing for renewals, and recruitment of new institutional members from the proprietary sector (Rutter to National Council, April 8, 1980). President Bob Huff was obviously pleased with the progress Rutter’s committee had made during his year in office, but he also realized that the job remained unfinished. In his report to the membership at the close of his term Huff stated:

I still remain dissatisfied with the current level of NASFAA’s membership compared with the potential for membership. Means have to be devised to increase membership by at least another 50 percent or legitimate doubts can be raised about the authority of the organization to speak for all of the financial aid community. I believe it will also lack an adequate, permanent funding base until its ranks are greater (Sample, 1986, p. 1.8.3)

By the end of the 1980-81 year there would be an additional increase of 18 percent in the membership of NASFAA — while not the 50 percent increase Huff had said would be necessary, this growth to 2,338 institutional memberships illustrated the steady enlargement of the base of the Association which had begun with its structural conversion (Sample, 1986, p. 9.1.2).

Long Range Planning

The drive to increase membership in the Association had followed immediately upon the approval of institutional dues in 1977. Several other recommendations of the A&R Paper were not adopted in that year, since NASFAA had determined to concentrate on the larger issue first. In order to focus the attention of the organization on other recommendations concerning potential structural changes, the Council established a new committee in May, 1977, giving it the title of “Long Range Planning.” This group was given broad freedom to pursue such areas of inquiry as it thought beneficial to the Association. The central idea behind the formation of the Long Range Planning Committee was “to provide NASFAA a means of self-examination ... a process by which a committee, without detailed and specific instructions, could consider the organizational structure of the Association and its relationship with other associations, postsecondary institutions, and federal agencies” (Association Governance Committee, 1984).

Neil Bolyard continued the Committee under the same charge as had been given at its founding. Under the chairmanship of Lola Finch the Long Range Planning Committee conducted several special assignments, but its main focus continued to concern “the organizational structure of NASFAA and to suggest ways in which it might be improved” (Finch to National Council, June, 1979). Her committee, after many hours of internal discussion and opinion-gathering, mailed to the membership in April, 1979, a survey soliciting views on several alternative models of associational governance. These models related particularly to the composition and manner of election of the Council itself; members were asked to rank four alternatives according to their preferences, and space for extended comments was provided on the survey document (Long Range Planning Committee, 1979).

Based on insights gained through this survey and on the opinions of the Committee membership, the Long Range Planning Committee released in the fall of 1979 a report outlining its recommendations for changes in the composition and election of Council. President Bob Huff had the report reprinted in the Newsletter, and called for membership comment on its contents. Plans called for the Council to take action on the recommendations of the Long Range Planning Committee at their meeting in July, 1980, and to vote on any necessary resulting changes in the By-Laws at its October, 1980, meeting. The report itself covered twelve typewritten pages. Among its more significant proposals which were adopted were a reduction in the number of regional representatives to Council from 18 to 12 and an increase in the number of at-large positions from 6 to 10 to be elected 5 per year for two year staggered terms, with elections to be held by the national membership rather than by regions (Newsletter, October 25, 1979).
Democratization and Nationalization

Two processes were in evidence in the Committee report. First, the Committee was continuing the democratization of council by calling for the direct election of some of its members. This followed a move in 1978 to choose a President-Elect by vote of the membership rather than by vote of council itself; Bob Huff was thus the first popularly elected NASFAA President (National Council minutes February 23, 1978). Second, the Committee was moving the Association toward a national base and away from more provincial perspectives. The historic structure of NASFAA, with its emphasis on the representatives of regions holding the power to make decisions, had arisen out of a perceived need to have a national coordinating body for regional activity. As the Association had evolved, however, its members had come to expect more leadership than coordination. The direct election of presidents reflected this expectation; it helped preclude the regional trade-offs and bargaining which had sometimes characterized previous Council elections (Miller, 1982). The proposed reduction in regional representation, the Long Range Planning Committee felt, would accelerate this process of becoming a truly national organization. Regions would still hold 12 of 27 positions on Council, but this would be a minority of Council voting strength, as opposed to their historic 18 of 29 majority (Newsletter, October 25, 1979).

Some concessions were made to the regions, however. Regional associations had preceded the national organization in the 1960s, after all, and the Committee affirmed that regions should not now become subject to the dictates of NASFAA. For instance, the Nominations Committee proposed in their report would remain in the hands of the regions. Even here, however, there was a significant alteration. Rather than continue to be chosen, one per region, by regional representatives on the Council itself, the members of the nominations committee henceforth were to be elected, again one per regional association, by the NASFAA members within each region. Concerns over the proper relationship of the regions and the national association had surfaced early in the history of NASFAA, and as Edson Sample had doubtless learned from his experience with the scissors, the issue was highly controversial. The appearance and subsequent adoption of this Long Range Planning Committee report did not cause the issue to disappear, but it did seem to diminish the regional tensions which had accompanied Council meetings previously. Adoption was achieved on schedule, with a majority of 19-6 voting to make the appropriate amendments for the accomplishment of the report to the By-Laws. As Gene Miller, then President of the Association, recalled, getting the report adopted by Council was no easy assignment, since those voting on the proposals were in essence voting themselves a diminished role in future deliberations of Council. She was delighted, however, that council members were able to put aside their own selfish concerns, realizing that giving up regional power was in the best interests of the national body (Miller, 1982).

The process of nationalizing the Association, as well as the new reality of sufficient funding for enhanced services, created the opportunity for alterations in the staffing arrangements of the Association. Concerns related to the central office operations of NASFAA took two forms: Council attempted to define the differing roles of staff versus volunteers and to determine the proper staff size for the services desired. This introspection began soon after it became clear that sufficient institutions were indeed joining the Association and that financial arrangements were likely to be satisfactory. In the autumn of 1977 the Council referred to its newly designated Long Range Planning Committee a motion to change the title of Executive Secretary to Executive Director. This change, which obviously would give increased recognition to Dallas Martin, was also designed to strengthen his authority to act on behalf of the Association. Recognizing that there are situations in which the Association’s salaried staff must act quickly, without the luxury of time to contact the elected leaders, the Long Range Planning Committee promptly advocated the change in titles, and Council ratified their recommendation in February, 1978 (National Council Minutes, October 20, 1977; February 23, 1978). This title change marked the beginning of much debate among NASFAA members as to the appropriate role of the salaried employees; the debate has lasted until the present. With funding increased to a level in which additional staff could be employed as needed, expanded services could be offered to members through the central office. With the new services and staff, however, came a concomitant requirement for more routine decision-making at the central office.

By the end of Bob Huff’s presidency in 1980 the issue of proper roles had been the subject of increased scrutiny, and Huff concluded that more formal attention was needed in regard to the division of labor between elected officers and the “splendid” salaried staff. “Too often,” Huff argued, “it is unclear whether a specific responsibility falls to the Executive Director or to the President.” More systematic communication between the officers and the central office staff is also desirable.” Huff carefully avoided letting his call for role clarification be construed as a criticism of the staff on hand, stating unequivocally that “the greatest strength of NASFAA is in its Executive Director, Dallas Martin. The influence which NASFAA enjoys and its ability to provide significant input in legislative and regulatory matters are all attributable to Dr. Martin’s dedication and great talent.” He further acknowledged the good fortune of the Association in securing the assistance of an “industrious and knowledgeable” support staff for Martin; he cited in particular the splendid work of Joyce Dunagan and Joan Holland (Sample, 1986, p. 1.8.4).

Dunagan, who had served as Director of Financial Aid at George Washington University, became Assistant Director of NASFAA at the beginning of the 1978-79 year, thus joining Barbara Anderson on the professional staff at the central office. In May, 1979, Dunagan was promoted to Associate Director of the Association (Newsletter, May 22, 1978; Sample, 1986, p. 5.2.1). Holland, who had served as an Assistant Director of the Training Project and earlier as an aid director at Brenau College in Georgia, began service as Assistant Director of NASFAA in fall, 1979 (Newsletter, October 2, 1979). She initially had responsibilities in supporting the work of commissions and committees, primarily in training and professional development (Newsletter, June 25, 1979). To accommodate the enlarged staff the central office moved twice between the beginning of 1977 and the end of 1980 (Sample, 1986, p. 5.1.1).
Evolving Strategies
Augmented NASFAA strategies accompanied the increases in space, staff, membership, and finances. As McCormick began his presidency in 1977 he had seen the possibilities ahead, viewing “a whole range of opportunities for the financial aid profession.” As an institutional membership organization, he argued, NASFAA now had “tremendous potential for development and professional growth.” McCormick listed three areas which would be crucial to the proper evolution of the organization. First, he saw the need to establish

a strong financial base so it [NASFAA] can provide the kind of services required by a growing profession. The research, training, publications, consulting, and other service needs of the financial aid community must be met and can only be addressed with sufficient capital (Newsletter, July 21, 1977).

Second, McCormick called for increased membership participation in decision-making. Third, he urged his colleagues to be progressive rather than reactive in dealing with the higher education community: no longer should NASFAA members be contented with gaining the ear of policymakers regarding only the technical aspects of aid programs; rather, they should formulate “well-developed positions far enough in advance so that members of Congress and others can react to NASFAA’s statements and philosophy as a basis of their consideration” (Newsletter, July 21, 1977).

Progress toward attaining the first two goals was soon evidenced; the increased membership provided the opportunity for the services McCormick listed; the Long Range Planning Committee’s recommendations related to governance and elections helped fulfill the need for additional membership involvement in Association decisions. It remained unclear whether NASFAA could attain a position from which its views would be solicited in advance of (rather than in reaction to) ideas from the rest of the higher education community.

Liaison With Others in the Policy Arena
The Association had certainly gained in stature within the larger community during the middle 1970s; as aid had increased in importance to campuses several other Washington associations had endorsed the importance of the aid administrators to their campus constituencies. Formal stature of a different kind was achieved by NASFAA in the summer of 1977; upon the recommendation of Dallas Martin the Council voted to apply for “Constituent Organization” membership in ACE. Dues for such membership were $650, a sum which earlier might have prohibited the aid administrators from joining, but Martin explained that membership would provide closer linkage with the higher education community, allowing aid administrators to be officially involved in the structuring of ACE policy positions while not jeopardizing NASFAA’s autonomy (Martin to National Council, July 5, 1977). By the end of the year the membership request had been approved by ACE, and a formal relationship with that group replaced the long-standing informal contacts. During the 1978-79 year, for example, ACE invited NASFAA to hold a one-year term on its Board of Directors. President Bolyard represented the Association as one of the two outside organizations serving on the ACE Board that year (Bolyard, 1982).

Bolyard had been chosen President-Elect by Council in February, 1978, replacing Thomas Butts in that position. Butts, who had been selected to succeed Joe McCormick as president, instead accepted a position as a policy advisor on student aid within the Carter Administration’s Office of Education. Bolyard himself was a man of broad experience within NASFAA; as such he was a natural selection for filling a position with less than normal planning time (a similar situation had occurred once previously, when Dallas Martin resigned as President-Elect in 1974 to accept a job with ACT, and Edson Sample, also a person of much experience, moved his term forward one year to fill the void). Bolyard had succeeded Allan Purdy as Director of the Commission on State and Federal Relations, and he had then served for two years as Director of Commissions and Committees. He certainly understood the strategies of the Association, and he was thus well-prepared to assume the presidency in July, 1978 (Newsletter, February 27, 1978).

By his own admission Bolyard preferred to function behind the scenes rather than out front. He further believed that the central office should become increasingly involved in NASFAA decision-making. Consequently, Bolyard’s strategy was to let the Association speak with one voice; and increasingly the voice was to be that of Dallas Martin (Bolyard, 1982). Indeed, many of the skills of the Association were best expressed by its Executive Director. After experiencing what he termed a slow start in learning the politics of Washington, Martin rapidly developed a network of influential connections during the 1977-78 year. Through him the Association was increasingly recognized as a group of experts who could speak for higher education regarding the effect on students of proposed changes to federal programs. As Jerry Roschwalb, Director of Government Relations for the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC) acknowledged, NASFAA had become valuable to the higher education community precisely to the degree that it can be looked to for highly objective technical expertise... (Just how would a change of phrase in a regulation affect the welfare of students and their families? What kind of timing is important in getting documents to the campus? How much does it cost to distribute funds in a work study program?) The point where NASFAA and the association’s members stop being technically expert and become just one more special interest representative (like myself) they lose the invaluable credibility of experts and gain probably not that much influence in this multi-faceted business of federal relations (Roschwalb to Martin, August 17, 1978).

While Roschwalb’s remarks appeared to be designed to encourage NASFAA neutrality on specific issues, he included in the same letter effusive praise for Martin’s political skills, lauding his “leadership” and expressing the universal admiration of Martin by his colleagues at One Dupont Circle. Perhaps it would have confirmed Roschwalb’s view of Martin had he received a copy of the Executive Director’s next communication to the Council and state association presidents (November 13, 1978), in which he stated that NASFAA will be asked to respond and provide technical analysis to various proposals [on student aid during upcoming reauthorization]. It is essential... that we maintain as much neutrality as possible throughout this debate, in order to direct the discussions into reasonable and manageable outcomes... NASFAA must continue to be an open forum representing all sectors of postsecondary education and taking into consideration the best thinking of all of our members.
NASFAA thus would continue to take the technical middle ground, not as representatives of narrow interests but rather as experts on the outcomes resulting from various proposals. In this role NASFAA had recently prospered beyond its fondest hopes of earlier years. Both the skills and the operating style of the Association were clearly illustrated by its activities related to the passage of the Middle Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA) in 1978. The chance for its involvement in this crucial legislation came as a result of a growing reputation and relationship with Congressman William Ford. On August 5, 1977, Ford, as Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education, had written to Martin, thanking him “for accepting the role as the ‘unofficial spokesperson’ for the postsecondary education community with respect to the Family Contribution Schedules, etc.” He then invited NASFAA’s Executive Director to testify before the Subcommittee on September 12, 1977, “to explain the views of the postsecondary education community on the implications of this proposed schedule.”

Relations with Ford had not always been so pleasant. The Michigan Democrat had become Chairman of the Subcommittee in January, 1977, and NASFAA had immediately made efforts to develop a working relationship with him. The National Council, however, had recently indicated its support for the exclusion of student loan indebtedness from discharge in bankruptcy. Congressman Ford was adamantly opposed to excluding any class of individuals from the protection of the bankruptcy laws and was angry with the NASFAA position, seeing it as a move to protect institutional coffers rather than student borrowing. As President of the Association, Joe McCormick was instructed by Council to arrange a meeting between Dallas Martin and Ford, a meeting in which Martin was to explain the Council position. McCormick urged Martin to shift the responsibility for the position away from himself and toward the Council — to go in and emphasize that he was just a staff member forced to support the Association’s position. According to McCormick this tactic enabled Martin to maintain a developing rapport with Ford, even as the Chairman made it clear that NASFAA could put its position on bankruptcy “where the sun doesn’t shine” (McCormick, 1983).

**Middle Income Student Assistance**

McCormick’s goal of a progressive posture for NASFAA regarding student aid programs gave Martin an opportunity to solidify his relationship with Ford and others influential in higher education policy, and this in turn afforded NASFAA the opportunity to play a major role in student aid policy in the late 1970s. By fall, 1977, political pressure was building in Congress to provide some college cost relief to the economic middle class. The source of this pressure was a middle-income citizenry which felt “squeezed out of college by rapidly rising costs because they are too ‘rich’ to qualify for student aid and too ‘poor’ to pay themselves” (Hansen and Gladieux, 1978). Assuring access to postsecondary education as well as some measure of choice as to the type of educational experience desired had been stated national policy in student aid for over a decade; the middle income family now demanded the extension of that policy to them as well (Johnson, 1980).

Secretary of HEW Joseph Califano later described this middle class of Americans as those “who ... work, pay the taxes, and who are so desperately pressed in terms of the higher education of their children” (U.S. Congress, 1978). Whether the Secretary was correct in designating middle income Americans as “desperately pressed” was and remains controversial. In 1977 the real costs of higher education, after making inflationary adjustments both in college expenses and disposable income, had not actually increased significantly compared with earlier years; rather than a squeeze on limited resources there appeared to be more of a problem with the lifestyle expectations among the middle class (Martin, 1980; Hansen and Gladieux, 1978).

The reality of a squeeze was unimportant in the political context of 1978 however; it was the perception of that reality among the politically articulate middle class which created the pressure on the Congress to provide some relief to them. The immediate challenge took the form of a measure introduced by Senator William Roth of Delaware late in 1977. The Delaware Republican proposed an income tax credit to be taken against tuition costs. The idea was not new, but, unlike in previous sessions of Congress when similar measures had been discussed this time there was a real chance of passage. Since 1967 the Senate had approved tuition tax credits on several occasions; yet before 1977 no such measure had ever reached the House floor. Now that a companion to the Roth proposal had come before the full House, Representatives could be held accountable for its defeat; the measure was popular among a wide spectrum of the electorate, and opposing it carried high political risks. Nevertheless, tax credits were opposed by the Carter Administration both as too costly in terms of lost revenues and as inherently “unfair,” and the President stated that he would veto any such “inefficient and inequitable means of using scarce federal resources to provide financial help to needy middle-income families.” Whether he would be able to use the veto, however, would depend on whether the Roth proposal was passed as a separate measure or tied to other popular legislation (Hansen and Gladieux 1978).

Thus there was genuine concern in the student aid community that postsecondary tax credits might pass, eventually diverting funds from the aid programs currently operating. Claiborne Pell, who had historic reasons to be skeptical of the motives of the higher education lobbyists, nevertheless found himself in agreement with them on this issue. The 1972 breach had been at least partially healed by 1978, and Pell did have good contacts with several representatives of the education community. Among these representatives was NASFAA, which after 1972 had spent much effort in building ties to the Senate as well as maintaining connections with the House. Senator Pell’s staff director, Jean Froelicher, was unfailingly helpful to the aid administrators, and through her NASFAA enjoyed a good working relationship with the Senator. Further, Rick Jerue had come to work for Senator Pell after the death of Steve Wexler in 1976, and NASFAA relations with Jerue were an improvement over those with his predecessor. Jerue and Martin became acquainted during hearings on the Basic Grant family contribution schedule, and in their developing relationship NASFAA gained access to a key player on the Senate side. Still, others were more influential than NASFAA in the Senate deliberations. Among them was John Phillips, President of the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, who discussed with Senator Pell in December, 1977, the need for some politically acceptable alternative to the tuition tax credit proposals.
Pell agreed with Phillips on the need to forestall tax credits and decided that the simplest way to effect changes in student aid which would benefit the middle class would be to tinker with the assessment rates on “disposable income” (that income remaining after certain cost of living adjustments) in the Basic Grant eligibility calculation. By February, 1978, he had decided to lower these assessment rates from the existing 20-30 percent scale to a uniform 10.5 percent; he introduced in that month the “College Opportunity Act of 1978” (Jerue, 1982).

The Carter Administration, too, wanted to waylay the tax credit idea, but it seemed to have little idea as to how to do so. In early December, 1977, Leo Kornfeld, Deputy Commissioner of Education, and his policy advisor, Tom Butts, were summoned from a meeting at One Dupont Circle by an urgent request to report to the Office of Management and Budget. OMB that day had been called upon to brief President Carter on student aid alternatives to tuition tax credits, and, as so often seemed the case during his term, that office was unprepared to give Carter the advice he wanted. One Carter operative representing OMB at the resulting meeting with Kornfeld and Butts was Suzanne Woolsey. Woolsey had to be persuaded by Butts to increase funding for SEOG, which the Administration had previously recommended eliminating, and for other existing federal student aid programs in order to satisfy diverse constituencies and thereby have a salable Administration alternative to postsecondary tax credits. Together they then created an “example,” as opposed to a formal proposal, which OMB resisted, and got Secretary Califano’s permission to present it to the President. Their example included a $700 million increase in the aid programs, divided among BEOG, CWS, NDSL, SEOG, and GSL. (Ford, Martin, and Butts, 1979).

Carter’s reaction to their “example” was not soon forthcoming, however. Indeed, there was no official communication of the Administration’s views even to the congressional committees, which would have to draft the necessary legislation. Congressman Ford, for example, learned through his own examination of the Carter budget proposal early in 1978 that there was included a mysterious $700 million increase for student aid — an enlargement with no detail or explanation provided as to which programs would receive the additional funding or why it was needed. In the absence of concrete information from the Administration, and independently of the efforts of Senator Pell, Congressman Ford began to realize that tax credits were so charging the political atmosphere that a significant expansion of student aid might finally be feasible. In the past Ford had been unable to put together a successful coalition in support of extending aid programs to the middle class, primarily due to opposition from civil rights groups and liberals who had feared that extension to the middle class would erode the funding available to the poor, who were the “proper” targets of federal assistance. Under the pressure of postsecondary tax credits, however, Ford saw the opportunity to persuade the liberals that the base had to be expanded — that in order to get broad, popular support for student aid programs the middle class had to be included as recipients. This, he argued, was the lesson learned from the Great Society poverty programs which had been savaged by the Nixon Administration. Only those programs with a broad base are popular enough to endure assault from opponents. (Ford, Martin, and Butts, 1979).

Ford discussed this philosophy during two dinners with Dallas Martin at the Palm Restaurant in Washington in late 1977 and early 1978. Joining them for the dinners were Tom Butts and Leo Kornfeld of USOE, Joe McCormick of NASFAA, and Thomas Jolly of Ford’s staff. The dinner that evening has been called by Ford the “genesis” of his Middle Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA) of 1978 — the title was decided upon as a means of broadening popular support for student aid (Ford, Martin, and Butts, 1979). Joe McCormick later suggested that the initial draft of MISAA was actually created on a paper napkin at the restaurant (McCormick, 1983). Given these results NASFAA members clearly had no reason to complain that unbudgeted funds had been contributed toward the cost of the dinner.

The membership did have reason to argue that the tax credit idea would be an unwise investment of federal resources. A Congressional Budget Office study released in February, 1978, indicated that tax credits would miss many at whom they were aimed, and that student aid could better target the resources at the proper group. For example, although $25,000 might have represented an appropriate annual family income ceiling for the middle class citizens which the Congress wanted to assist — and around 75% of American families were below that figure in 1978 — tax credits for tuition would also be available to the 25% of the population with higher incomes than those in the target group. Using student aid, however, more precise eligibility determinations could be established to control and target the expenditures, ensuring that funds would be directed at precisely the families desired by the policymakers (Ford, Martin, and Butts, 1979).

Armed with such data and unencumbered by any detailed proposals in the Administration’s budget, Ford moved to create a consensus among higher education groups as to how the mysterious $700 million might be divided. He held meetings to determine how best to spend the additional money with several leaders from the higher education community, including Dallas Martin, Charles Saunders of ACE, John Phillips of NAICU, and Jerry Roschwalb of NASULGC. The effort, Ford has recalled, was to get both public and private institutions to agree in advance on a compromise in which no sector got everything desired but each sector received something of value. A united higher education community was essential if passage of an alternative to postsecondary tax credits was to be accomplished. At one of these meeting with the higher education groups, Ford was accompanied by a Michigan colleague, William M. Brodhead, who sat on the Ways and Means Committee. Brodhead frankly told the group that $700 million would be an insufficient political counterproposal to tax credits and suggested that $2 billion would be needed to assure majority support in his committee. The higher education group assembled by Ford took this advice to heart, and, after several more discussions, came to an understanding of how to divide the larger sum. Ford then carried this compromise package back to his committee members and gained their support. At that point his legislative proposal was drafted, with the assistance of Dallas Martin, and Ford communicated to Secretary Califano the need for prompt Administration endorsement if postsecondary tax credits were to be defeated. There was an obvious political value to pairing the two issues; a Congressman could then explain to constituents a vote against tax credits as a vote for a better alternative (Ford, Martin, and Butts, 1979).

The Administration, however, continued to grope for what it could consider an appropriate expenditure, and it thus did not move quickly on Ford’s request. Finally Ford informed Secretary Califano
that his Bill would be introduced with or without Administration leadership, and he offered the Administration a final chance to “get aboard” and take credit for the measure. This, he argued to them, was essential — a basic political strategy is to be for some alternative which will make people feel positive rather than to anger them by simply opposing an unwise measure. This essential rule of politics, however, was one which the Carter Administration never seemed to understand. OMB opposed the increase in dollars beyond the $700 million which had been in their original example, and for a time the whole package was in jeopardy. Finally the Administration agreed to support expenditures of $1.2 billion, but in order to gain the approval of his entire subcommittee Ford wanted at least $1.4 billion. This extra $200 million illustrated a major problem pragmatic politicians such as Bill Ford had with the Carter Administration, which simply was unable to see the political benefit of spending extra dollars in obtaining broad support from both political parties. In this case, however, Ford prevailed. With somewhat reluctant Administration endorsement the $1.4 billion package was approved by the unanimous vote of the subcommittee, including even those members who were advocates of tax credits. Ford had achieved his goal of winning broad acceptance of the bill; civil rights advocates supported the measure when assured that guarantees were written into it which would preclude taking needed funds away from lower income students in order to support their middle income counterparts. (Ford, Martin, and Butts, 1979).

The Demonstration of NASFAA Skills

The role of NASFAA in this entire process illustrated the skills which Dallas Martin had acquired during his first two years in Washington. NASFAA served to provide objective, technical assistance during the discussions by the diverse higher education groups — detailing how certain divisions of the dollars among various aid programs would affect the different constituencies. Martin worked to persuade the Carter people to retain SEOG in the division since that program was necessary for the continued support of the independent institutions. He also prepared sample cases of various BEOG formulas so that all constituencies could see the impact of changes in that program. His sample cases gained a fame of their own when Secretary Califano appeared to testify before Ford’s committee. Both Califano and Ford, each without the knowledge of the other, were using the same calculations. When that fact became obvious during the hearing, much of the press assumed the studies came from the Office of Education, but in fact they came from NASFAA’s Executive Director. Both the Congress and the Office of Education, it seems, knew on whom they could rely for expert technical information. (Ford, Martin, and Butts, 1979).

Once the legislation was drafted and introduced in the House, Martin began work with the NASFAA membership to help promote its passage. In his Executive Secretary’s Report to Council of February 6, 1978, he included a summary of the events leading to the Bill’s introduction and a section on “Future Strategy.” In this strategy he outlined several reasons the aid community should support the Bill, even though he readily acknowledged that everyone would not like the precise division of funds among the programs included. It must be remembered, he said, that “the whole attempt behind this legislation is to defeat tax credits.” He went on to emphasize positive aspects of the legislation and to offer some specific arguments which aid administrators could employ in public discussions of what was now deferentially termed the Administration’s proposal:

1. The Administration’s proposal delivers money to students at the beginning of the academic year when they are faced with tuition charges, rather than at the end of the year. This alternative ensures that money goes to the student to pay for postsecondary education rather than going to the parents, which may or may not result in dollars being spent on education. 2. Tax credits are more expensive since they spread the dollars to all families, regardless of income, whereas this proposal limits it to families with $25,000 incomes. (The Roth $250 tax credit proposal would cost between $1.7 billion and $1.9 billion in the first year. This proposal only costs $1.2 billion). 4. The Administration’s proposal does not reduce a student’s eligibility for other kinds of need-based aid the way tax credit legislation would. This is because of the way the need-analysis systems treat income-tax paid. 5. The $1.2 billion is substantially more money than we have collectively been able to receive at any one time. Such an increase will help to maintain general public support of existing need-based programs and will provide us with substantially more dollars in student aid, which can be redistributed in future years through reauthorization.

In March NASFAA brought a similar message to the membership at large in a “Special Legislative Report.” The membership was advised that the proponents of tax credits appeared strong and that the MISAA legislation was in jeopardy of defeat. Members were urged to contact representatives during the Easter Congressional recess as well as to have their students write and telephone Congressional offices. The effort illustrated both the continuation and the enhancement of the two themes in NASFAA’s legislative advocacy development: providing solid technical information to policymakers and promoting grass-roots contact with the Congress (Martin, 1978).

The Congressional debate over tax credits and the student aid legislation in both Houses continued into the summer of 1978. Neil Bolyard, the new President of NASFAA, had several concerns about certain aspects of the MISAA legislation, especially regarding the proposal to eliminate the income cap on eligibility for the GSL program. The 1976 reauthorization of these loans had mandated for eligibility an income ceiling of $25,000, after certain adjustments. The original MISAA proposal called for increasing the cap to $45,000, but, during Joint Hearings on the issue, Senator Jacob Javits argued that since that ceiling “includes practically everybody, [then] eliminate the limit and you eliminate bureaucracy” (U. S. Congress, 1978). Javits’ concern to avoid the costs of bureaucratic paperwork was endorsed by Senator Pell, and the Congress thus moved to eliminate any income ceiling for GSL eligibility. Bolyard saw the removal of the cap as a potential “public relations nightmare.” Nevertheless, he still regarded MISAA as a better alternative federal policy than tuition tax credits, and while he expressed reservations privately he did not oppose the efforts of NASFAA to secure passage of the MISAA package. In order to let the Association speak with a united voice he purposefully stayed away from Washington during the summer and let Martin lead the Association’s efforts (Bolyard, 1982).

On August 16, 1978, the Senate voted approval of the College Opportunity Act, which by this time was quite similar to the Ford proposal. However, the Senate also approved the Roth tax credit measure, which had previously passed the House in a slightly different version. The tax credit Bills now went to a conference committee, but
the MISAA legislation in the House had still not come to the floor for a vote (Newsletter, August 24, 1978). House action was delayed until October 5, when the Rules Committee finally released the MISAA Bill for floor action. The House then passed the Bill and sent it to the Senate, which promptly approved it, “clearing the way for Presidential signature which is expected soon.” (Newsletter, October 16, 1978) At the same time tax credits were rejected. The victory of the student aid community seemed complete. Ford called the Act “the largest infusion of aid to middle-income and working-class families since the GI Bill,” and Neil Bolyard reflected that “NASFAA can certainly be proud of its role and the role of its Executive Director, Dr. Dallas Martin, in making this landmark financial legislation a reality.”

Within a month of this triumph, however, Martin was busy again in alerting members to the legislative front. The mid-term elections had just been held, and there were some significant changes in the Congress. In a Status Report to the National Council and State Association Presidents Martin outlined changes expected on key committees — including probable staff changes — in both the Senate and the House. He then gave predictions which assessed the political climate expected for student aid programs in the next Congress. His predictions were specific and thorough; he continued to educate the membership on the political climate for funding of programs as well as leading the way for the 1980 reauthorization battles (November 13, 1978).

**Reauthorization, 1979-80**

Preparation for that reauthorization began in earnest in the spring of 1979. Congressman Ford asked Dallas Martin to testify on the first day of scheduled hearings in May, wanting “a basic overview of actual workings of the aid programs ... [and] a macro-view of funding” (Executive committee Minutes, April 21, 1979). In August of that year Martin reported to the National Council and officers of the Association that “this office has been exceptionally busy in the last few months, providing a great deal of technical assistance to the House Postsecondary Education Subcommittee as they wrestle with their new piece of legislation” (Martin to National Council, August 24, 1979). The senate, too, had begun consideration of reauthorizing the Higher Education Act, and on September 14, 1979, Martin presented testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on Education, Arts, and Humanities “on behalf of” NASFAA, ACE, and the United States Student Association.

According to Martin the early beginning of the 1980 reauthorization process was largely the result of the efforts of Thomas Wolanin, an aide to Congressman Ford. Wolanin convinced Ford to commence the process by requesting written proposals for change from the higher education community. This served the purpose of putting the community “on the line,” assuring that later reneging on agreements would be difficult. Apparently Wolanin shared Claiborne Pell’s view of the “Great Fudge Factory.” Even the Office of Education was asked to submit their written proposals early. Fortunately for the aid community, however, USOE experienced the now-customary delay in putting their views together, and in their tardiness the higher education groups found an opportunity to form their own consensus. The departure of HEW Secretary Califano in 1979 added to the confusion at the Office of Education, as did the reorganization of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare into two separate Departments — the Department of Education (ED) and the Department of Health and Human Services. This reorganization was lengthy, becoming final in May, 1980. Consequently the USOE/ED proposals never reached center stage in the consideration of reauthorization. As a result, says Martin, the recommendations of the higher education community became the focus of discussion. With very little effort, he adds, “lots of extra ornaments were hung on the Christmas tree” (Martin, 1981).

Some effort was required, however, and NASFAA provided much of it. Charles Saunders, Vice-President for Government Relations at ACE, reported to the NASFAA National Council on October 25, 1979, that about 90% of the recommendations of NASFAA and the higher education community were in the Bill. This was an impressive showing, particularly in light of the growing political pressure to “balance the budget.” Bill Gaul, now Associate General Counsel to the House Committee on Education and Labor, and longtime friend and mentor to NASFAA, spoke to a group of aid administrators on the changing political climate in early 1980. He urged the assemblage to continue to orchestrate mail from constituents. It has taken us a long time to get to where we are, he cautioned, and we must be certain that we do not lose ground. The needs of students must not be overlooked in the rush to balance the budget, he continued, and NASFAA had to be cognizant of the fact that the Congress was much altered in 1980 from even 1976. The majority of the members of the full Education and Labor Committee, for example, had not even been in the House four years earlier. Further, with the various “reforms” of the structure of Congress over the past decade, the old seniority system had been diminished. No longer was it only the views of the Speaker and the senior members which carried weight. Congress now saw things through a “compound eye.” This resulted in the open expression of more diversity of opinion on higher education than had previously been heard in the House of Representatives. “Some look upon higher education and see its value, others see its costs,” said Gaul (Gaul, 1980).

It was NASFAA’s task, of course, to help policymakers concentrate on the value rather than the cost of higher education, and it thus participated in legislative battles which transcended the reauthorization process. In early 1980 the Carter Administration, in its zeal to be seen as attempting to balance the budget, proposed the rescission of NDSL funds already allotted to campuses and the deferral of a portion of promised Basic Grant funding. NASFAA immediately expressed its objections to its Congressional allies (Newsletter, April 17, 1980). Their efforts were partially successful; in June the Newsletter reported that the NDSL rescission was not approved.

Meanwhile, action on the “Education Amendments of 1980,” as reauthorization was entitled, continued. On July 24, 1980, the Senate overwhelmingly endorsed the measure, by a vote of 92-4. This legislation could now be sent to the Conference Committee, since the House had approved the companion piece in November, 1979 (Newsletter, July 8, 1980). There was much disparity between the two versions, however, especially regarding loan programs. The Senate version was also less costly, and there were concerns that the full Senate might not approve even the Conference Committee version adopted August 19, 1980. This concern was well-justified, as the Senate rejected the Conference legislation, sending its conferences...
back on a 44-44 tie vote. The upper body cited a “previously unused” part of budget law, called “reconciliation,” and they used that process to mandate a savings of $350 million in FY 1981. A second Conference Report was then issued and adopted (Newsletter, September 30, 1980).

While the final compromise Bill was not as good for higher education as the House version might have been, the results of the 1980 reauthorization were generally quite positive for the student aid community. Much of the legislation was the work of NASFAA. As Anne C. Roark wrote in the October 6, 1980, edition of The Chronicle of Higher Education, the 1980 Amendments were “considered one of the most comprehensive pieces of legislation ever written for higher education. Mr. Martin not only helped push the bill through Congress, he drafted large parts of it.” She continued with further evidence of the technical mastery achieved by NASFAA and the regard in which that mastery was held: “Not only did Mr. Martin write much of the student-aid legislation but he has been asked by the Department of Education to help draft the regulations that will put those changes into effect.” She quoted a Department of Education official as stating that “I know a lot of people around here who believe that Dallas Martin has been doing a lot of our work — for an awfully long time.” Martin was described by Tom Wolanin, Chief Counsel for the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education, as “by far the single most effective and influential education lobbyist in this town.... I might hazard to say that everyone on the Hill has great confidence in Dallas.” Much of Martin’s success was attributed to his personal skills; “but his success may also be traced to the fact that his organization, unlike many education groups, represents all sectors of higher education — public and private, large and small, profit and non-profit” (pp. 3-4). NASFAA thus continued to benefit from Allan Purdy’s old strategy of including all points of view in order to be seen as spokespersons for the entire community.

Yet another reason for NASFAA’s success was that aid legislation itself had become increasingly complex. Beginning with their distrust of the Nixon motives, through the Watergate-inspired reassertion of Congressional powers, to the abdication of executive leadership during the Carter years, the Congress had come more and more to rely on legislation to spell out details of program administration. Not trusting the Office of Education (or its successor, the Department of Education) to administer the aid programs in the ways Congress intended, the Congress wrote the regulations that will put those changes into effect.” She quoted a Department of Education official as stating that “I know a lot of people around here who believe that Dallas Martin has been doing a lot of our work — for an awfully long time.” Martin was described by Tom Wolanin, Chief Counsel for the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education, as “by far the single most effective and influential education lobbyist in this town.... I might hazard to say that everyone on the Hill has great confidence in Dallas.” Much of Martin’s success was attributed to his personal skills; “but his success may also be traced to the fact that his organization, unlike many education groups, represents all sectors of higher education — public and private, large and small, profit and non-profit” (pp. 3-4). NASFAA thus continued to benefit from Allan Purdy’s old strategy of including all points of view in order to be seen as spokespersons for the entire community.

The Millennium Arrives — Or Does It?

With the passage of the 1980 Amendments, then, NASFAA had come of age. Gene Miller, who became President of the Association in July, 1980, was involved with Martin in lobbying efforts. After passage, she said, “we were thrilled.... [The amendments] seemed to us the millennium.” She and Martin both attended President Carter’s signing ceremony for the legislation, held in an overcrowded room at Northern Virginia Community College. Proper arrangements for the event had not been made; several invited guests at this ceremony, which occurred just prior to the 1980 presidential election, were unable to get into the room. Miller herself had to stand in the back of the room, and Dallas Martin was among those guests who could not get in at all (Miller, 1982; Martin, personal communication). Perhaps the difficulties at the signing ceremony were symbolic of things to come. Within a few days the election was held, and a new Administration was coming to town. And while the Carter people, with their constant indecision and occasional pushes for budget reductions, had often been difficult, this new Administration was vocally hostile to programs such as the ones represented by the 1980 Amendments.

Rather than succumb to panic as a result of the elections, however, NASFAA prepared itself for the coming changes. The organization had increased in political acumen and effectiveness over the previous decade, and it saw opportunity even in what appeared to be a significant electoral setback. In the fall of 1980 Dallas Martin composed a report to Council which outlined the depth of understanding he had gained. In his message he focused on arguments which might be used in defending aid programs against attacks and on the need to establish close connections with the new players in the Washington higher education subgovernment:

It may be good for all of us to ... attempt to reestablish our priorities. Surely not everyone will agree on what they should be, but the process of going through and selecting priorities can be healthy.... Student aid historically has been designed to help with many of society’s problems, including educational opportunity for those who could benefit but did not have the financial means; manpower development for shortage areas and in critical disciplines; international understanding and support for our principles of democracy; and even to help provide for a stronger national defense .... we should begin to collect the data, and tell the facts of what has been accomplished ... and what remains to be done. Investment in human capital, like investment in materials capital, can go far in helping to resolve many of our more complex societal problems.... We must also begin to take a more in-depth look at the issues and select carefully our course of action. Spontaneous responses and short sighted solutions will only add to the confusion and paranoia that exists today.... Accentuating the positive ... is certainly more important in the current environment than perhaps it has been in the past.... Most of the people that have helped us in the past, including key congressional staff personnel, will no longer be in the same leadership positions. Consequently we will have to become better acquainted with the new members of the key committees and their staffs. Each state and regional Association will want to encourage their members to develop these ties and relationships, so that we develop an effective communication system which will keep all parties informed. This will be essential if we are to maintain the broad bi-partisan support that has been developed in the past few years for our aid programs (Martin to National Council, November 19, 1980).
The NASFAA Role in Training

NASFAA in the late 1970s involved much more than legislative activity and Dallas Martin, of course, and there were during that period a number of enhancements to existing systems in training, committees and commissions, conferences, and publications. For example, the Training Commission, chaired by Donald Ryan of California, was chosen “outstanding committee of the year” in 1977-78, for its three areas of focus: distributing summaries of state training schedules, compiling a calendar of professional activities, and developing a set of training modules for use by states and regions (McCormick, 1978, p. 7).

Ryan’s committee had also begun to explore the sensitive issue of the proper role the national body should take in the area of training. Its conclusion was simple in theory but controversial in practice: “NASFAA should be responsible for developing training agendas and training materials, and ... the regions and states should be responsible for the presentation of those materials in conducting workshops” (National Council Minutes, October 21, 1977). The modules themselves were not the source of great controversy; they had been developed over a two-year period, with involvement from Neil Bolyard as well as Ryan and his committee members; and they were widely regarded as comprehensive and well-done. The controversy lay in the question of some regions as to the propriety of national involvement in developing training materials. When in 1976-77 Ryan had obtained the initial funding for the development of the modules he had met some resistance from representatives of NASFAA and SASFAA, who wanted and received assurances against a national usurpation of a traditional regional role in training. Nevertheless, there was broad support in other regions for some national effort, since some regions lacked the time and resources to develop materials on their own, and since a unified effort would achieve economies of scale as well as national consistency of training information (Ryan, 1982).

Still, the concerns in NASFAA and SASFAA were not totally abated. Curtis Whalen, then Vice-President of SASFAA, wrote to Joe McCormick expressing his reservations regarding NASFAA’s role in training. While he praised the efforts of the training committee in developing materials, he also suggested that the Association lacked a clear idea as to the direction training should take — what was missing was clear “coordination of the fragmented financial training efforts now taking place.” For instance, NASFAA was then planning to conduct a series of twenty-five one-week workshops across the nation; Whalen’s objection was that these would simply be superimposed upon an existing patchwork of state and regional training activities; he thus called for more structure and fewer workshops (Whalen to McCormick, February 17, 1978).

Whalen’s letter had its effect: it was discussed thoroughly at the Executive Committee meeting on February 21, 1978, and the vote on a motion to conduct the series of workshops was tabled. At the next meeting of the National Council the issue was again debated, resulting in the adoption of a formal position for the Association in training activities. Henceforth it would be considered appropriate for NASFAA to develop materials for regional coordination of delivery of training; NASFAA would deliver the training only when a region was unable to do so. The Association also promised to support a “lead trainer” concept, in which an individual would be designated in each region to provide the needed coordination of training activities (Newsletter, June 16, 1978).

Certification and Accreditation

Another area of NASFAA focus in professional development during the late 1970s was Gene Miller’s Commission on Professional Standards. Under her leadership two separate committees were charged with investigating the related concepts of accreditation and certification. Much discussion and deliberation was devoted to these two issues, which concerned, respectively, the review by the Association of an institution’s financial aid operations and an affirmation that an individual aid administrator was competent in a number of technical areas. Despite the efforts of several years on the part of a number of individuals, however, the Association decided in September, 1978, that it should not proceed with certifying the competencies of individual aid administrators. To do so, the Council voted, would be too hazardous on legal grounds. The risks to the organization had been outlined by its attorney, Bruce Hopkins, at the same council meeting. Hopkins expressed reservations in three areas: antitrust law, where the Association could incur liabilities both for the employment problems of uncertified individuals and for the faulty judgement of certified aid administrators on whose decisions employers relied; constitutional law, which created difficulties regarding an individual’s right to due process and appeal of a NASFAA certification decision; and tax law, under which the IRS might wish to reclassify NASFAA as a trade association rather than a charitable educational one. These hazards appeared too significant to ignore, and Council therefore adopted a Don Ryan motion to set standards for certification but to let any responsibility for implementing the standards fall to those states and regions which were willing to take the risks (National Council Minutes, September 19, 1978).

Essentially this decision marked the end of NASFAA’s involvement in individual certification of aid administrator competencies; Miller, among others, was disappointed to see the issue disappear because of potential legal problems. Having spent so much effort on the area, beginning with her service on Dick Palhe’s Certification Committee years earlier, Miller saw certification as “an issue we have copped out on.” She later expressed the opinion that certification, had it been pursued, would have headed off dubious ED “quality control” studies and “brown-shirt” attacks on “fraud and abuse” in the early 1980s (Miller, 1982).

In accreditation, too, NASFAA withdrew from active participation in on-campus program reviews; in this area, however, a new publication called the “Institutional Guide for Financial Aid Self-Evaluation” appeared in 1976-77. This guide, which was distributed free of charge to NASFAA members, was an outgrowth of the deliberations of the 1976-77 Committee on Program Review, which was designated “committee of the year” for its work. The publication, which enabled an institution to review its compliance with numerous federal regulations in a checklist fashion, was highly successful. Not only did NASFAA members appreciate the thoroughness of the document, but USOE purchased quantities sufficient to use in the BEOG Training Program as well, ensuring both increased recognition of the Association and a significant profit for its treasury (Martin to Council, August 18, 1977 and February 6, 1978). Efforts in accreditation continued afterwards as revised editions of the guide were published.
Expanded Publications

Other publications, too, developed in the late 1970s, as Associational resources began to permit long-desired strategies to be employed for the first time. With the change to institutional membership and the resulting augmentation of the financial base of the Association, NASFAA began in 1977 to offer publications in addition to the Newsletter and Journal of Student Financial Aid. The purposes of these initial NASFAA publications had been of a dual nature; while both were designed to inform and educate the membership regarding issues confronting student aid, each had also a larger purpose. The Journal was designed as an outlet for scholarly research in the field as well as a means of developing the reputation of a fledgling association within the higher education community. The Newsletter was a resource designed to enhance the reputation of the National Association among its own membership. In the early 1970s NASFAA was not the only organization competing for the loyalties of practicing financial aid administrators, and the Association’s early leaders had been quick to recognize that increased publicity for their activities would be essential to the growth of the organization. As Allan Purdy expressed it in a letter to Sample, Martin, Bolyard, and Clark in 1976, “we just haven’t gotten it across to a lot of our members and potential members the value of all the activities that NASFAA offers.” He concluded by advising the others that “Ye shall toot your own horn or verily I say unto ye your horn shall not be tooted.” The Newsletter alone, no matter how effective, was insufficient, and Purdy thus supported Sample’s call for additional publicity (Sample, 1985).

At the time Purdy wrote these thoughts to his colleagues the financial condition of NASFAA was such that he focused on potential external sources of publicity, little dreaming that additional associational publications which could help “toot the horn” could be afforded. By the following year, however, with institutional dues arriving at a pace which made it clear that expansion was possible, Edson Sample stood ready to propose a new publication for the Association. Sample’s idea was that NASFAA could print and distribute a report on federal activities, including items such as NASFAA testimony before Congress, status of current legislative proposals, copies of federal regulations and proposed regulations, and other related issues. This, he argued, would expose the membership of the Association to both the expertise and the wide range of activities of their national organization (Sample to McCormick, October 3, 1977).

Sample’s idea was popular, and the Executive Committee at its February, 1978, meeting heard a report from the Finance Committee suggesting that publication of the “Federal Report” begin with the next fiscal year. By the end of 1978 the new publication was issued, under the revised title of NASFAA Federal Monitor. During the next twelve months some twenty issues of this new periodical were mailed to members, on a variety of topics including all of those first proposed by Sample. This new series was received enthusiastically by NASFAA members; the Association was able to print and distribute proposed USOE regulations well in advance of the schedule for distribution of the official Federal Register; doubtless the quantity as well as the efficiency of distribution enhanced NASFAA’s reputation among its members.

The Monitor was not the only new publication of 1978, however. Robert Clark edited for NASFAA distribution A Handbook for Use in the Preparation of Student Expense Budgets, compiled from a conference on that topic which NASFAA and MASFAA had co-sponsored (Sample, 1986, p. 12.11.1). This publication, too, on an area little-regulated by the Office of Education, gave credence to NASFAA’s claim of serving the professional development needs of aid administrators. During the next two years the pace of publication increased, with a number of substantial pieces being offered to the membership in addition to the twenty Monitors and nineteen issues of the Newsletter. These included a second and third edition of the Institutional Guide for Financial Aid Self-Evaluation, a Fundamental Financial Aid Self-Learning Guide for new aid administrators, the results of a survey on Characteristics and Attitudes of the Financial Aid Administrator, a set of papers presented at a joint NASFAA-ACE symposium on Student Loans: Alternatives for Reauthorization, and the Financial Aid Support Staff Training Guide (Sample, 1986, pp. 12.11.1-12.11.2). Both the diversity of publications and their depth of coverage augured well for the growing reputation of NASFAA.

NASFAA Conferences

Another item which helped NASFAA to gain increased respect among the aid administrators across the nation was its annual conference. Prior to 1975 there had been only “Leadership Conferences,” to which participants were invited to fill a limited number of spaces. After the success of the Aspen, Colorado, meeting in July, 1975, however, NASFAA made an open-to-the-membership conference an annual occurrence. Conferences through 1980 had an average attendance of nearly 700 members; those held in the “political” years of 1978 and 1980 drew 882 and 796, respectively. Sites were chosen at a variety of geographical settings, including Washington, D.C., New Orleans, San Francisco, Boston, and Denver, in addition to Aspen (Sample, 1986, pp. 8.3.1-8.3.2). Each conference was distinguished by the quality of speakers engaged; high ranking political, USOE, and higher education association officials consistently joined the aid administrators as presenters and special guests.

Structural Alterations and Controversy

In almost every way, then, NASFAA’s systems had been improved during the late 1970s. The Association was increasingly effective in its political operations as well as in its communications with its enlarged membership. Still, there were other enhancements which seemed desirable to the leaders of the organization. The committee and commission arrangement was one area which had been defined and redefined throughout the decade; as Bob Huff assumed the presidency in the summer of 1979 he decided to try once again to enhance the effectiveness of this structure. He thus reorganized the commissions into the four areas, which he saw as essential to associational operations: government relations, professional growth, services to institutions, and associational activities. In addition he appointed two special presidential committees, one on minority concerns (continuing a longstanding attempt to give formal voice to minority interests) and one on proprietary and non-traditional concerns (attempting to provide a similar procedure for these newest NASFAA members). Huff also appointed a special ad hoc committee to study the fiscal affairs of NASFAA. The reorganization itself did not spark great controversy. The appointees were a respected group of aid administrators:
CHAPTER V: COPING AND MATURING IN THE REAGAN YEARS

A Modified Policy Arena

If Gene Miller started her term as NASFAA President thinking the “millennium had arrived,” her illusions were shattered by the election of November, 1980. Ronald Reagan was elected on a platform calling for budget reductions and the dismantling of the Department of Education. If Jimmy Carter had seemed unaware of the needs of student aid or reluctant to spend the funds necessary to meet those needs, he had at least been considered pro-education. Differences with the Carter Department of Education there had been; the requests for rescissions had been fought by the aid community, and on countless issues the Department had moved in a confused, unsteady manner, creating delays in delivery of financial aid to campuses and students. Yet, under Carter, the debates really were devoted to concerns over how much could reasonably be afforded in order to open postsecondary education to all Americans. Further, these differences were settled between an Executive and a Congress controlled by the same political party. And the Congress was friendly to student aid issues; Representative Ford and Senator Pell, the chairmen of the subcommittees directly concerned with student assistance were very much pro-education; the ranking minority members of each subcommittee, Representative Buchanan of Alabama and Senator Stafford of Vermont were also favorably disposed toward funding student aid.

After the election of 1980, however, the cast of characters changed. Not only was there a new President, portending changes in the Department of Education, but the new Senate would be controlled by the Republicans for the first time since student aid had been in existence. This meant that the staff members on the key Senate committees and subcommittees would change; a number of Democratic staffers would be reassigned to other duties, and others would simply disappear from the capital. The relationships which NASFAA had cultivated for more than a decade were changing, and it was unclear how aid policy would be made in the future. Complicating matters was a change in the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education. Congressman Ford gave up his chairmanship of that group to become Chairman of the full Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. The new Subcommittee Chairman, Paul Simon of Illinois, was friendly to financial aid but was not as well known to NASFAA as was Ford.

Still, the main area of concern was the Senate. The new Chairman of the full Committee on Labor and Human Resources was Orrin Hatch of Utah. Hatch chose to focus his efforts on issues relating to elementary and secondary education, and deferred to Senator Stafford, the new Chairman of the Subcommittee on Education, on aid-related matters. Stafford, a New England Republican, was not so different from Pell in either his background or his approach to higher education. His staff was composed of moderate Republicans, too. Heading the staff was Polly Gault, with whom NASFAA had worked in the past and with whom a good relationship was enjoyed. NASFAA also had a good working relationship with David Morse, formerly an education staffer for Senator Jacob Javits of New York (Dallas Martin, personal...
Working With the Reaganites

Whether the regulations would be modified and reissued after the freeze was unclear, but the Reagan Administration’s intentions regarding student financial assistance were not hidden for long. By early March they had proposed “major reductions” in Guaranteed Student Loans and Pell Grants, to be achieved by programmatic adjustments in eligibility criteria. Anticipating Congressional consideration of their recommendations, the Administration stopped the Pell Grant process in its tracks, refusing to calculate eligibility for applicants until resolution of their proposals was accomplished by the legislative branch. All of this was done under the guise of “restoring” the focus of federal aid to the “truly needy”; but NASFAA saw low-income students suffering from the change along with their middle income counterparts. While acknowledging that, in the changed political climate, “expenditures for postsecondary education perhaps should be refocused and reasonable reductions should be made,” Dallas Martin argued for NASFAA that these efforts should be made with care and with the understanding that there are societal benefits attached to postsecondary education and access to it which render it different from the many special interest groups demanding attention (Newsletter, March 9, 1981).

The battle was thus joined, and debate raged on student aid as on other domestic spending issues during the spring and summer of 1981. In August of that year Congress approved the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, setting expenditure ceilings for the coming year. The results were harmful yet not catastrophic for student aid; but these were ceilings, not actual appropriations (Newsletter, August 13, 1981). One round of the fight had ended, but an equally important one was just beginning. It would be fought among friendly adversaries. While Secretary of Education Terrell H. Bell assured NASFAA conferees in July that there remained a strong commitment to student aid even as cost savings were sought, his Deputy Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education, Edward Elmendorf, stunned the assembled aid administrators with his announcement that the efforts of the Department “may not be in your best interests, but it will be in the student’s best interests” (Newsletter, September 9, 1981).

Clearly Elmendorf had not yet attained an understanding of the underlying cultural values in NASFAA, values emphasizing the well-being of the student above all else.

It was therefore vital to NASFAA that a relationship with Elmendorf be cultivated, and both new President Donald Holec and Executive Director Dallas Martin worked to do just that. Holec, who had been involved for years with NASFAA’s federal relations efforts, had come into his job with a clear understanding of the rules of the political game and of just who the players of that game were. On the Title IV Committee he had an opportunity to sit down with representatives of the Department of Education, along with congressional staff members, and discuss legislative and regulatory proposals. This interaction had been helpful to NASFAA in the past, establishing working relationships and preventing a number of burdensome proposals from ever becoming public. Holec was interested, however, in transcending the traditional role of technical advisor to the Department, wanting NASFAA’s advice to be sought also in broader questions of public policy. He therefore believed it vital that a dialogue be established with Elmendorf and others in the Department, and he was successful in pursuing this goal. As he would later recall, Elmendorf and company had been quite open to discussion throughout 1981-1982, both on technical and policy questions. While NASFAA could not be certain of getting its way with the new powers at ED, it could be sure its position would be heard (Holec, 1982). On-going discussion was facilitated by the previous acquaintance and working relationship between Elmendorf and Dallas Martin (Martin, personal communication).

Yet being heard, and even being understood, by the Department of Education was no longer enough. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which under previous administrations had essentially been a tangential player in the game, had achieved a new stature under Reagan. Its Director, David Stockman, was a prominent figure in the media and in the policy development of the Reagan White House. Accordingly, OMB’s influence became stronger in education policy. All regulations promulgated by ED under Reagan now had to gain clearance through OMB before being published; people unfamiliar with the rationale behind various aspects of regulations now had firm control over them. Cost-savings now seemed the only rationale which counted.

A Uniting Higher Education Community

NASFAA and the entire higher education community had to adjust its strategies accordingly. As Holec argued, in a way the changes had been favorable for higher education: by being so severe and so threatening to the well-being of students and institutions, the
Reagan era proposals had united the community in a common cause. By the fall of 1981 NASFAA had been unanimously elected to join the ACE Secretariat, a group primarily composed of the administrative directors of the presidential associations. As Lauristen King has stated, the Secretariat is “a regular point of policy and strategic exchange.” It reflects “a community norm that associations... keep each other informed about all important political activities and policy positions” (King, 1975, p. 111). NASFAA had been represented at meetings of the Secretariat on several previous occasions, and Dallas Martin was already a regular participant in the less formal “Monday group” strategy sessions held among representatives of a number of Secretariat organizations. Martin had first been invited to the Monday group meetings only when financial aid was on the agenda, beginning in 1978; as aid issues came to dominate higher education during the 1980 reauthorization and under the Reagan Administration, he was invited almost weekly (Dallas Martin, personal communication, May 5, 1985). By placing NASFAA on the Secretariat, then, ACE was in some ways legitimizing this Monday relationship. Membership for NASFAA on the Secretariat was mutually beneficial to the associations involved; NASFAA’s contacts and reputation were by this time well-established, and by regular membership Martin could better report to NASFAA the broader perspective on higher education which motivated other associations.

Liaison with the rest of higher education had never been stronger, and cultivating relationships with the new players at ED and OMB remained a part of the strategy of all the groups, but other plans were now considered as well. For example, it was becoming clear that the Congress would have to become even more heavily involved in legislating technical matters, rather than leaving them to regulatory interpretation, if OMB proposals were to be defeated. It had also been clear for years that grass-roots contact with the Congress was quite beneficial. Consequently, in September, 1981, the NASFAA Executive Committee debated the desirability of holding NASFAA’s annual conference in Washington, D.C. on a regular basis. The thinking was that those organizations which meet regularly in Washington have more opportunity to work with the Congress than do those which do not hold meetings there. Benny Walker and Elton Davis therefore proposed that NASFAA hold its conferences in the nation’s capital in alternate, non-election, years, and under the Reagan Administration, he was invited almost weekly (Newsletter, January 28, 1981). The intention was not only to inform the members but to do so without taking an inordinate amount of staff time. The recorded information proved to be quite popular with members; by May a second tape system was added to the original, in an effort to keep busy signals to a minimum (Newsletter, May 18, 1981). The initial popularity continued; during the summer of 1981 the Hotline service averaged wall over 1,000 calls per week (Martin to National Council, September 14, 1981).

The Role of the Central Office Staff

Staff, too, was to be given increasing responsibilities. In part this doubtless stemmed from the reputation acquired by Dallas Martin during his tenure with NASFAA. It had been largely through his efforts in 1978 and 1980 that NASFAA’s reputation had been enhanced; his skill and expertise were such that arguments against letting him make day-to-day decisions on behalf of the Association seemed weak. Too, by being the NAFAA representative on the ACE Secretariat and at the Monday group sessions, Martin was frequently placed in a situation of having to express NASFAA positions and policy, sometimes prior to Council deliberations. However, his time was limited, and the demands upon it were growing. To ask him to do more would obviously require additional staff and support systems.

One method of support was devised in January 1981. A telephone “Hotline” was placed in the Central Office as a means of informing members about the federal scene in student aid. The service, which was a three-minute recording, was to be updated weekly (Newsletter, January 28, 1981). The intention was not only to inform the members but to do so without taking an inordinate amount of staff time. The recorded information proved to be quite popular with members; by May a second tape system was added to the original, in an effort to keep busy signals to a minimum (Newsletter, May 18, 1981). The initial popularity continued; during the summer of 1981 the Hotline service averaged wall over 1,000 calls per week (Martin to National Council, September 14, 1981).

The Broadening Role of the Council

Structural changes, too, were part of the NASFAA response to the Reagan era challenges. One problem which had long plagued the Association was the customary lengthy debate over minute detail which dominated National Council meetings. One of Don Holec’s major goals as incoming President was to move the Council away from these tedious, technical debates on minor issues and toward a new role — that of a Board of Directors, a policy group. The idea of a Council as Board of Directors was not new with Holec; the NASFAA By-Laws stated that the Council would serve in this capacity. Edson Sample, for one, had been concerned for some time that the Council became bogged down in the petty and secondary issues; he had called in 1979 for the Council to change its name to “Board of Directors” in an effort to communicate the need for broader discussion (Sample to LRP Committee members, September 25, 1979). Gene Miller, too, had worked in this direction. But Holec formalized the process, seeking diligently to implement the recommendations of the Long Range Planning Committee, chaired by Lola Finch, that NASFAA take a broad view in policy development and focus on substantive issues, but that the Council also remember that it must come to positions of compromise among the various sectors after public debate if NASFAA were to speak for the entire aid community. Student aid had by 1980 become large enough that it was a target for a number of special interest groups. As Marcia Gardiner of Connecticut College put it to her fellow Long Range Planning Committee members, “Other organizations with far less sophistication about aid are already active in promoting financial aid programs to benefit one category of students and/or institutions without much regard for the general weal. If NASFAA becomes less able to speak for the whole aid community this process will be accelerated.” (Gardiner to Finch, February 11, 1980).

The problem facing Holec, then, was to maintain the public debate which gave credence to NASFAA positions without having Council meetings dominated by technical matters. He chose to resolve this dilemma by placing increased reliance on committees for the development of policy positions to be taken by Council and on the central office staff for day to day decisions. Council, under Holec, gave broad directives both to the committees and the staff and then let them develop the technical aspects of issues in keeping with this guidance. Final approval, of course, continued to rest with Council (Holec, 1982).
An Adversarial Political Environment

Meanwhile, the political climate in which NASFAA found itself fighting was worsening. The Administration was expected to ask for less in financial aid appropriations for FY 83 than were included in the budget ceilings, and NASFAA learned in December that Reagan might also seek rescissions in FY 82 allocations. When the Administration officially unveiled its new budget proposals in February, 1982, the aid community saw its worst fears realized. Not only was the President’s request 56 percent below the FY 83 ceilings approved in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, but it also sought rescissions for FY 82 and proposed the dismantling of the Department of Education. To replace the Department Reagan offered a “Foundation for Education Assistance” (Newsletter, February 8, 1982).

The National Council, meeting in the same month, responded by opposing reductions below those of the 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act and pledged its support to those lawmakers who would fight for those spending levels (Newsletter, March 9, 1982). The Congress, in its turn, largely ignored the Reagan requests for rescissions in FY 82. Still, OMB refused to allow ED to allocate funds for the campus based programs until Congress either made a decision or until the request for rescission legally expired in late April. The resulting delay in the delivery system caused institutions to be unable to deliver offers of assistance to students with any degree of certainty. (Newsletter, April 6, 1982).

Allocation letters were not the only delays being experienced by aid administrators and students in the spring of 1982. There were technical problems with the certification of GSL applications, a delay in publication of the payment schedule for Pell Grants (the new name for Basic Grants under the reauthorization of 1980), and the specter of 100 percent of the Pell Grant applications then being filed being flagged for the tedious, time-consuming process of validation. NASFAA responded with an open question concerning the motives of the Reagan Administration: “Given the consistency with which delays seem to be occurring, one must begin to wonder if they are not part of a deliberate attempt to discourage students in the hopes of saving money that has been appropriated to help them attend postsecondary institutions.” (Newsletter, April 6, 1982)

This adversarial style marked a relatively new departure for NASFAA. There had been differences with numerous ED (USOE) proposals through the years; there had been harsh words and hot tempers; but after 1981 the style of NASFAA in dealing with the Administration became more openly suspicious and questioning regarding their possible ulterior motives. The concerns reached new heights when the Washington Post reported the resignation from ED of Undersecretary of Education William Clohan. Clohan, who prior to Reagan’s election had been a minority counsel to the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education, served as second in command in the Education Department. His resignation was viewed by the Post as an “ideological purge,” and NASFAA expressed its sadness at his departure. While serving as minority counsel in the House Clohan had been receptive to student aid requests; as the number two man in Reagan’s Department of Education he had served as a “staunch and steadfast representative of the administration.” He was described as “graceful under pressure in defending the President’s policies … a noble and respected opponent” (Newsletter, April 20, 1982).

While the change in style and tone indicated a distrust of the motives of the Reagan Administration, it did not indicate an unwillingness on the part of NASFAA to communicate with Reagan’s representatives. In July, 1982, Ed Elmendorf attended the National Council meeting in Dearborn, Michigan. At this session he thanked outgoing President Holec for his “hard work and cooperation with the Department.” He further stated his willingness to attend all Council meetings in the future, “to continue to build upon the relationship developed with the Council over the past year” (National Council Minutes, July 13, 1982). NASFAA and Dr. Elmendorf had come a long way together indeed since his assertion a year earlier that student interests and NASFAA interests were not synonymous.

NASFAA also worked during this period on building and maintaining its connections with the Congress. Among the participants in the Dearborn conference were Senator Stafford, Representative Thomas Coleman, who served as the ranking Republican member of the House Postsecondary Education Subcommittee, and old friend Congressman Ford, the former chairman and still senior Democratic member of the Subcommittee. Stafford even held a mock hearing before the group, taking testimony on a variety of issues facing student aid (Newsletter, July 27, 1982). Such close work with Congressional opinion leaders by NASFAA may have helped set the legislative mood, but the risky politics associated with cutting popular programs in an election year were doubtless more influential. The Congress paid little attention
to the Reagan budget requests for student aid 1982. Prior to the election the Congress also acted in positive ways to support the principle of postsecondary access. In August ED had released the Pell Grant “Family Contribution Schedule” (the eligibility formula) for the coming academic year, 1983-84. The release was over four months later than the date specified by statute, yet there were no enforceable penalties associated with the delay on the part of ED. Consequently, later that same month Congress passed several “technical amendments” which were designed to control that and similar abuses by the Administration. In the future, under these amendments, the Family Contribution Schedule would be released on time “or else” the previous year’s version would automatically be updated for inflation and mandated for use. Further, other changes were written into law to prevent tampering with the aid delivery system for the next two academic years. Yet even this action by the legislative branch did not seem to deter OMB in its efforts to slash expenses. In September additional legislation was introduced to prevent continued delays caused by OMB interference with the application forms to be filed by students for aid in 1983-84. The new legislation, entitled “The Student Financial Assistance Technical Amendments Act of 1982,” passed in October, and the aid delivery system was protected through the 1984-85 year from further alteration by the Executive Branch (Newsletter, October 5, 1982).

One issue did challenge the relationship between Congress and the aid community. In July the “Solomon Amendment” had been introduced in the House, as had a companion measure in the Senate. This legislation proposed to link registration with Selective Service with receipt of student financial aid. As Election Day approached in November the Selective Service and ED were already working on regulations which would implement this linkage. This potential problem, however, was not allowed to spoil NASFAA’s November election returns were quite encouraging to the aid community. As Dallas Martin wrote, “The 1982 election results seem to clearly suggest that Americans are far more interested in following a course of moderation than one of extremes.” He continued that the voters seemed to be more interested in a number of other issues than in education, but added that the primary interpretation of the election was that voters “expect their government to apply a more even handed approach in balancing outlays for social programs, the environment, jobs and public works, with expenditures for defense” (Newsletter, November 3, 1982).

As 1982 came to a close the aid community and NASFAA could take a measure of pride in their accomplishments for the year. For the second consecutive year the worst of draconian cuts proposed by the Reagan Administration had been rejected by the Congress and technical legislation had been enacted to protect the delicate delivery calendar from continued slippage. While the regulations offered by ED for the implementation of the Solomon Amendment were burdensome and clearly seemed beyond the intent of the Congress in terms of the on-campus verification required, the year had been a positive one for NASFAA.

**Associational Introspection in the 1980s**

Even as NASFAA concentrated significant energies on governmental activities during 1982, it did find time to examine itself as well. To succeed Holec as President NASFAA first elected Norman Beck; his unexpected resignation in July, 1981, led to a special election which was held in February, 1982. At that time the membership chose Lola Finch as the new President-Elect. Finch found herself in the position of having to prepare for her presidency in significantly less time than most of her predecessors had enjoyed. Fortunately, she was well-prepared to face that challenge after several years of experience with the Long Range Planning Committee; in that role she had studied virtually every aspect of the Association’s structure, strategies, and systems; she had further come to know the differing points of view of a diverse membership.

There was little doubt that she would continue Holec’s emphasis on taking the broader view of student aid and its relationship to higher education; there was also little doubt that she would support the concept of moving the Council toward a role of Board of Directors, leaving much of the detailed work of the Association to the central office staff and to the appropriate committees and commissions. Dallas Martin aided Finch in this approach at the September meeting of the National Council in Aspen, Colorado. Martin reflected on the changes expected during the 1980s in demographics, the economy, and in technology; he speculated on how these changes would affect postsecondary education. After a number of Council members joined the discussion of these topics President Finch suggested that readings relating to changes facing higher education could be included in the next Council update mailing and that the first day of the next Council meeting would be devoted to a discussion of these readings. The nature of the Council, this discussion indicated, had changed in the desired direction during the past two years (National Council Minutes, September 23, 1982).

Other changes were occurring as well. Former President Bob Huff, examining the proper roles of staff and volunteer leaders, began to comment that more should be put into the hands of staff, directed by broad policy set by Council. Aid issues moved so swiftly and were so complex by 1982 that Huff believed concentrating operations in the hands of the staff was the only realistic method of managing the Association (Huff, 1982). Even as the issues of regional versus national control of the Association were diminishing in the wake of the changes in Council composition, renewed discussion thus arose concerning the appropriate roles of staff. As Dallas Martin reflected in 1981, some members wanted the staff to do more tasks, while others accused them of trying to take over the Association. A delicate balance was therefore required (Martin, 1981). The debate over how to strike that balance would continue into the middle of the decade.

Other issues were less divisive. The trend toward democratization in NASFAA, which had accelerated in the late 1970s, continued in the early 1980s. Forms soliciting volunteers for committee assignments were widely circulated, and the Association expressed concern that the composition of the committees reflect the diversity of the membership. In February, 1982, the Newsletter reported the results of an analysis of committee representation conducted by Marlene Shettel of Cleveland State University. Her study concluded that committee membership was more diverse than in education, but added that the primary interpretation of the election was that voters “expect their government to apply a more even handed approach in balancing outlays for social programs, the environment, jobs and public works, with expenditures for defense” (Huff, 1982).

As 1982 came to a close the aid community and NASFAA could take a measure of pride in their accomplishments for the year. For the second consecutive year the worst of draconian cuts proposed by the Reagan Administration had been rejected by the Congress and technical legislation had been enacted to protect the delicate delivery calendar from continued slippage. While the regulations offered by ED for the implementation of the Solomon Amendment were burdensome and clearly seemed beyond the intent of the Congress in terms of the on-campus verification required, the year had been a positive one for NASFAA.

**Associational Introspection in the 1980s**

Even as NASFAA concentrated significant energies on governmental activities during 1982, it did find time to examine itself as well. To succeed Holec as President NASFAA first elected Norman Beck; his unexpected resignation in July, 1981, led to a special election which was held in February, 1982. At that time the membership chose Lola Finch as the new President-Elect. Finch found herself in the position of having to prepare for her presidency in significantly less time than most of her predecessors had enjoyed. Fortunately, she was well-prepared to face that challenge after several years of experience with the Long Range Planning Committee; in that role she had studied virtually every aspect of the Association’s structure, strategies, and systems; she had further come to know the differing points of view of a diverse membership.

There was little doubt that she would continue Holec’s emphasis on taking the broader view of student aid and its relationship to higher education; there was also little doubt that she would support the concept of moving the Council toward a role of Board of Directors, leaving much of the detailed work of the Association to the central office staff and to the appropriate committees and commissions. Dallas Martin aided Finch in this approach at the September meeting of the National Council in Aspen, Colorado. Martin reflected on the changes expected during the 1980s in demographics, the economy, and in technology; he speculated on how these changes would affect postsecondary education. After a number of Council members joined the discussion of these topics President Finch suggested that readings relating to changes facing higher education could be included in the next Council update mailing and that the first day of the next Council meeting would be devoted to a discussion of these readings. The nature of the Council, this discussion indicated, had changed in the desired direction during the past two years (National Council Minutes, September 23, 1982).

Other changes were occurring as well. Former President Bob Huff, examining the proper roles of staff and volunteer leaders, began to comment that more should be put into the hands of staff, directed by broad policy set by Council. Aid issues moved so swiftly and were so complex by 1982 that Huff believed concentrating operations in the hands of the staff was the only realistic method of running the Association (Huff, 1982). Even as the issues of regional versus national control of the Association were diminishing in the wake of the changes in Council composition, renewed discussion thus arose concerning the appropriate roles of staff. As Dallas Martin reflected in 1981, some members wanted the staff to do more tasks, while others accused them of trying to take over the Association. A delicate balance was therefore required (Martin, 1981). The debate over how to strike that balance would continue into the middle of the decade.

Other issues were less divisive. The trend toward democratization in NASFAA, which had accelerated in the late 1970s, continued in the early 1980s. Forms soliciting volunteers for committee assignments were widely circulated, and the Association expressed concern that the composition of the committees reflect the diversity of the membership. In February, 1982, the Newsletter reported the results of an analysis of committee representation conducted by Marlene Shettel of Cleveland State University. Her study concluded that turnover on committees ranged from 33 percent to 50 percent each year; and out of 121 positions on committees in 1981-82, there had been 115 different people serving. Breakdowns by gender, sector, and ethnicity reflected the active involvement of all groups in NASFAA committee work (Newsletter, February 8, 1982).
Still, one group which had long felt the need for a united voice separate from the other committees was the minority aid administrators. When Gene Miller had attempted to “mainstream” minority concerns by assuring their inclusion on every committee, she had learned that the minority aid administrators wanted also to continue a separate group designed to represent their interests. Their desire was made formal at the Council meeting of February 25, 1982, in Las Vegas, when William Bennett, Chairman of a special Task Force on Minority Affairs appointed by Holec, made a report on behalf of that group. Bennett reported results of a survey of minority aid administrators, citing the conclusions of the Task Force that NASFAA needed to do more to encourage participation by minorities; and that minorities should be represented on all committees as well as on a standing committee devoted exclusively to their concerns. In keeping with the sensitivity to diverse viewpoints which NASFAA had encouraged since Allan Purdy organized the Council, Bennett’s report was accepted and the work of his Task Force commenced by unanimous vote (National Council Minutes, February 25, 1982).

The Reagan Threat Accelerates

But if 1982 had ended on a positive note regarding legislative accomplishments and associational harmony, the beginning of 1983 reminded NASFAA members of the continuing threat posed to higher education by the Reagan Administration. While his FY 84 budget proposals for student aid were far more reasonable than his previous request, the President asked in February, 1983, for radical changes in the aid programs themselves. After two years of failing to achieve the budget reductions they had proposed, the Administration now attempted a less direct route to the dismantling of the structure of student aid. President Reagan released details of his proposals in March; among the requests were the restructuring of Pell Grants into “Self-Help Grants,” which would impose a work or loan burden on student aid recipients before federal grant money could be obtained. While this was offered as a “return” to the basic principles of student aid, it actually resembled most closely a set of 1970 Nixon Administration proposals which had been denounced in the Congress (Gladiex and Wolanin, 1976, pp. 70-72). Far from being a return to past aid principles, the Reagan proposal was so radically different from anything ever seriously considered by earlier lawmakers that it received scant credence in Congress in 1983; as Gladiex and Wolanin have argued, “new policy is usually not made by uprooting wholesale what already exists; federal programs already in place will be the starting point for action” (Gladiex and Wolanin, 1976, p. 3).

NASFAA objected strenuously to the proposals of the Administration, arguing that any substantial program changes should await reauthorization and should not be made simply for the purpose of attaining spending reductions. After all, NASFAA maintained, the authorizing committees had a sense of the history of the aid programs and the reasons behind their development; the appropriations and budgeting committees would lack this historic consciousness. NASFAA did not have to press its case, however, since the Administration’s proposals were greeted by a Congressional yawn.

More effort was required in response to the regulations linking registration with Selective Service to receipt of financial aid. As proposed, these regulations required a two-part effort on the part of postsecondary institutions. First, a statement certifying compliance (or exemption from compliance) was to be collected prior to the disbursement of funds. On this issue the Department was reasonable; this required statement could be integrated with the mandatory “Statement of Educational Purpose” which was already collected from each recipient of federal student aid. The second part of the requirement, however, imposed a burden on the institutions, particularly on those large enough to require automated systems for the maintenance of student documents. In addition to the requirement of certification of registration status the Department proposed that each student provide the aid administrator with a file copy of his Selective Service letter acknowledging registration. Apart from the difficulties inherent in tracking the receipt of this documentation on thousands of students, NASFAA raised the issue of potential delays at Selective Service hindering payments of needed funds to students. There were Members of Congress who agreed. The House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education held an “oversight” hearing on the subject of the proposed regulations, and while Assistant Secretary Elmendorf maintained that collection of the documentation would impose no real burden on aid office operations, several Members and witnesses alike expressed concerns regarding the cost of implementation and the probable difficulties involved in this verification scheme. Much of the discussion focused on the divergence between the regulations and the law; nowhere was there a requirement in the legislation that documentation be furnished. As a result of the oversight hearings it became clear that ED would have to modify their proposals (Newsletter, February 28, 1983).

By the time they did so, temporarily at least allowing aid administrators to rely on the statements of students regarding their registration status, the focus had again shifted to the Reagan self-help proposal. Despite the inattention of Congress to this requested restructuring of student aid, ED in its release of the new Pell Grant Family Contribution Schedule — on time, for a change — took the unusual tactic of having two sets of alternative proposals — one if Reagan’s restructuring were approved, another if it were ignored. Nearly obscured by the attention given in the comments accompanying this odd “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” was a plan to increase the assessment rates on discretionary income in the Pell formula. In order to defeat this latest proposal to reduce federal expenditures at the expense of student aid recipients, NASFAA announced plans to seek technical amendments in the Congress (Newsletter, May 18, 1983).

The pattern of increasing Congressional attention to administrative detail in aid programs was continuing; and in the summer the Congress passed the “Student Loan Consolidation and Technical Amendments of 1983,” again specifically limiting the authority of ED in writing regulations. Among the new restrictions was one forbidding ED to change assessment rates in determining Pell Grant eligibility for students (Newsletter, August 9, 1983). During the same period the Congress also debated appropriations for aid programs in FY 84; by September both Houses had approved figures considerably above those requested by the President, and David Stockman, understanding that the Administration requests were no longer under consideration, had indicated Reagan’s
Preparing for the Future

For example, new President Mary Haldane began the 1983-84 year by announcing goals regarding the assumption by NASFAA of “the leadership in developing technical amendments as well as new initiatives in the reauthorization process and in developing self-regulations for our profession.” She planned also to continue the role of NASFAA’s Council as a broad policy-making body and to enhance the reputation and role of the aid administrator in the larger context of higher education. (Executive Committee Minutes, June 14, 1983).

Achieving these goals would involve many things; among them would be an enhancement of training opportunities for aid administrators, providing them with a broad focus regarding aid and the enterprise of higher education. Further, the planning process in NASFAA could be strengthened and streamlined, enabling the Association to make more efficient use of its boundary-scanning mechanisms. Additionally, more attention was needed to the problems of the central office staff — relating both to its organization and its work processes.

These staff needs were addressed first. Indeed, reorganization and delineation of responsibilities of the staff had been an ongoing concern during the 1980s. In early 1982 the various activities of the Association were listed, and a staff member was assigned primary responsibility for each area. This information was made available to the membership through the Newsletter in order to inform members of the proper staff contact person for questions or concerns regarding the different activities. In an effort further to delineate responsibilities and to tie the actions of both staff and volunteer leaders to formal policies of the Association, Edson Sample and Mary Haldane worked together to codify the policies and procedures of NASFAA. By February, 1983, Sample presented for Council approval a 279-page NASFAA Manual of Policies and Procedures, designed not to create but rather to reflect existing practices. The Council not only adopted the Manual but, in recognition of the customary thoroughness of the work done by Edson Sample, unanimously agreed that any prior actions of Council which were in contradiction to the Manual as compiled would be superseded by it (National Council Minutes, February 23, 1983). Reorganization of the staff continued during the summer, as the support staff positions were brought in line with the structure of the Association — one secretary was assigned to each of three Commissions, Association Activities, Professional Advancement, and Government Affairs (Newsletter, August 23, 1983).

Growth as well as rethinking responsibilities characterized NASFAA’s central office during the early 1980s. Upon the resignation of Joyce Dunagan in June, 1981, Constance White was employed as an Associate Director. Shortly thereafter the decision was made to create an additional professional position on the central staff, and after a search of several months, in February, 1982, Dennis Martin was employed as an Assistant Director. This brought the number of professional staff members to four; upon the departure of Constance White in November, 1983 the staff size remained at four, since in October NASFAA had employed Robin Jenkins to serve as a salaried Treasurer. Still, the staff size seemed insufficient for the workload thought Herb Vescio, who took a leave of absence from Eastern Kentucky University during 1982-83 to work on special projects in the NASFAA central office. Vescio reported to Council in May, 1983, regarding the responsibilities of the staff: he found the size of the staff insufficient for the demands placed upon them; there was a “constant drain” on the staff created by the many scheduled and unscheduled meetings with other higher education associations; and the committees placed too much on the staff which they could do for themselves (National Council Minutes, May 6, 1983). Clearly NASFAA would have to enlarge the staff if it were to continue to call upon the same services from the central office. Discussion of the general situation, however, still continued in October, 1983. All seemed to agree that the central office was understaffed and overworked, but no concrete action was taken that fall (Executive Committee Conference Call Minutes, October 3, 1983).

One reason for the inactivity on staff employment was finance. Membership concerns had been at the forefront of Council deliberations since the 1982-83 year. The concerns were no longer the solvency questions which had characterized the finances a decade earlier; now the questions raised were over the sustaining and enlargement of member services balanced against dues increases. In an effort to improve services while maintaining dues at a steady state the Association continually attempted to enlarge the membership itself. Its efforts in that regard were phenomenally successful. Membership increased in every year after 1977-78; by the early 1980s NASFAA had become the largest institutionally-based professional organization among the higher education associations in Washington, including in its numbers all sectors represented in higher education (Executive Committee Minutes, September 22, 1982). Still, in order to expand services additional funds were needed; one method of attaining these funds was to market membership in NASFAA even more aggressively. A variety
of mechanisms were considered. For example, in May, 1982, Council discussed the creation of a “subscriber” category of membership. This would entail an effort to secure the dues of institutions which for various reasons could not budget a membership in another professional organization but which could expend institutional funds for subscriptions to NASFAA Federal Monitor, Newsletters, Monographs, Special Reports, and other publications. Some interest was expressed at the Council meeting in pursuing this idea, and outgoing President Finch charged the incoming Executive Committee to investigate the “subscriber” options (National Council Minutes, 5/15/82, p.4).

**A Refined Role in Training**

The situation was not an urgent one, but there were signs of possible financial strain to come. The Student Financial Assistance Training Project (SFATP), successor to the Basic Grant Training contract first awarded to NASFAA and a consortium in 1974, was in some funding jeopardy for the 1982-83 cycle, and its future beyond that time was doubtful. In the absence of training by the federal government, some group would have to pick up the training for new aid administrators and guidance counselors. NASFAA would certainly feel a professional responsibility to do so, even though the Association realized that such activities would no longer be subsidized by federal dollars (Executive Committee Minutes, September 22, 1982).

The proper role of NASFAA in training had been the subject of ongoing debate for years, and the threats to the SFATP again caused it to resurface. As early as 1982 NASFAA leaders had been aware that the federal contract for the training project was finite; Donald Ryan, as chairman of the Training Committee that year, presented to the Association a “philosophical position” and “alternatives” which might “succeed the Training Program when it ceases to exist.” Based on information from sources at ED, Ryan believed the contract would likely exist no longer than the end of 1983. The Association then adopted a formal position on training, which declared that its “role in training begins with the premise that it will act as an umbrella in organizing, coordinating, and facilitating training efforts as they relate to national, regional, and state levels.” The position acknowledged that the Association would continue to encourage regional, state, and ED efforts in professional development and would serve to coordinate those efforts for the aid community at large. Moreover, NASFAA itself would now focus on three aspects of training for the profession. These were identified as “core training” on basic competencies for newer aid personnel, “management training” designed to foster improved office operations skills among aid administrators and “professional development,” which involved the production of training materials and specialized training activities which could lead to the aid administrator’s ability “to realize a greater degree of impact on the institution’s management team.” The essential focus, insofar as actual delivery of training was concerned, was to be on the core effort (Executive Committee Minutes, September 22, 1982).

Ryan had been close to the mark in his hypothesized timetable for the withdrawal by the federal government from the training partnership. In late 1983 NASFAA began to negotiate with ED on the continuation of the training contract, only to have the process derailed by an unwillingness on the part of the Department either to pay the Association what NASFAA considered reasonable indirect costs or to allow the Association to make decisions on the content of training opportunities. As a result negotiations concluded without a contract, and, for the first time since 1971, a training relationship with the federal government did not exist (Executive Committee Conference Call Minutes, January 24, 1984 and February 15, 1984). The void created additional interest in the training position previously adopted by the Association, and its thrust was again confirmed as appropriate during 1984. Indeed, four of the six regions represented on Council strongly encouraged increased NASFAA involvement in training; only in MASFAA and SASFAA, where regional training efforts were traditionally strong, was there some reluctance expressed. Even in those regions, however, there was a recognition that the absence of federal involvement necessitated an expanded role by the National Association (Executive Committee Minutes, March 19, 1984).

In 1985 the NASFAA position on training was again endorsed as proper by the Executive Committee, and the Association made plans to distribute copyrighted material at a cost to states and regions (Executive Committee Minutes, June 18, 1985). While there was some concern expressed over the ability of various regional and state associations to bear the expense of these materials, general feeling prevailed that this activity was necessary and the costs were simply an associated factor which could not be avoided. As one regional president later explained to his regional executive board, the need to have consistent training materials on a national basis made absolutely necessary NASFAA’s involvement in developing the literature and curricula, and finances dictated that the Association had to provide materials on at least a break-even basis (Carmichael, 1986).

Moving into the void created by the federal withdrawal, then, created some debate among the regional associations as to whether NASFAA was usurping their traditional role, but most members saw the action as necessary for the continued professional development of aid administrators. Some even saw opportunity in adversity. As early as 1982, when Ryan had announced the coming end of the training partnership, plans were underway for a comprehensive reference document designed to enhance the aid community’s education. This document, tentatively entitled the NASFAA Encyclopedia of Financial Aid, was to be compiled by Ruth Burns and offered to members as a subscription, with periodic updates as required by changing regulations and legislation. The project was thus to be self-supporting, independent of regular dues, and it was designed to address “the overall administration of financial aid” (“Executive Committee Minutes, September 22, 1982”). By early 1984, when substantial progress on the Encyclopedia indicated that NASFAA could indeed develop effective and comprehensive materials for the community on a timely basis, Lola Finch challenged her colleagues who worried about losing the SFATP contract. That loss, she asserted, would provide NASFAA an additional opportunity to display its professionalism (Executive Committee Conference Call Minutes, January 24, 1984). The distribution and excellent reception accorded to the Encyclopedia in the fall of that same year nicely illustrated Finch’s point.
Self-Examination Continues

In other ways, too, the Association re-examined its staff, systems, and strategies for the battles of the Reagan age. NASFAA had come of age in a time of great legislative and internal successes; it now continued to mature in an era of adversity. It had developed within a partnership among higher education, successive federal Administrations, and the Congress; it now had to continue its efforts with the Administration openly hostile and the Congress operating within a political environment of soaring national debt and huge outlays for defense spending. NASFAA would therefore have to devote its energies both to filling the void left by the Administration’s withdrawal from the partnership and ensuring that the Congress had the information it needed in order to resist the Administration’s repeated attempts to have it join in the assault on student aid. In order to accomplish these new purposes NASFAA would need to strengthen not only its legislative advocacy role but also its internal capabilities. The central office staff thus grew in direct response to the developing needs of the Association to provide its members with training and other services previously available through the Department of Education. Barbara Kay, who had long been associated with the SFATP, was employed by NASFAA as Assistant Director for Training and Technical Assistance on May 15, 1984, and Marty Guthrie, who also had extensive training experience, was hired as Assistant Director for Technical Assistance in November of the same year. By early 1985 NASFAA had compiled an organizational chart of central office responsibilities, breaking down various components of staff expertise and communicating these components to the membership. Staffing now consisted of six professional and seven support positions; their new arrangement into management areas reflected the growing need for specialization and division of labor in response to the demands of monitoring the federal situation and offering increased services to members (Newsletter, May 25, 1984; January 11, 1985).

The appropriate role of this enlarged staff became a major point of discussion within the Association during 1984 and 1985. The Association Governance Committee, which was a hybrid of the former Long Range Planning and By-Laws Committees, recommended in May, 1984, that the organization consider a “redefinition of the roles of the President, Executive Director, and Commissions” in order “to increase the effectiveness and efficiency in establishing goals and priorities and the process of accomplishing them” (Association Governance Committee, May, 1984). Among the proposals for redefinition was a title change for both the President and the Executive Director.

In large measure this proposal was not intended so much to redefine the roles of those offices as to reflect the evolving reality of the two positions. As the Committee acknowledged,

> for some time the Executive Director has performed tasks formerly done by the President.... Job titles and functions evolve and change.... the role of the salaried executive has become the most visible spokesperson for the Association. And, in greater amounts, organizational responsibilities have gravitated to this position (Association Governance Committee, 1984).

In part, then, the title change suggestion reflected recognition of the increased prominence of Dallas Martin within the Association and the entire higher education community. It also depicted a change in the amount of time a campus aid administrator might reasonably be expected to devote to voluntary service to the Association in the 1980s. This change marked a direct effect of the ever-increasing technical evolution of aid programs:

> there has been a tremendous expansion in the amounts of aid and complexity of administering it at the campus level. In view of this greater responsibility and accountability of the practicing financial aid administrator, the Committee feels that the demands placed on the elected President to be the chief executive officer of the Association may be too great. Can the Association continue to demand of its elected President, a full-time employee of his or her institution, the time and effort required by the present NASFAA administrative arrangement? There is considerable evidence to support the view ... that many very able and potentially qualified candidates will not, or can not, allow their names to be placed in nomination for President-Elect because of the large time commitment and ... magnitude of the responsibility (Association Governance Committee, 1984).

There was little overt opposition on Council to the general thrust of the changes proposed by the Association Governance Committee. The precise titles and responsibilities which should be assigned to each position, however, were the subject of intense debate. Council asked the Committee to discuss its position again and make refined recommendations in the spring of 1985 (National Council Minutes, November 14-15, 1984). By July, 1985, these refinements had been made, presented to Council, and distributed to the membership for comment. Council formally approved the title changes effective July 1, 1987. After that date the salaried executive will be the President of NASFAA while its elected head will be termed the National Chairman (Newsletter, October 28, 1985). The precise duties of the two offices were detailed by the Committee in its revised report to Council (Association Governance Committee, 1985).

In other ways, too, the Association was attempting to make its systems better able to cope with the realities of the decade. At its summer meeting in 1984, for example, the Executive Committee had voted to engage the firm of Coopers and Lybrand to undertake a management study of NASFAA. It also directed the Fiscal Planning and Management Committee to investigate the possibilities of hiring a staff person to direct organizational development and fund raising activities (Executive Committee Minutes, July 20, 1984). New President William Bennett of Ohio agreed with the expanded thrust toward long-range goals and development of the organization. As he assumed the presidency Bennett called for the Association to pursue five objectives, including a five-year fiscal stabilization plan which emphasized management enhancements and cost-effectiveness studies and formulation of “a comprehensive marketing strategy” which would emphasize NASFAA services and thus aid in increasing membership.

Maturing in an Era of Adversity

Bennett’s other goals for the Association were more traditional but no less important; among them was a desire to “provide politically effective leadership during the reauthorization process” scheduled for 1985 (Bennett to National Council, July 5, 1984). While reauthorization itself was ultimately postponed until the 1985-86 NASFAA year, Bennett nevertheless found himself and the Association busily involved in the political process. One source of involvement came in the departure of Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of Education, Terrell H. Bell, at the end of 1984. While
the Department of Education under Reagan had certainly been considered less than friendly to the interests of student aid, Bell’s moderating influence had been seen by NASFAA as ameliorating the worst of the Reagan Administration’s attacks on aid programs (Newsletter, November 9, 1984). With Bell leaving the future looked threatening, particularly since potential successors were being examined for “fitness” by the “Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress,” a group which had previously voiced opposition to many of the policies held in high regard by the educational community. It was considered unlikely that President Reagan would choose any candidate who lacked this group’s certification that he or she held the “correct” positions on school prayer, tuition tax credits, and other education issues dominating the conservative agenda (Newsletter, November 21, 1984). By January this committee had done its work, and the President had nominated Bell’s successor, William J. Bennett, Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities. This new Secretary of Education bore no resemblance other than in name to President Bennett of NASFAA; while NASFAA’s Bill Bennett proposed increased funding to insure continued access to postsecondary education in an era of rising costs, the new Secretary vigorously defended the Administration’s proposals for a 25 percent reduction in student aid in FY 86 (Newsletter, January 23, 1985; February 5, 1985).

Clearly NASFAA continued to have challenges before it in the federal political arena; at its annual conference in Washington in July, 1985, the Association orchestrated visits to House and Senate members by the nearly 1,400 members in attendance. The visitations were followed by a successful reception for Members of Congress. The Association thus expanded its old strategy of involving members from the field directly in legislative advocacy activities. It also amplified its newer, more adversarial style. Gerald T. Bird, incoming President of NASFAA, began his term with a speech to the NASFAA Conference which was essentially a call to arms, castigating the Department of Education for its seemingly purposeful delays in issuing its complex Pell Grant “validation” handbook and chiding the federal authorities for ignoring the purpose behind student assistance: students needed to be free to concentrate on the content of their textbooks, rather than fettered by worrying whether they could afford to buy those books (July 30, 1985).

The tone of defiance in Bird’s remarks was purposeful; by issuing a public challenge to the Department he clearly indicated NASFAA’s determination to defend vigorously the right of access to higher education, and to defend it both from budgetary and programmatic attacks. Still, Bird did not indicate an unwillingness on the part of the Association to depart entirely from the traditional methods of working with the Department of Education in achieving common ground. Rather, his independence reflected the pride NASFAA felt in reaching its twentieth anniversary year as “the most widely respected organization on student aid in the country.” As such, he seemed to indicate, NASFAA would become as aggressive as it felt necessary in combatting Administrative challenges to the aid programs its members regarded as essential to students (Bird to NASFAA Members, July 1, 1985).

Thus, NASFAA would continue to seek enhancements to its primary activities of providing technical assistance and professional development. The future represented more political uncertainty than at any time in the history of the Association, and the leadership in 1985 was well aware of the risks which that uncertainty contained. Yet NASFAA continued to assert with confidence that Americans still held a deep belief in the desirability of student aid as a means of promoting access to higher education. The prevailing political culture had undergone significant changes in appearance since the 1965 Higher Education Act, but its underlying value of equal educational opportunity had not been dramatically altered. It thus remained the greatest challenge facing the maturing Association to remind the American people of just what their values really were.
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

The Evolution of the Policy Arena

The study of the history of the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators has both illustrated and illuminated several aspects of the politics of higher education. The illustrations are of changes within the policy arena in which decisions regarding student aid are made. During the period of NASFAA's existence all components of the policy arena have changed, both in terms of individuals involved and in terms of operating style. The Congress, including both Members and staffs, has found itself involved in an increasingly technical legislative process; as such its role has come to encompass greater reliance on the advice of outside experts, lesser attention to the opinions of successive Administrations, and an enlarged role in developing technical expertise of its own. The Executive Branch has correspondingly moved toward the role of a gallantly in the process; the activities of Secretary of Education William Bennett in promoting public acceptance of the Administration's efforts to diminish the federal role in student financial aid by emphasizing its every negative aspect are far-removed from the days when Jim Moore at the Office of Education worked so closely with the Congress in drafting legislation to provide educational opportunity. Representatives of the higher education community, too, have changed; more groups have become involved in aid issues as they have grown in importance.

One of those groups, of course, has been NASFAA. Its involvement with the higher education policy arena has moved from practically nil to a position of leadership within two decades. That leadership is subtle; for example, most initial decisions regarding a united position for higher education are thrashed out by groups representing the major sectors within the community, and only after these discussions have been initiated are NASFAA opinions usually sought. NASFAA thus becomes the medium in which compromise can take place, since in providing technical assistance to diverse groups it can take advantage of its own special nature as representative of all sectors on student aid matters. In a very real sense, then, the other organizations have had to accept NASFAA as an equal partner. As aid programs were enlarged during the 1970s, student aid became a primary concern of the traditional higher education establishment. Therefore they began to solicit NASFAA opinions and advice based upon the recognition that the aid administrators were the only ones inside postsecondary education who would possess the technical expertise to provide legitimate viewpoints.

While the policy arena underwent changes, the political culture undergirding it was remarkably stable, as the study of NASFAA's history illuminates. The culture was not static, however. The expression of support for student assistance was altered through time, from the 1965 emphasis on aid programs which campuses could administer for eligible students, to the 1972 Basic Grant approach which centered more directly on student recipients, to the 1978 broadening of the goals of access and choice to include students from middle class families as well as those from lower income backgrounds. Yet for all these shifts in emphasis prior to the advent of the Reagan Administration, there had been a unifying cultural concept; the quest for a means of offering the American citizenry equal opportunity in higher education motivated all the differing approaches. When, under Reagan, the pursuit of enlarging that opportunity was challenged by attempts to reduce it, the real stability of the cultural emphasis on equal opportunity was revealed. Only by employing indirect means could the opponents of student aid defeat it; none dared argue against the ultimate goal. Instead the opponents of student aid quarreled with the methods employed to reach that goal or asserted that too many who were capable of helping themselves shared in the benefits of the available programs. Even then the Administration was less successful than it desired in curtailing aid programs; it was only in terms of level expenditures in an age of increasing costs of postsecondary education that the programs suffered defeat. One reason for the strength of the aid programs was the effort of NASFAA in keeping the people reminded of their underlying commitment to access to higher education — and the reminders were sent in ways which incorporated both the positive moral arguments which had characterized the Association in its early days and the more practical power relationships with policymakers which the aid administrators had developed since the middle 1970s.

NASFAA as a Mixed Model: Mutual Benefit and Service

The study of NASFAA has also revealed aspects of organizational behavior. One method of examining that behavior is based upon the typology proposed by Blau and Scott. While NASFAA at first glance appears to be firmly within the mutual benefit type of organization, a closer inspection of the Association over time reveals that it also possesses characteristics of the service organization. The code of ethics of the Association, for example, contains eleven points; of these ten are centered directly on the treatment of the interests of the student client. Even the eleventh is indirectly related to the well-being of students, asking institutions to estimate fairly their need for funding. In addition, the Association's statement of purpose calls for the serving of interests of "students, institutions, government agencies, and sponsors." The order was chosen deliberately, and the emphasis on students was intentional. Perhaps the explanation for the mixed model (under the Blau and Scott typology) is that NASFAA is a mutual benefit association composed of institutional members which are themselves service oriented — thus NASFAA can be seen as dedicated to the mutual benefit of service organizations. As such it has dealt with the central problems of each type of organization.

The major problem of the mutual benefit association is the maintenance of democratic control rather than fostering dependence upon the wishes of a ruling oligarchy. NASFAA, throughout its history, has evinced its concern with this central dilemma of maintaining democratic processes. It has made certain that the ruling elite, if it exists, has been at least representative of the membership at large by its method of selection of National Council representatives. Further, all meetings of that Council are well-publicized and are open to attendance by any Association member. NASFAA has been careful through the years to include on the Council representation from women, minorities, and all sizes and sectors of educational institutions, involving individuals from institutions of varying prestige and reputation. Indeed, the
Association has even concerned itself with more subtle aspects of maintaining democratic processes; managing after the middle 1970s to pay the expenses of committee and commission members in an effort to prevent those systems from becoming the preserve only of aid administrators working for institutions possessing the resources and willingness to support such activities.

NASFAA also actively encourages its members to participate in its efforts. Membership service on committees and commissions is solicited by means of the Newsletter each year, and selection for appointment to committees is based on the need to balance the qualifications of a volunteer for a specific role with the interests represented by that volunteer. Additionally, attendance at the annual conference of the Association is promoted extensively through mailings and in the Newsletter. The publicity effort is based at least partially on the desire to increase the base of involvement. NASFAA also sponsors what unquestionably are the most effective training opportunities available to student aid administrators; a need to participate in this training inspires attendance at the annual conference and at other NASFAA events.

NASFAA, then, appears to have dealt with the problems of a mutual benefit organization throughout its twenty-year history. It has also encountered the classic problem facing service organizations, the conflict between the professional ideal of service to clients and the necessity for bureaucratic procedures which may hinder that service. It has dealt with this conflict in two ways. First, in its training activities since the first “training the trainers” project, NASFAA has served as a buffer for its members between their professional orientation as representatives of student interests on their campuses and the seemingly too-complex bureaucratic organization of the federal programs which they have to administer. Even while under contract with the Office and then Department of Education, NASFAA kept the focus of training on benefiting the student client while maintaining program integrity, rather than emphasizing only compliance mechanisms. In so doing the Association was able to enlarge the service ideal among trainees in ways the federal bureaucracy could not have done. Further, since the collapse of the contract with the Department of Education, NASFAA has been free to develop this ideal still more.

A second way in which NASFAA has dealt with the problem of conflict arising from possessing a professional orientation while administering bureaucratic programs has been in the inculcation of values in individual financial aid administrators. NASFAA is what Etzioni (1975) would term a “normative” organization, since its major power orientation is related to supporting the values it espouses. With members who become heavily involved NASFAA also exercises some remunerative powers, but for most members it is normative. As such the Association tends to promote “moral” behavior in its members; it has done so by being tightly coupled on values. The symbol system of the organization is devoted to enhancing equal opportunity, to the needs of deserving students to gain access to higher education, and to the duties of aid administrators to act honorably and equitably in order to assure these needs are met. The value system is so tightly coupled that it can legitimately be termed an organizational culture, a system of explanation of the purposes behind administering an otherwise frustrating and cumbersome set of programs. The culture is based upon an ideology of opportunity which parallels the one which undergirds the higher education policy arena; it holds as evident and central that postsecondary education is the key to expansion of opportunity in our society. NASFAA, then, serves its members as a reference group — a set with which the individual can identify in an affective sense. In its role as a reference group NASFAA stresses its values and performs for its institutional members the enculturation of their representatives. In so doing, the Association models the service organizations which comprise its membership.

It seems logical, then, to conclude that NASFAA is indeed a mixed organizational model, being partially a mutual benefit organization and partially a service association. As such it may be vulnerable to charges that it uses the cultural trappings of the service agency to promote the interests of its own members. It appears, however, that the mixture of interests and culture has been of genuine benefit to the student-clients as well as to the membership of the Association. NASFAA has played an increasingly important role in the development of balanced and equitable programs of federal student financial assistance which have served the interests of the Association’s diverse membership. As an organization representing all the sectors of higher education, it has been in the self-interest of the Association to avoid squabbling among its own constituencies. In this regard, then, NASFAA has by its nature sought common ground upon which all sectors could compromise. The unifying symbol behind this atmosphere of compromise has been the student; and in serving its diverse interests NASFAA has gone to elaborate lengths to keep student interests paramount in order to divert its own attention from differences in institutional interests. The result has been the development of policies which contain provisions beneficial to students regardless of their choice of educational institution; another effect has been the unification of NASFAA. Without its pervading culture of fighting for student interests it is doubtful that the diverse institutions comprising the Association could have developed a successful coalition.

**NASFAA in the McKinsey 7-S Framework**

The use of the McKinsey 7-S Framework of Peters and Waterman provides an additional perspective on the development of organizational culture and a focus on the components of organizational activities. In each of seven interrelated variables the organization experienced change during its history. These variables include strategies (organizational goals, both long-term and short-term), systems (means employed to effect those strategies), structure (the hierarchical arrangements and macro-systems needed to assure organizational viability), skills (the present and hoped-for level of expertise and talent), staff (the personnel employed by the organization), and style (the overall management “personality” of an organization). These six variables are linked around a common core of shared values, or organizational culture, which provides meaning to all the activities of the organization.

**Strategies**

In its strategies, for example, NASFAA began in 1966 with a desire to gain a voice within the policy arena. While the early members of the Association understood that liaison with other higher education groups would be an important part of gaining that voice, they saw less clearly that professional development activities would also be a means to the desired ends. For that reason the early NASFAA
placed relatively little emphasis on professional development. It did, however, begin to focus its energies on students rather than on institutions, partially as a result of advice from Bill Gaul that this focus would be helpful in dealing with the Congress. Gaul was certainly correct, but this strategy had an even more important additional effect — it kept the membership in NASFAA united in common purpose rather than divided over differences which separated the sectors.

Efforts at liaison with other groups were enhanced in 1972 by the moving of NASFAA’s central office to Washington; while at first the attentions of the other groups may have been given out of professional courtesy, in time the physical presence of NASFAA at the center of operations for the higher education policy arena fostered a more genuine involvement. NASFAA stumbled into another profitable area in its initial contract to “train the trainers” for the Office of Education; out of the resulting efforts the leaders of the Association saw clearly that professional development had a number of benefits beyond simply enhancing the skills of members. By conducting the training project NASFAA could gain in revenue both from the contract itself and from increased memberships resulting from enhanced awareness of its reputation among aid administrators in the field. By 1977-78, when increased revenues permitted more services to the profession, NASFAA strategies broadened to include research as well as increased publications and training opportunities. It also began to seek to broaden its reputation as technical experts into an awareness that aid administrators should be involved in policy development at early stages. The success of this attempt to broaden the scope of NASFAA’s reputation was illustrated in its participation in the enactment of the Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978.

In liaison, too, NASFAA in the late 1970s shifted its emphasis from a limited base of personal contacts with heads of other higher education organizations toward more formal association with those bodies. Membership as a constituent organization with ACE symbolized this transition. By the end of the decade the Association had seen so many of its traditional goals attained that it began to turn its attention to moving beyond influence on legislation, with the creation of self-regulatory initiatives. This strategy was curtailed by the election of 1980, the results of which demanded additional legislative attention by the Association.

Consequently, the NASFAA which emerged by the middle 1980s continued its emphasis on broad involvement in student aid policy, seeking also to establish alliances with other groups threatened by the Reagan assault on domestic programs. For example, NASFAA planned in March, 1986, to solicit agreement with elementary and secondary education political groups to support their request for funding in Chapter 1 programs in exchange for the endorsement of a Pell Grant program (Executive Committee Minutes, March 19-20, 1986). This working together with groups outside the higher education community illustrated the movement in NASFAA strategies since 1966. Another event revealing similar increased usage of power relationships rather than just moral persuasion was the “working the Hill” by 1,400 attendees at the 1985 NASFAA annual conference in Washington. This represented an enlargement of a traditional strategy of involving the field in contacting the Congress; in this recent case the field was actually brought to the Congress en masse.

### Systems

The systems employed by NASFAA in order to attain these strategies evolved through the two decades of its history from an informal, personal, basis to more elaborate and formalized efforts. Early systems for working with Congress involved relationships between a small group of aid administrators and a growing set of policymakers; in a similar manner liaison with other organizations initially was formed around the association of NASFAA leaders with their counterparts in the other groups. The system, as NASFAA struggled to carve out its own niche in the higher education subgovernment, was based upon the individual reputations of NASFAA leaders rather than on recognition of the Association itself. Personal connections among key individuals marked the limits of the early NASFAA systems in political influence and organizational liaison.

In the early 1970s more formal systems began to develop, especially the establishment of the committee and commission system in 1973. This new system was designed to promote a consensus approach to decision-making; the plan to add a director to the commission structure followed shortly in an attempt to coordinate the overlapping activities of the various committees. Still more modifications to the committee system were tried by Bob Huff and others succeeding him in the presidency. By the early 1980s the organization placed an increased reliance on the committees and commissions in directing the discussions of the National Council away from technical issues.

### Staff

A similar increase in reliance on staff paralleled this evolution of the committee and commission system. The Association began with no staff at all, and its first Executive Secretary began as a volunteer. The work of NASFAA was thus performed by elected leaders and volunteers in the field until 1972, when Dick Tombaugh moved to Washington as a part-time employee of the young Association. Tombaugh possessed organizational skills which enabled him to establish the central office as a necessary part of associational operations; but finances were so limited during his tenure with the Association that he was unable to expand the services of NASFAA in ways he might have wished. Dallas Martin, his successor, has become widely recognized as “Mr. Financial Aid,” and his skills both on a technical and a political level have propelled the Association into the forefront of the higher education subgovernment. Over the decade since he replaced Tombaugh, Martin has witnessed an accelerating shift in responsibilities from volunteers among the membership to a trained and efficient central office staff, and it has been in the skillfulness of that staff as well as of Martin himself that NASFAA has met with much of its success. The changing of Martin’s title to President (and of the title of the elected leader to Chairman) signifies the evolution of the roles of the salaried staff.

Indeed, greater reliance on the central staff, based upon their skillful approach to organizational objectives, became a system in itself by the early 1980s. As increased efforts to communicate with the membership through enhanced and expanded publications became possible after 1977, the nature of the responsibilities of staff underwent a change which has continued to mark the operations of the Association. The publications have been used to enhance membership skills and awareness and to mobilize the grass roots for legislative advocacy efforts. Additionally, the systems involving staff
in communications have been refined in the 1980s, with the advent of the Hotline and the delineation of specific responsibilities among staff members.

In the 1980s other systems continued to become more formalized. The joining of the ACE Secretariat, while confirming a relationship which had existed in the “Monday group” since 1978, also served to legitimize that relationship. So, too, did the adoption of positions by the National Council on the propriety of professional development initiatives at the national level, portending efforts to make the systems for goal attainment more formal. The initiation of a management study and a five-year planning effort in 1984 were additional evidence of the same process of formalization.

Structure
The structure of the Association had also evolved over its two decades of existence. It had begun as a loose confederation of interested individuals. There was no hurry to make this relationship more official; it took nearly three years to adopt the first set of by-laws. The initial structure of NSFAC/NASFAA was constructed around Allan Purdy and a small group of his colleagues. By the early 1970s the Association had begun to make some structural modifications in order to attain organizational viability, and by creating NIFAA and gaining tax exempt status NASFAA believed it had found the solution to its early financial crises. When these modifications failed to demonstrate sufficient success, the Association began its long process of converting from individual to institutional membership; that single step was unquestionably the most significant event in the history of the Association, since it finally provided the financial resources to conduct the business which had been desired since the founding meeting over a decade earlier.

At the same time the decision to become an institutional membership organization was being debated, the Association accelerated its transition from a benevolent oligarchy toward more democratic control. This in part was no doubt related to the enactment of Basic Grants in 1972; that program brought many institutions into financial aid for the first time and promoted also an awareness at the institutional level that aid administrators would require training. Since NASFAA was providing that training, it attracted new members who sought involvement in the activities of the Association. In its meetings, for example, NASFAA had begun with Council sessions open to member attendance. It had then moved to invitational Leadership Conferences, which broadened participation. In 1975 it began what has become an annual event, the conference to which all NASFAA members are invited. The growth of democratic procedures was further demonstrated by the changes which moved Council from strictly regional representation to slotted at-large positions and in the active solicitation of volunteers for assignment to committees and commissions. This trend accelerated in the late 1970s with the adoption of amended by-laws calling for the election of the president and at-large positions on Council directly by the membership rather than by Council and in the changing of representation to consist of a majority of at-large rather than regional positions.

In the 1980s Council itself tried to alter its own structure, becoming a Board of Directors acting on broad policy matters rather than debating ad infinitum on technical matters. Council was able to move in this direction because it placed increased reliance in the evolving staff and committee system. Still, this shift has not been a pure one. The dilemma for Council has been assuring the potential for full and open discussion of issues in order to provide a unified position which promotes the “common weal,” while not becoming bogged down in endless discussion. Insofar as this public debate can be attained through balanced and knowledgeable committees, the Council has been able to shift its focus away from technical issues. Analysis of the composition of the committees has affirmed the democratic processes which have been used to select members in the past. In order to function as a Board of Directors, however, Council would have to maintain sensitivity to diverse viewpoints and give continuing attention to the composition of committees.

Skills
The skills of the Association had similarly developed along with its importance over the years. In the beginning NASFAA was the beneficiary of the political skills of Allan Purdy; his abilities as a presenter of testimony and as a diplomat in dealing with other higher education associations carried the fledgling group further than it had any right to expect in 1966. By presenting themselves as technical experts the NASFAA “club” was able to fill a data void for the Congress, and thus they gained some early recognition. The main limitation of the early skill level of the Association was the smallness of the group which spoke for NASFAA; members in the field lacked the training and expertise in the political process to contribute to the efforts. The first Leadership Conference, in 1971, began to change that and to enlarge the group of people on whom NASFAA could call for help in political advocacy and other areas of associational effort.

As this group grew larger the skills became greater; the technical information needed by the Congress became more important in the early 1970s than it had been earlier, and NASFAA was in a position to capitalize on that situation. In addition, the Association began to enlarge its political efforts, calling on aid administrators and sometimes students and parents to contact Congress in support of positions favored by NASFAA. While this indicated growing political awareness and capabilities, NASFAA in the middle 1970s still had much to learn, as evidenced by the sub-minimum wage flap with Congressman O’Hara. Skills were limited in that period, too, by the regional perspectives which dominated the Council. Still, NASFAA had evident and increasing skills which were perhaps best illustrated in its serving so often as the medium of compromise between the service agencies. That ability to represent a diverse community would enhance NASFAA’s reputation among the higher education associations themselves in the late 1970s. That period saw increased capabilities in mobilizing the membership, students, and parents in letter-writing campaigns, and, while there were still political difficulties because of positions taken (such as the one on bankruptcy and student loans), Dallas Martin was particularly adept at anticipating those difficulties and thus finding ways to minimize them. Martin’s growing expertise became the hallmark of the organization; his attention to detail and ability to remember the vast complexities of aid programs, instantly calculating the impact of proposed changes on various groups, made it natural that policymakers turned to NASFAA for advice. In large part this was due to the extraordinary skills of the Executive Director, but
there was a group facility at work as well. In representing diversity yet speaking with a united voice NASFAA could command the consideration of policymakers. While Martin’s expertise probably attracted much of their initial interest and continued attention, the presence of an organized and informed group throughout the nation undoubtedly helped persuade the Congress not only to listen to Martin’s data but also to hold the NASFAA viewpoint in genuine esteem.

Thus the Association actually became involved in drafting legislation, first with the Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978, then with the reauthorization process in 1980, and since then with numerous technical amendments adopted by Congress in an effort to prevent executive encroachment on legislative intent. Such involvement has illustrated the broadening skills possessed by the Association. In addition, the 1980s have required an increased talent for monitoring the federal Department of Education. This boundary scanning by NASFAA has been time-consuming yet essential; the organization actually serves today as a watchdog for the Congress in heading off the Reagan Administration’s attempts to alter the aid system without first gaining legislative assent.

**Shared Values**

All these variables related to the shared values which form the core of NASFAA organizational culture. These values have centered on students and their well-being, on professionalism in the face of bureaucracy, and on attention to detail in program administration and in policy analysis. These values have had different faces through the years, as described above, but they have held remarkably consistent since NASFAA was founded. In its emphasis on the central value of client interest NASFAA has exhibited the behavior of a service organization. The happy result has been not the hiding of self interest behind a mask of service, but the creation of a collaborative system which has effectively served the interests of students while at the same time advancing the status of aid administrators. In this sense, and based upon the variables in the McKinsey 7-S Framework, NASFAA can be seen as a truly excellent organization. Its history has been one of goal attainment and progress, and its future, based upon its ability to plan and to monitor both its internal processes and the external environment, will certainly contain many additional achievements.

As Dallas Martin stated to a group of aid administrators at the beginning of NASFAA’s twentieth year, the future of student aid will be filled with many challenges and constraints, both budgetary and administrative. The past had been a true success story. Martin told the group in a statement evocative of the central values NASFAA holds. The dollars previously expended have “made it possible for our country to have a dream,” and while its promise has not been totally fulfilled, its very existence has enabled many people to share a dream which would otherwise have been impossible. Five years from now, Martin concluded, NASFAA would begin its twenty-fifth year. At that time he hoped to find the nation’s dream

a little more fulfilled. Let us hope that through educational opportunity peoples lives are better ... and let us also hope ... that we continue to make certain that all people, all races, young, old, rural, and those in cities, all have the same opportunities for enlightenment, knowledge, and a better life (Martin to National Conference, July, 1985).
BIBLIOGRAPHY


History of the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators and the National Institute for Financial Aid Administration. (1977?). Unpublished manuscript.


Trotter, V. Y. A bicentennial perspective on education. College and University, 50, 626-632.


Wooten, K. (1971). Is direct dialing more efficient or merely an affront to the index finger? Unpublished manuscript.